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ABSTRACT
Contemporary research and development settings are increasingly collabo-
rative and cooperative. Collaborative in the sense that they bring together
experts from different scientific and technical cultures in order to address
grand challenge science problems (e.g. climate change). Cooperative in the
sense that the research objects produced by and used in these collaborations
are broadly shared.
Successful long-term collaborations aren’t an accident - they require pur-
poseful coordination, clear communication, and adjustments made to both
human and technical infrastructures over time. Similarly, successful long-
term cooperation requires the ability to design governance and enforce rules
related to access, use, and ownership over shared resources.
Traditional approaches to the governance of scientific research struggle
to accommodate these novel forms of collaboration and cooperation. For
example,
• A marketplace model creates individual property rights through limited
monopolies, and
• A state-based model develops regulatory policies based on a single cen-
tralized authority.
A third model, the commons, mixes elements of both the market and
the state in providing a broad framework for cooperative resource sharing.
The commons has proven to be an effective governance strategy for sustain-
ing shared environmental resource systems, such as fisheries, pastures, and
forests. This dissertation explores the commons as a governance model for
sustaining shared resources in cooperative scientific research settings. It asks
how governance models used in cooperative research settings change over
time, and how, in practice, those models differ between domains of knowl-
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edge production. The relationship between sustainability, cooperation, and
governance is explored through two sets of studies:
• A longitudinal case study of the International Comprehensive Ocean
and Atmosphere (ICOADS), a collaborative project in climate science,
is developed to give an account of how a governance model evolves over
time.
• Drawing upon previously completed case studies of governance in as-
tronomy, biomedical, and genomic research settings, a comparative ac-
count is developed to show how governance differs between domains of
knowledge production.
In conducting these studies, an empirical framework is developed for ana-
lyzing different characteristics of a governance model. A number of concepts
from sociotechnical systems development are also addressed, including the
peering of provision and production activities in contemporary research set-
tings, polycentric models of governance, and the emergence of new types of
commons models, including the knowledge commons.
The results of this dissertation demonstrate that analytical frameworks
(similar to those used in socioecological systems) can produce reliable empir-
ical data about sustainability in a sociotechnical realm. In turn this data can
be used for a comparative study of sustainability in the sociotechnical sys-
tems used by contemporary science research and development. The results of
this dissertation also hold a number of important implications for science and
technology policy, including the efficacy of using a standardized framework
in designing new governance models for cooperative research projects.
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CHAPTER 1
GOVERNANCE FOR SUSTAINABILITY
1.1 Commons: Between Markets & States
Contemporary research and development activities in basic science are in-
creasingly cooperative. This includes the sharing or pooling of research ob-
jects (e.g. data, software, and instruments) as well as broad collaboration in
producing those products. Evidence of increased cooperation within contem-
porary science can be seen through indicators such as the growing number
of authors on peer-reviewed articles (Cronin, 2001), organizational diversity
in research grant applications (Fortin & Currie, 2013), and in the increased
financial support for research collaborations that combine expertise in two
or more research areas (for an overview see Jirotka, Lee, & Olson, 2013).
But, the cooperative features that mark contemporary research and de-
velopment activities also come at a time of intense competition for research
funding (Stephan, 2012), and the increased privatization of outputs from
basic science research (Mirowski, 2012; Graff et al., 2013). How then do
contemporary science institutions sustain a cooperative atmosphere within a
fiercely competitive environment? How and why do individual self-interests
give way to sharing initiatives that benefit a collective good? And what, if
anything, guarantees that these arrangements are a sustainable basis upon
which reliable scientific knowledge can be produced?
One way that questions about the sustainability of cooperation can be
answered is to look at the norms and rules developed for institutional gov-
ernance. For instance, governance analysis might help to understand what
rights users, producers, and funders have with regards to collaboratively pro-
duced data, the licenses that are attached to co-developed software, or the
ways that a community determines authorship on formal publications. These
aspects of governance partially capture the expectations and assumptions of
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an institution attempting to sustain cooperation over time.
Two traditional governance models used by scientific research projects
have been the market and the state; each of which struggles to accommodate
the collective aspects of contemporary research and development activities:
• Marketplaces use intellectual property rights and patents to grant pri-
vate ownership, and
• States tend to intervene in markets by subsiding innovation, and con-
sequently creating open-access resource systems which are limited in
their long-term sustainability.
Although the market and state models can be found in many domains
of the economy, in contemporary science and technology policy the two ap-
proaches have come to represent a tension between the commercialization of
science on the one hand and the “normative ”regulation of science on the
other (Merton, 1973; Heller & Eisenberg 1998; Rai 1999; Reichman & Uhlir
2003; Mirowski, 2011; Madison, 2014).
Between these two poles lies a middle ground — the commons. In prac-
tice the commons resemble institutional arrangements predicated on self-
organization and community governance at local levels and broad cooper-
ation, shared norms, and collective rule-making procedures at larger-scales
(Ostrom, 1990). The commons offer an institutional alternative to markets
and states, but this models is not fully separate from government subsidy
nor without answer to contemporary capital-based marketplace models.
Once we recognize that a binary distinction between markets and states
is an oversimplification of the organizational models of governance in con-
temporary science the commons begin to appear ubiquitous in contemporary
research and development settings: they are the shared libraries of open-
source software that run high-performance computing centers; the research
data archives which enable whole earth climate simulations on a petabyte
scale; and the instrumentation at the center of massive collaborations such
as observatories in astronomy and particle colliders in high-energy physics.
But although the commons appear to be a pervasive phenomenon in sci-
ence and technology settings there is little empirical understanding of how
these types of institutional arrangements are successful over time; there is
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a lack of understanding about which governance arrangements enable sus-
tainable knowledge production, when, under what circumstances, and for
how long; and, there is yet to emerge a systematic way of collecting data to
compare across these different contexts.
This dissertation takes an initial step towards understanding the role of
governance in sustaining research and development activities that depend on
shared resource systems. In doing so this work develops a systematic ap-
proach to studying the governance of sociotechnical systems for cooperation.
In the following sections the relationship between this dissertation and
previous works on the commons, sustainability, and governance in the so-
cioecological realm are further discussed.
1.2 A Systematic Approach to Governing the
Knowledge Commons
The commons have proven to be an institutional arrangement especially ef-
fective for sustaining socioecological systems that couple people, technolo-
gies, and environmental issues of a complex nature (Dietz, Ostrom & Stern,
2003). For instance, commons governance models are often used in the shared
management of forests (Agrawal, 2007), aquifers (Cox, 2010), and fisheries
(Acheson, 1988). Examples of these successes can also be found at a number
of different scales and locales; ranging from effective international treaties-
such as the Montreal Protocol (Epstein et al., 2014) - to the preservation of
natural resources in rural villages - such as irrigation technologies found in
Nepal (Lam, 1998).
Like the state and marketplace models the commons have their own lim-
itations including a susceptibility to social dilemmas of collective action (Ol-
son, 1965). What the diverse body of literature on the commons teaches
us is that what works in one socioecological setting may prove ineffective in
another (Ostrom, 2010). In short, contextual variables matter to the success
of a governance model for sustainability (Ostrom, 1998).
A salient example of how context effects sustainability can be found in
fisheries literature. In this domain, regulations on landings (total amounts
of a catch measured in millions of kilograms) are often enforced through
different governance regimes. In the same geographic locations facing the
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Figure 1: Two landings in millions of kilograms over time. Dotted lines
show lobster populations thriving, and the blue line shows the Atlantic Cod’s
stock collapse. Both fisheries represent approximately the same location,
but managed under different governance regimes. Figure taken from (Dietz,
Ostrom & Stern, 2003).
same biophysical conditions certain fisheries may collapse, such as Atlantic
Cod which were managed under state regulation, while other fisheries thrive,
such as lobsters managed under a self-organized commons regime (Dietz,
Ostrom & Stern, 2003).
The lesson to learn from the fisheries example above is not that the com-
mons are the best solution, but that given the two context, commons are
effective for sustaining lobster stocks while state-based regulation leads to
instability for cod stocks.
By developing a comprehensive framework for studying related socioe-
cological systems, commons scholars like Elinor Ostrom have been able to
generate a deep understanding of which types of social dilemmas require
which kinds of governance systems (Acheson, 2012). This empirical agenda
has reinforced the notion that the effectiveness of rules (Walker et al., 2000;
Sigmund et al., 2010), sanctions (Bardhan, 1993; Agrawal, 2003), and policy
instruments (Grafton, 2000; Armitage, 2007) depend greatly on the context
in which they are deployed (Dietz, Ostrom & Stern, 2003). It has allowed
policy makers to look critically at contextual variables and avoid adopting
panaceas for all resource systems in all contexts.
While there is much to learn from the socioecological literature, includ-
ing the techniques used to gather and analyze case study data, a one-to-one
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mapping will not be perfect between the natural resource systems of Os-
troms study and the purposefully designed and engineered systems that are
the subject of this dissertation. Sociotechnical systems are complicated not
only by the sophistication of their users and the rapid evolution of their tech-
nologies, but also because they are purposefully engineered systems that are
designed to achieve ends that are imbued with the values and morals of their
stakeholders.
This normative dimension of sociotechnical systems has recently been ad-
dressed through the notion of “culturally constructed” resources managed as
“knowledge commons” (Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, 2010). Where
natural commons are the institutions, resource sets, and interactions gov-
erned in a socioecological system, the knowledge commons are the coopera-
tive arrangements that share, curate, produce, provision, and sustain infor-
mational resources within a sociotechnical system.
Initial studies of the knowledge commons argue that sociotechnical gover-
nance is critical to sustainable knowledge production. Frischmann, Madison
and Standburg, explain, “The nested, multi-tiered character of productive
and sustainable knowledge and information systems and the diversity of
attributes that contribute to successful governance regimes are key to un-
derstanding knowledge commons as mechanisms for knowledge production,
collection, curation, and distribution in the context of modern information
and IP law regimes”(2014 p. 17).
In order to better understand the ways in which governance impacts the
sustainability of cooperative scientific institutions, this dissertation answers
two broad research questions:
• RQ 1. What are the effective institutional arrangements (governance)
for sustainable scientific knowledge commons?
• RQ 2. How do these arrangements differ between domains of knowl-
edge production?
These questions are answered in two ways. First, findings from a longitu-
dinal case study of the International Comprehensive Ocean and Atmosphere
(ICOADS) are presented. This analysis is guided by the adaptation of a
socioecological framework that has previously been used to trace how a gov-
ernance model evolves over time. Then, drawing upon previously completed
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case studies of governance in astronomy, biomedical, and genomic research
settings, a comparative account is developed to show how governance differs
between domains of knowledge production throughout science.
The remaining sections of this chapter introduce the case study subject
(ICOADS) and justify the importance of this sociotechnical system for un-
derstanding the relationship between governance and sustainability. A full
discussion of the background environment for ICOADS appears in Chapter
4.
1.3 Research Context and Rationale
The International Comprehensive Ocean and Atmosphere Dataset (ICOADS)
is a cooperative project that curates, develops and distributes quality con-
trolled data, metadata, historical documentation, and software to the climate
science community. The project, originally named COADS, was initiated in
1981 by federal agencies, such as NOAA and NCAR, in the USA. Over time
the project grew to include many international collaborators, and was re-
named the “International COADS.”
Contemporary data curated by ICOADS come from a variety of sources,
including the Global Telecommunications System (GTS), in-situ measure-
ments taken by sea-faring vessels, earth observing satellites, and both drift-
ing and moored buoys. Historical data come from an effort in the early 1980s
to aggregate existing marine data records from maritime archives around the
world, as well as a continual stream of historical records that have been redis-
covered and newly digitized. A small but important contribution of new data
come from the use of crowd-sourcing efforts to transcribe weather recordings
taken by military, shipping, and whaling voyages from the 17th, 18th, and
19th century (Brohan et al., 2009). These early records are significant cul-
turally and historically, as “Ssailors were among the first to systematically
record the weather because the states of ocean and atmosphere controlled
their progress and survival” (Woodruff et al., 1987).
The labor-intensive process of taking heterogeneous records from different
observing platforms, and uniformly processing and integrating the data into
a larger set of historical observations is the major value of ICOADS ongoing
work. This includes the preservation of provenance metadata that is recorded
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for each individual record, allowing a researcher to trace backwards in time
to verify whether the source of a climate anomaly is genuine or the result of
a data processing error (Worley et al., 2005).
Free and open access to ICOADS has helped it become recognized by
the climate community as the “most complete and heterogeneous collection
of surface marine data in existence” (Woodruff et al., 2011). ICOADS data
have been used extensively in international climate assessments such as the
IPCC AR4 and AR5 reports, as well as reanalysis projects that combine his-
torical data with contemporary weather observations to create authoritative
datasets for the climate modeling community (Kalnay et al., 1996).
The success and widespread use of ICOADS has not resulted in greater
stability for the funding of the project. This is due in part to the diffi-
culty in calculating the research impact of many different ICAODS products
(Weber et al., 2014), as well as an overall decrease in federal funding for
the maintenance of research infrastructures (Berman and Cerf, 2013). The
politicization of climate related research has also impacted ICOADS funding
in recent years as congressional pressure to defund climate research continues
to mount.
In the winter of 2012, this became a major issue for the sustainability of
the project, as NOAA announced that, “For budgetary reasons, stemming
from pending large cuts at the NOAA Climate Program Office (CPO), ESRL
Directors have determined that it is no longer feasible for its Physical Science
Division (PSD) to continue supporting any further ICOADS work effective
immediately” (NOAA, 2012).
In response, project partners at the National Center for Atmospheric
Research (NCAR), the UK Meteorological Office, and the Deutscher Wet-
terdienst (German Meteorological Service) signed a memorandum of under-
standing to continue contributing to the maintenance of the project and its
various resources. The research of this dissertation was conducted beginning
at the point that signatures for a memorandum of understanding were signed.
It is argued that ICOADS offers a unique case for studying the sustain-
ability of a knowledge commons for the following reasons:
• Project partners are diverse in terms of their organizational affiliations
and expertise. As such, ICOADS is nested within a number of overlap-
ping governance structures, which impact the coordination and coop-
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eration of individual actors. The relationship between individuals and
their institutional affiliations represents an opportunity to understand
which relationships are valued, and under what circumstances.
• Climate science is a unique domain of knowledge production in that it
necessarily requires a broad scheme of cooperation in order to generate
verifiable research results (for a thorough overview, see Edwards, 2011).
Additionally, the research results from climate science are some of the
most scrutinized and politically charged forms of knowledge production
in contemporary research and development settings.
• The resource sets provisioned by ICOADS have persisted over a thirty
year period that has seen a number of fluctuations in funding, the
politicization of the subject matter, and rapid technological change.
ICOADS therefore presents an opportunity to better understand how
diverse resource sets consisting of software, data, human expertise, and
computational infrastructures are sustained over time.
1.4 Structure of Document
In conducting a case study of ICOADS sustainability, and in answering the
research questions stated above, this dissertation takes the following struc-
ture:
• In Chapter 2, literature relevant to the emergence of the commons and
scientific cooperation is reviewed. This chapter focuses on the similari-
ties and differences between socioecological systems and sociotechnical
systems. It suggests ways that the findings from commons theory may
be applicable to contemporary science and technology settings, includ-
ing the adaptation of empirical frameworks from Elinor Ostrom’s work
on common pool resources. An extended review of studies that have
previously addressed the topic of sociotechnical sustainability is offered,
including the introduction of “peer-production” as a major theme of
the analysis found in Chapters 4 and 5.
• Chapter 3 describes methods used for data collection as well as the
approach to organizing and analyzing the results of the ICOADS case
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study. The range of methods used for data collection include a set of
scientometric studies, an ethnography, and archival document analysis.
It is argued that the features of a sociotechnical system, described in
depth through Chapter 2, are amenable to a “systematic approach” to
governance through the development of an empirical framework. The
structure of that framework is then described in the third chapter, and
operationalized in the fourth.
• Chapter 4 presents an analysis of the case study data organized by
the Knowledge Commons Framework (Frischmann, Madison & Strand-
burg, 2014). In this chapter the background, attributes, and governance
models of ICOADS are historically contextualized. The current prac-
tices of the ICOADS governance are described in detail and a number
of variables which capture important features of sustainable governance
are described.
• Chapter 5 further analyzes the ICOADS case study data by adapt-
ing portions of the Social-Ecological Systems Meta-Analysis Database
(SESMAD) schema (Cox, 2014) to a sociotechnical context. After an
extended discussion of the implications of results from the ICOADS
case study, this data is then compared to previously completed case
studies of sustainability in genomics, rare-disease research, and astron-
omy. Research question 1 and 2 are answered at the conclusion of this
chapter.
• Chapter 6 discusses the limitations and implications of the results from
this study. These findings are contextualized for three audiences: sci-
ence and technology policymakers, practitioners involved in the gover-
nance of cooperative scientific institutions, and theorists / scholars of
the commons. The dissertation concludes with future directions of the
research agenda described throughout.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter reviews literature relevant to the governance and sustainabil-
ity of shared resource systems, including commons theory. The chapter is
divided into four main sections: Section 1 provides a history of commons
theory, and describes how shared resource systems have been studied in eco-
nomics. In section 2, various models of governance are reviewed, including
the work of Elinor Ostrom in “Governing the Commons” (1990). Section
3 reviews the findings of research projects that have previously addressed
sustainability in sociotechnical systems, and argues that a major gap - that
of a normative account of sustainability- is present in the current literature.
Section 4 describes the phenomena of peer-production, and argues that the
division of labor in commons-based science collaborations should be studied
through this lens.
2.1 A Brief History of Commons Theory
In the first half of the twentieth-century classical economic theory recognized
two systems of producing, distributing, and provisioning resources: markets,
and states. The market was to be a loosely regulated domain where pricing
signals would direct self-interested actors exchanging goods and services to
satisfy their individual preferences. The other system - the state - was to
be responsible for provisioning public services that may go under-produced
if left open to a pure marketplace model. Examples of these public goods
include the repair of roads, the delivery of basic utilities, etc. In short,
classical economics created a binary organizational model: the market was
for private enterprises like bakers, butchers and brewers, and the state was for
public utilities such as lighthouses, railways, and infrastructures (Frischmann,
2005).
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In the second half of the twentieth-century, economists and political sci-
entists developed a more nuanced view of the organizational models that
effectively operate within society. One of the most contested and poorly
understood models of organizing was the commons, which seemed destined
to fail based on long-held assumptions about self-interested actors and the
effect of unregulated markets (Hardin, 1968; Olson, 1965).
In the sections that follow I briefly describe the empirical agenda devel-
oped to test whether or not these assumptions were true. The implications
of these findings are relevant to this dissertation in that many current mod-
els of governance for scientific cooperation are based on either marketplace
price signals or a state subsidy. It is argued that instead of the market or
state being the only two options, there are in fact many governance models
that may be applicable to contemporary research organizations, including
the commons.
2.1.1 ‘Tragedy of the Commons’
In 1968 Garret Hardin penned a short but highly influential article in ‘Sci-
ence’ that described a hypothetical dilemma facing a shared resource system.
In Hardin’s scenario a set of herdsman are grazing their cattle on an open pas-
ture where consumption is unrestrained as a result of commons governance.
Hardin writes:
Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase
his herd without limit - in a world that is limited. Ruin is the
destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best
interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons.
Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all. (1968, p. 1244)
Hardin’s ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ presents a standard externality prob-
lem that results from failed collective action (Aligica & Boettke, 2009). The
inevitable collapse of the commons that Hardin predicts is built on an as-
sumption that resource users act independently, and solely for their own
self-interest. The solution set that Hardin offers consists of two approaches
from classical economics: 1. Enclosure, where land is privately parceled out
for individual ownership (e.g. a market); or, 2. Management by a centralized
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government that could prohibit overgrazing through regulatory policy (e.g.
a state).
Hardin’s hypothetical scenario makes an important early observation about
the difficulty of sustaining a shared resource system when communication be-
tween users is limited. However, a number of scholars have since pointed out
that as a critique of the commons Hardin’s scenario is flawed in a number of
ways: the resource system he describes is not necessarily a commons, but an
open-access management regime (with no regulation or limits to use), and his
assumptions about rational actors independent of collective conscious turns
out to be greatly oversimplified (e.g. Stiglitz, 2012), especially when com-
pared with the results of commons governance in real world scenarios (for an
overview see Taylor, 1990).
To better understand shared resource management and how it operates
in practice it is necessary to first review the classification of goods based
on two dimensions: their rivalry and their excludability. Then, by looking
closely at the governance regimes that are adopted to manage access and use
of goods across these classifications it will become clearer why the tragedy
of the commons scenario is flawed. These resource classifications also help
to clarify what is really at stake in the design and adoption of different
governance models for shared resource systems in contemporary science.
2.1.2 Classifying Goods: Rivalry and Excludability
Economic resources can generally be classified along two dimensions: rivalry
and excludability.
Along the first dimension, a good with rivalry can be owned or consumed
by a limited number of individuals. A rivalrous good is finite in this sense, and
its value is largely a function of the limited nature of its ownership (Ostrom
& Ostrom, 1999). A resource with no, or even low degrees of rivalry can be
shared among a large number of individuals without the value of the good
being significantly harmed - its value then is a function of its accessibility
and shareability.
The other classification of goods turns on the question of whether or not
it is economically efficient to create barriers (exclusion) to the consumption
of a resource. A high degree of excludability, means that it is both possible
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Figure 2: The classification of goods by degrees of rivalry (substitution)
and excludability.
and economically efficient to create a barrier to access or use (Ostrom &
Ostrom, 1999).
At the intersection of rivalry and excludability is where resource categories
emerge: private goods, like a loaf of bread, have high degrees of both rivalry
and excludability; club goods, like a country club, are excludable, but lack
high degrees of rivalry; common pool resources, like a grazing pasture,
often lack excludability, but have at least some degree of rivalry; and, public
goods, like an ocean or a lighthouse, have low degrees of both rivalry and
excludability (Ostrom & Ostrom, 1999). In some goods a population can
claim exclusive ownership (such as private or club goods), and in others the
power of ownership is distributed or collectively shared (such as common
pool resources and public goods).
While these are not absolute or exhaustive categories of economic re-
sources, this matrix provides a useful heuristic for developing both resource
management and governance models. I turn next to models that have proven
useful in sustaining common pool resources, and public goods - classifications
that apply to many basic science research products.
2.2 Governing the Commons
Commons governance is marked by the absence of a hierarchical power to
determine the rights of use or access to a resource (Benkler, 2014). Instead
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of hierarchy, resources are managed through community governance that in-
cludes the adoption of rules, and an adherence to normative standards of
behavior. Much of the early literature that addressed commons governance
came from the research of Elinor Ostrom and colleagues working in socioe-
cological systems management (e.g. V. Ostrom, Bish & Ostrom, 1988). A
repeated finding of this work is that small, well-bounded commons not only
outperform other models of governance, but oftentimes state intervention
actually leads to a decrease in the efficiency of these institutions (Ostrom,
1990). These early findings directly refuted the tragedy of the commons the-
sis, and moved the empirical research agenda of the commons towards two
broad questions:
1. Which type of governance models most effectively provision resources
that require collective action (e.g. public goods and common-pool re-
sources)?
2. How do novelties in the design of institutions for collective action im-
pact their ability to provision a resource set? That is to say, if context
matters for sustainability, then what effect does it have on the design of
similar commons in different contexts, and different commons in similar
contexts? (Ostrom & Hess, 2007)
To make progress on these questions, Ostrom and colleagues developed
a broad framework for both gathering and analyzing empirical data on the
various institutional arrangements that were used for governing socioecolog-
ical systems (e.g. Ostrom, 2007; Cox, 2014). These collaboratively devel-
oped frameworks established the data that were be collected about different
commons - including the definition of variables, the specific units of measure-
ment for those variables, the statistical tests which were to be run on those
variables, and the design of shared databases to report those variables (see
McGinnis, 2011 for thorough historical overview of this process). This stan-
dardization was done so that governance models used in different contexts
could be compared, and the results of these comparisons could then be used
for consensus policy-making (Cole, 2014).
Below, it is argued that the systematic approach developed to study gov-
ernance in and across different socioecological systems should be adaptable
to the study of sociotechnical systems. This assumption is based on a reading
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of this relationship as follows: the knowledge commons (made up of informa-
tional resources) are to sociotechnical systems, just as the natural commons
(containing environmental resources) are to socioecological systems.
Before turning to the similarities and differences between these two types
of systems, I will briefly review some of the important findings from the CPR
literature, and the extension of this work to public goods. This review is to
demonstrate the types of findings that can be generated by using empiri-
cal frameworks to study governance, and to set up a comparison between
the existing body of literature on CPRs, and the results of this dissertation
(examined in detail in Chapter 5).
2.2.1 Relevant Findings from CPR research
In most commons settings bundled rights are established through rules; some
formally and legally enforceable, and others informal and community policed.
The socioecological literature draws an important distinction between two
rule types: those written down and codified being the “rules-in-form,” and
those unspoken, tacit, and community enforced being the “rules-in-use” (for a
full summary see Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker, 1994). Critical to understand-
ing the proper functioning, and long-term success of a commons is finding
ways to observe how institutions for collective action (commons) establish,
enforce, and evolve rules-in-use to effectively deal with social dilemmas that
result in sharing resources (Ostrom, 2007).
Because collective action is a micro-economic concern, the focus of this
type of work is on how these dilemmas are solved amongst individuals with
competing interests; that is, the unit of observation is often individual actors,
but the unit of analysis - what is the major thrust of the research analysis-
is the institutional arrangements that govern these actions (Taylor, 1990).
Solutions for collective action dilemmas, especially in the context of envi-
ronmental common-pool resources, are often found in the development of
rule types that establish and in some cases prescribe a number of different
expectations for commons stakeholders (Ostrom, 2007). Over time, socioe-
cological scholars have been able to create a categorization of rule types
used in collective action institutions, including the following types: bound-
ary, position, informational, authority, aggregation, scope, and payoff rules
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(McGinnis 2011; see glossary for full definition of each rule type).
The study of these rule types hold a number of important implications for
the study of sociotechnical systems, including the following findings: com-
munity governance is most successful in sustaining shared resources when
social capital is symmetrically distributed (i.e. there are few gatekeepers)
(Agrawal, 2003); communities that are small, and well mapped geographi-
cally often have an easier time creating accepted sanctions (Cox, 2012); and,
long-term sustainability in commons requires that stakeholders whom are
most dependent on a pooled resource have what is known as a “low discount
rate” or a “willingness to sacrifice current payoffs for higher payoffs in the
future.” (Acheson, 2011; Ostorm, 1990; 1994; 2007)
In sum, research on effective governance of the commons was furthered
by the collaborative development of a framework to reliably compare across
different types of systems, and through careful and diligent synthesis of these
results. Over time, these results have led scholars like Ostrom to produce
general institutional design criteria of lasting policy impact (Ostrom, 2007).
The goal of this dissertation is to begin to move sociotechnical scholarship
in the same empirical direction.
2.2.2 Comedy of the Commons
It is often assumed that the social dilemmas of common-pool resources (CPRs)
are the social dilemmas faced by all commons. For instance social dilemmas
found in many CPRs, such as the free rider problem, are also found in di-
verse open-access regimes (e.g. Acheson, 1990), and the zero-contribution
thesis of collective action is often found in both small-scale and large-scale
cooperative projects (Olson, 1965).
However, commons that include the production and provision of public
goods often face problems of congestion (overuse) that differ substantively
from the CPR context made famous by Ostorm and colleagues. Work that
addresses these differences began with Carol Rose, a lawyer, in the late 1980’s
writing about the “inherent public property” of goods such as waterways,
the atmosphere, and public beaches (1986). Rose asked how, and to what
degree, common law establishes a set of rights for public access to these
resources (1986). Her argument was that in the absence of congestion these
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types of resources create positive spillover effects - and hence have substantial
economic value not often afforded to public goods. In short, public goods are
the infrastructure for a number of downstream innovations - and the freedom
to operate within those infrastructures should be inherent, not just by virtue
of their being large and difficult to exclude access, but because they create
great wealth (Frischmann, 2005).
Rose coined a phrase to refer to the spillover effects of these common
rights as a ”comedy of the commons”; and she then went on to show, through
a number of case studies, how in distributing access and usage rights to
public goods made individual actors value the resource more, and in turn
become complicit in the effective provisioning of the shared resource system
(Benkler, 2014). As Rose argues, investment in such coordinating costs would
be prohibitively expensive using either a market or state based model of
organization. It was only through a commons, with symmetrical rights to
operate effectively shared by all resources users, that innovation occurred
rapidly (2014).
Rose’s work on public goods and the comedy of the commons holds many
important lessons for informational goods and knowledge commons - includ-
ing the ways in which users become complicit in the maintenance or upkeep
of a freely shared resource. Examples of this can be seen in Wikipedia knowl-
edge sharing (Antin & Cheshire, 2010) and open-source software user / devel-
oper relations (Weber, 2004). The comedy of the commons offers an explana-
tion of collective action that goes beyond altruism, and helps to explain how
it is that public goods can be maintained over time when there are limited
individual ownership rights. For contemporary research and development in
basic science, things like software, databases, and cyberinfrastructures are
the basis of much downstream innovation. How it is that these types of re-
sources are maintained over time is a matter of collective action, coordinated
largely by making users of these platforms complicit in their upkeep. The
comedy of the commons therefore provides a useful point of reference for this
work, which focuses on the ways in which comedic effects of shared resource
systems are sustained over time, even in the face of fierce competition.
The following sections explore commons outside of the environmental sys-
tems that dominate Ostrom and Rose’s research. The focus is specifically on
how governance regimes for sustainable commons evolve for informational
goods, and how these institutions leverage networked information commu-
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nication technologies to organize scientific research activities in new ways.
Much of this work is predicated on the idea that collective action problems
emerge around both the production and provisioning of informational goods
in ways that differ from environmental resources. The argument advanced is
that “knowledge commons” such as open-source software projects (Schweik &
English, 2012); genomic data archives (Contreras, 2010); and telecommuni-
cations infrastructures (Frischmann, 2005) face dilemmas of collective action
at both a point of initial production, as well as in the sustaining and pro-
visioning of the resource sets over time. In these domains, the initial terms
upon which cooperation is founded play an important, and non-trivial role
in the structure of later governance models (O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007).
2.2.3 Informational Goods and Knowledge Commons
For environmental resource sets managed as commons, the following were
generally true:
1. Resource boundaries were clear.
2. Resource systems were small and easy to observe.
3. Solving social dilemmas was of high importance to appropriators (fun-
ders, land users, governments, etc.)
4. Institutions were long enduring, and evolved rules and sanctions over
equally long periods of time. (Hess & Ostrom, 2005)
Nearly all of these features are the opposite for commons that deal with
informational goods. These resource systems are typically large and have un-
clear boundaries. Information-based knowledge commons often form rapidly
and without plans for long-term maintenance in mind; and, this is especially
true of the types of research and development projects in science, which are
typically funded through short-term government sponsored grants (Ribes &
Finholt, 2009).
From the Socioecological to Sociotechnical
Two other important distinctions mark the knowledge commons, and it is
argued that both of these features are critical to understanding the role of
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a governance for sustaining shared resource systems in the sociotechnical
domain: 1. Knowledge commons are purposefully engineered and as such
come with a set of normative concerns for their design and evolution; and, 2.
The actors within knowledge commons play many different roles, which blurs
a traditional distinction between content producers and content consumers.
1. Knowledge commons are almost always purposefully engineered sys-
tems. That is to say, they are designed and built instead of natu-
rally occurring. Therefore, to analyze the effectiveness of a governance
model in the knowledge commons one needs to also be concerned with
the values or background assumptions upon which a commons has been
designed and built.
Herbert Simon’s work on a ‘Science of the Artificial’ describes another
important aspect of built environments - they evolve within a context
of use (1981). In Chapter 5, it is argued that an account of this brand
of commons needs to attend to the intentions of design and to the
adaptation of artificial things, in use. To do so, the concept of “selective
pressures” is used to describe how and when a knowledge commons
adapts to external pressures.
2. Related to the normative implications of design and engineering, there
is a blurring of traditional user, producer, or consumer roles within the
knowledge commons. This is especially true within shared resource sys-
tems related to informational goods, where resource flows are no longer
bi-directional (producer to consumer), but are instead n-dimensional
(Dourish, 2010); producers of an informational good in one context of-
ten become users of the same resource in a different context (Benkler,
2006).
Stakeholders of the knowledge commons both use pooled resources and
contribute to the provisioning of those resources over time (Benkler,
2006). These blurred distinctions result in a number of social dilemmas,
such as the continuation of a “Matthew Effect” in hyper-authorship net-
works (Glnzel & Schuber, 2005), identity disambiguation in the process
of attributing knowledge claims (Fegley & Torvik, 2013), large collab-
orations that do not have a clear chain of ownership for intellectual
property (Reichman & Uhlir, 2003), and the distributed nature of most
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eScience infrastructure development, which complicates a clear distinc-
tion between production and provision (Fry, Schroder & den Besten,
2011). Many successful collaborative projects include a scenario where
an actor is enabled to modify, change, or improve a given technology
for his or her own research while simultaneously making those modifi-
cations, changes and improvements available for others to use (Howsion
& Herblseb, 2013).
Purposefully built systems containing “artificial things” that evolve through
use and a collapse between traditional roles of economic actors in producing,
using, and provisioning informational goods are what marks sociotechnical
systems as a unique branch of the knowledge commons research agenda. The
next two sections specifically focus on previous studies of sustainability in sci-
ence and technology settings and concludes by describing the emergence of
peer-production and its relevance to the research project at hand.
2.3 Sustainability
The socioecological systems literature contains a number of different con-
ceptualizations of sustainability, three of which will be reviewed here: re-
source sufficiency, functional integrity, and normative accountability. These
approaches are described in order to characterize contemporary research on
the sustainability of sociotechnical systems found in science and technology
studies.
Resource sufficiency is a technical approach to environmental steward-
ship that is generally concerned with two measurement problems related to
sustainable practices; The first measurement problem is to accurately cap-
ture the rate of consumption for any given resource system; and, the second
measurement problem is concerned with estimating the stock of available
resources. To characterize sustainability of a socioecological system through
resource sufficiency then is to match consumption practices with rates of
stock regeneration (Moore, 2010).
Functional integrity is a systems-based approach to sustainability prac-
tices. In this paradigm, a “practice that creates a threat to the system’s ca-
pacity for reproducing itself over time is said to be unsustainable” (Thomp-
son, 1997). A functional integrity approach requires modeling reproduction
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cycles and the practices that effect these cycles over time. Functional in-
tegrity could also be conceived of as a risk management approach to systems
sustainability.
To compare and contrast these first two conceptions of sustainability -
resource sufficiency is utilitarian in that it conceives of sustainability as an
outcome of balancing resource stocks and flows (Moore, 2011). Functional
integrity leans towards a communal, albeit cautious, view of risk in relation
to the stability of broad systems, including social, economic, political, as well
as environmental.
A third approach offered by both environmental economists and philoso-
phers is to extend the systems thinking of functional integrity to a normative,
values-based model. A normative accountability approach to sustain-
ability emphasizes the impact that production and provisioning - otherwise
grouped together as development practices - have on the environment, soci-
ety, and the economy. An example of this approach is as follows, “We define
sustainable agricultural development in this paper as an agricultural system
which over the long run, enhances environmental quality and the resource
base on which agriculture depends, provides for basic human food and fiber
needs, is economically viable, and enhances the quality of life of farmers and
society as a whole” (Davis & Lanham, 1995, p. 21-22). Normative account-
ability is unique from both resource sufficiency and functional integrity in
that it conceives of a target that sustainable development practices or poli-
cies should be aimed.
Sustaining Sociotechnical Systems
In the following section, these three notions of socioecological sustainability
are mapped onto contemporary work on sociotechnical systems sustainability.
Literature reviewed in this section comes from the fields of science and tech-
nology studies (STS) and Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW).
Ribes and Finholt
Ribes and Finholt studied the design and deployment of “e-infrastructure”
by doing a longitudinal cross-case analysis of the daily work practices of
“sustaining research facilities” in universities and federally funded research
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centers (FFRDCs) (2009). They describe the problematic nature of research
funding cycles that are misaligned with sustainability work, saying in partic-
ular that long-term infrastructure is primarily an institutional consideration,
beyond the scope of any single project or discipline. (2009, p. 377) Their
findings are broadly construed as implications for the funding of future cy-
berinfrastructure work, as they describe the various tensions in the deploy-
ment of a technology, and its maintenance over a relatively short period of
time (2 years).
Overall, this study uses a resource sufficiency approach to systems sus-
tainability. The authors describe how resource flows, constrained by financial
support from the USA government, impact stocks of knowledge and infras-
tructural maintenance required for a sustainable research enterprise.
Bietz, Baumer, and Lee
A series of studies by Bietz, Baumer, and Lee explains the “work” of sus-
taining genomics cyberinfrastructures, which they describe through the con-
cept “synergizing.” Sustainable sociotechnical systems in this domain are
made possible through the “...work that developers of infrastructure do to
build and maintain productive relationships among people, organizations,
and technologies” (2012). Their concern for invisible or overlooked work in
genomics database maintenance emphasizes the emergent phenomena of a
complex system. As such, they conclude that cyberinfrastructure sustain-
ability is “less about maintaining any particular technology than it is about
being prepared to accommodate technological, scientific and organizational
change;” accommodating this change is best achieved when maintaining sys-
tems level functionality (2012, p. 8). They briefly touch on the flexibility in
the rules developed by the genomics community to govern shared resources
but do not tie these to sustainability per-se.
Bietz, Baumer, and Lee conceive of sustainability as functional integrity
of a system, acknowledging that “emergent” phenomena within a work-group
are impacted by removing one or another member. The authors stress the
need for accommodating change by identifying disruptive forces within a
cycle of knowledge production and suggest that the work of adaptation be
labeled “synergy.”
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Kee and Browning
Kee and Browning focused on the funding infrastructure of developing new,
shared high-performance computing centers for scientific applications (2010).
They propose to treat these issues as “dialectical tensions” , with “five sets
of seemingly opposing forces on three levels of institutions, individuals, and
ideologies” (2010, p. 285). Kee and Brownings conclusions are that the
longevity and sustainability of an infrastructure is compromised, “...when it
is based on short-term commitments and part-time attention of a distributed
group of technologists...” (2010, p. 286). Their proposal is to conduct further
work on the long-term, historical implications of such small funding cycles.
Like Ribes and Finholt, this study takes a resource sufficiency approach
to sustainability. The author’s focus on balancing inputs to a sociotechnical
system, such as dollars in grant funding and private sector support, with
tangible, measurable outputs. The “dialectical tensions” are positioned as
naturally occurring between desires to increase one set of stocks or flows over
another.
Vertesi and Dourish
At NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) Vertesi and Dourish studied two
research teams working on the same spacecraft mission. This work produced
a cross-case comparison of data sharing and resource pooling. They describe
a number of sociotechnical features that complicate the open exchange of
data, including an analogy to different types of data having currency within
a larger research “data economy” (2011). Their findings emphasize a need
to develop systems with a concern for “data infrastructures that reflect and
secure data sharing practices specific to each scientific collaboration” (2011,
p. 9).
Vertesi and Dourish are concerned with how policy aimed at increasing
data sharing in federal laboratories will impact the sustainability of effec-
tive collaborative arrangements at JPL. In practice this work resembles a
functional integrity approach to sustainability by focusing on cycles in which
data are produced and how the practices and policies of managing that data
then impact long-term collaborations.
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Fry, Schroder and den Besten
In a series of in-depth interviews with principle investigators of eScience
projects in the UK, Fry, Schroder and den Bensten investigated “research
governance at the institutional level and local research practices at the project
level” (2008, p.6). Their work asked research questions about both the sus-
tainability of eScience infrastructure models and further to what extent they
promoted openness in sharing research products and collaborating. Their
findings indicate that, “The fundamental challenge in resolving openness in
practice and policy, and thereby moving towards a sustainable infrastructure
for e-Science, is the coordination and integration of goals across e-Science ef-
forts, rather than one of resolving IPR (Intellectual Property Rights) issues,
which has been the central focus of openness debates thus far” (2008, p.6).
The authors note that they identified a number of conflicts between contrac-
tual governance at a micro-level and project settings (institutional contexts)
at a macro-level — which introduced uncertainty for the sustainability and
trust between different collaborators.
Fry, Schroder and den Besten are engaged in a normative account of
sustainability, as they conclude with a discussion of different approaches to
evaluation between researchers and their funding agents; “Such a schism
may be because contractual and institutional arrangements in science have
traditionally focused on final products (or outcomes) of projects such as pub-
lications, compounds or genes, rather than engaging at the level of knowledge
creation. This is a particular issue for e-Research as there is more of an impe-
tus to disseminate and share by-products such as software code and data not
used in final results” (2008, p. 23). They are concerned not just with target
communities of sustainability, but with an approach that sees sustainability
in terms of justice for future generations of scientists that will need to draw
upon a stock of knowledge produced by this work.
Synthesis of Studies
Even when conceptualizing of sustainability differently, socioecological schol-
ars are able to integrate the results of their research for two important rea-
sons:
1. They can rely on well-accepted quantitative measures for comparison
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(landings yields (fisheries) or wood density (forests)).
2. Over time, the sub-domains that study different socioecological sys-
tems have developed ways to conduct meta-analysis by way of system-
atic frameworks that guide the collection of new data or re-analysis of
existing data.
Using either of these methods for integrating the results of sociotechnical
systems analysis, such as those described above, will be difficult. Currently
there is lack of reliable quantitative measures for sociotechnical systems’ per-
formance. None of the studies reviewed above have a quantitative compo-
nent, and it remains unclear how sustainability might be correlated with
quantitative measures for evaluation.
However, developing systematic empirical frameworks is a more tenable,
immediate step for the study sociotechnical sustainability. Many of the re-
sults above could be easily synthesized if findings were reported in a standard
way, and data on well defined variables were reported to a shared database.
In Chapter 4 and 5, I demonstrate how an initial step towards developing
such a framework for sustainability requires a normative approach. There-
fore, much of the analysis in these chapters is based on how the values, norms,
and behaviors of an institution can be translated into qualitative data vari-
ables.
The final section of this chapter describes research on the governance of
systems for peer-production. It is argued that this is an important but under-
explored concept in literature that focuses on sustainability in research and
development settings.
2.4 Peer-production
The decentralized and non-proprietary phenomena of organizing work on the
Internet found early success in Free / Libre Open Source Software projects,
such as Linux and Apache (Lakhani & Von Hippel, 2003). In these settings
people who were paid to contribute often worked alongside volunteers in an
almost non-hierarchical structure. Motivation for participating in these types
of production systems include the freedom to reap rewards of one’s own work,
the prospect of future employment, status within a community, reciprocity
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for help with similar software projects, social justice activism, and simply
wanting interesting problems to solve (Weber, 2004; Schweick & English,
2007).
Benkler describes projects organized around this model of labor as “peer-
production” systems:
...a form of open creation and sharing performed by groups on-
line that: set and execute goals in a decentralized manner; har-
ness a diverse range of participant motivations, particularly non-
monetary motivations; and separate governance and management
relations from exclusive forms of property and relational contracts
(i.e., projects are governed as open commons or common prop-
erty regimes and organizational governance utilizes combinations
of participatory, meritocratic and charismatic, rather than pro-
prietary or contractual, models) (2014).
The new mode of organizing that is enabled can be further refined as
commons-based peer production, a system that is:
...radically decentralized, collaborative, and non-proprietary; based
on sharing resources and outputs among widely distributed, loosely
connected individuals who cooperate with each other without re-
lying on either market signals or managerial commands (2006, p.
60).
While this early definition characterized peer-production as “loosely con-
nected” Haythornthwaite later described lightweight and heavyweight models
of peer-production on the Internet:
• In a lightweight model of peer production loosely connected individ-
uals contribute effort to accomplishing many small well-defined tasks.
The strength of the lightweight model is that when combined, the mas-
sive amount of these tasks adds up to a complex, large, sophisticated
technology that could never have been accomplished if it were centrally
planned. The strength of a lightweight model of peer-production is that
participants can self-select tasks and maximize their own skills while
simultaneously learning new skills through collaboration.
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• The heavyweight model of peer-production - which diverges from Ben-
kler’s definition - is exemplified by virtual organizations (VOs) made
up of strongly connected and highly committed members whose tasks
are loosely coordinated, and their contributions are accepted based on
quality control mechanisms such as peer review (2009). Heavyweight
peer production often includes the development of a technology for a
very specific use, by tightly connected individuals.
Peer production in basic science research most often resembles the heavy-
weight model described above; examples of this form of labor division can
be seen in“community” model development in the earth sciences, shared ge-
nomic databases in biology and ICOADS in climate science.
2.4.1 The Evolution of Peer Production
Early research on peer production systems often claimed that these models
of organizing were superior in quality when compared to their market-based
competitors (e.g. Wikipedia vs. Encarta) (Benkler, 2006). These systems
were described, in general terms, as having an egalitarian nature of “com-
munal information goods” (Fulk, Flanagin, Kalman, Monge & Ryan, 1996;
as quoted in Shaw & Hill, 2014) that represented a new paradigm of “con-
vergence culture” (Jenkins, 2006).
Some of the peer-production systems that achieved early success have
gone on to create democratic organizations that have had transformative
and lasting success in industries that are traditionally dominated by pri-
vate firms (i.e. Apache Server software, Linux and Android operating sys-
tems, Wikipedia, etc.) But, subsequent research on collective action in peer-
production has shown that - for instance - successful F/L OSS projects are
often the work of a single, heroic individual effort (Ingo, 2006); by most mea-
sures open-source software projects are highly uncooperative (Hill, Burger,
Jesse, & Bacon, 2008); that Wikipedia is a single success in what were many
similar wiki-based encyclopedia projects that failed to attract participants
(Kittur and Krut, 2008; Ortega, 2009); and that more generally, wiki plat-
forms are often ruled by an oligarchy of editors (Hill & Shaw, 2013). Most
recently, commons and peer production scholars have started to turn their
attention from what has made the Wikipedias of peer production successful
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towards what has caused similarly structured projects to fail (Shaw et al.,
2014).
All of this is to say that while peer-production is a novel organizational
form for producing commons-based goods, it does not necessarily lead to suc-
cessful or even democratic divisions of labor (Kreiss, Finn, & Turner, 2011).
Peer production is able to balance the costs and benefits of managing shared
resources by exploiting networked communication infrastructures — like the
Internet - for organizing labor. And, given the right circumstances peer
production can outperform traditional models of producing and sustaining
resources in the on-line setting. But, the contexts in which peer-production
does outperform traditional models of organizing outside of on-line collabo-
ration remains both underexplored and under-theorized. This is especially
true of science and technology settings that make use of heavyweight models
of peer-production. In these settings, the effects of different commons-based
governance models have been almost wholly ignored by science and technol-
ogy scholars.
The following chapters will demonstrate how new modes of production
(including peer-production) have been governed within the ICOADS com-
munity. A series of studies demonstrates that the social dilemmas of a so-
ciotechnical system, like ICOADS, can be efficiently solved through commons
governance, and that the organization of labor within these arrangements re-
quires a set of normative variables which are currently absent in existing
studies of scientific cooperation.
2.5 Summary
This chapter has reviewed relevant literature to foreground the empirical
studies described in the following chapters. The major concepts reviewed in
this chapter are as follows:
• A classical economic approach to production and provisioning of goods
creates a binary between state and markets. The commons, an insti-
tutional alternative which sits somewhere between these two models,
has been shown to be particularly effective for shared resource systems
in socioecological settings. It is argued then that a commons model
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has potential applicability to sociotechnical systems — including the
governance of cooperative scientific research projects.
• The missteps of the “Tragedy of the Commons” logic was to confuse
resource types with governance models. A classification of economic
resources based on two dimensions - rivalry and excludability - was
then used to argue that the types of externality dilemmas which effect
socioecological systems are also applicable to sociotechnical systems.
• A number of different findings from Elinor Ostrom’s work were de-
scribed, including a set of principles for the design and arrangement
of institutions for collective action, and a typology of rules that have
proved to have high explanatory power for long-enduring socioecologi-
cal systems.
• In reviewing research findings from previous studies of sustainability,
in both socioecological and sociotechnical systems, a gap in the litera-
ture was identified. It was argued that this gap includes a normative
dimension to purposefully built commons.
• The concept of peer-production was introduced, and previous empirical
studies of this mode of organizing were reviewed so as to understand
that it is one of several models of explanations for the division of labor
in contemporary research and development settings.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION &
ANALYSIS
This chapter describes in detail the methods used to carry out this disserta-
tion’s empirical research. This includes the design of a case study, as well as
the various methods used for data collection and analysis.
First, the overall case study design is described using best practices in
social science research. Next, three sets of studies for collecting data on
ICOADS are described. Each study includes justification for 1. The use
of the method, 2. Background literature and relevant findings that bear
on the study at hand, and 3. The data (e.g. range, type, format, etc.)
that each study produced. The multiple methods of data collection used
in this work are justified on grounds of triangulation and complexity of the
subject matter. The organization and analysis of this data draws on two
existing empirical frameworks: The Institutional Analysis and Development
(IAD) framework, and the Socioecological Systems Meta-analysis Database
(SESMAD) framework. This chapter concludes with a description of the va-
lidity constructs that have guided this analysis, including external validation
through comparison with the results of previous studies of the commons.
3.1 Case Study Design
The marked features of an empirical social science case study are as follows:
• Investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context
• Is appropriate when the boundaries between phenomenon and context
are not clearly evident
• Copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be
many more variables of interest than data points
• Relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge
in a triangulating fashion
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• Benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide
data collection and analysis (quoted from Yin, 2005)
In social science research that takes things like organizations, institutions,
or systems as a unit of analysis the case study approach can be used to test,
extend, or further develop existing theories (Stake, 1995). The case study
developed in Chapter 4 will adapt and extend existing socioecological frame-
works for studying sustainability issues in sociotechnical systems settings.
The research design of a case study requires the following elements:
1. Clear definition of the case type
2. Research questions that are well bounded and answerable
3. A set of propositions that clearly state the background assumptions
which have been made for the case study design
4. Unit(s) of analysis that make a clear division between what (or whom)
will be studied and what data this will generate
5. An explanation of the logical framework that will link the data to the
propositions, and
6. Criteria for interpreting findings based on this framework (Yin, 2005).
3.2 Research Design for Case Study of ICOADS
Below, I describe the design of the ICOADS case study using each of these
elements.
Type of Case Study
Distinctions in case study types are generally made along categorical lines
such as exploratory, descriptive, explanatory, or critical (Flyvbjerg 2006).
The case study of ICOADS presented in Chapter 4 is most comparable to
the descriptive approach, as it attempts to describe how and why a certain
institutional arrangement has been successful at sustaining a shared resource
set over a period of time.
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3.2.1 Research Questions
As described in Chapter 1, two broad research questions are answered in this
dissertation:
• RQ 1. What are the effective institutional arrangements (governance)
for sustainable scientific knowledge commons?
• RQ 2. How do these arrangements differ between domains of knowl-
edge production?
3.2.2 Unit(s) of Analysis
In short, a unit of analysis is the subject of a case study, and units of obser-
vation are individual measures of the subject (Long, 2004).
The unit of analysis in this case study is ICOADS as a sociotechnical
system. The implication of a sociotechnical approach is that differentiating
between “social” and “technical” aspects of a system is not only difficult but
actually reduces the efficacy of an analysis. Instead, “systems thinking ”is
applied to sociotechnical phenomena, and emergent properties such as the
“mutual constitution” of sociotechnical phenomena are studied (for further
definition see Sawyer & Jarrahi, 2013).
Smith, Stirling, and Berkhout provide a nice description of the need to
expand a unit of analysis when analyzing sociotechnical phenomena,
Conventional economic analysis of technical change tends to fo-
cus on pressures that operate visibly at the level of the firm
(such as pricing, competition, contracts, taxes and charges, reg-
ulations, standards, liability, profitability, skills and knowledge).
Analysis at the level of the socio-technical regime, on the other
hand, includes such factors, but goes beyond them to consider
less economically visible pressures emanating from institutional
structures and conventions, including changes in broad political
economic landscapes, or wider socio-cultural attitudes and trend.
(2005)
In this case study, there are multiple units of observation, including, users,
producers, and stakeholders of the ICOADS project, as well as the digital
resources themselves (e.g. ICOADS software and data)
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3.3 Data Collection Methods
A number of different methods were used to collect data for this case study.
Below I describe these methods in detail. Each of the sections that follow
are structured to include the following:
• A description of the intention of research method used (what particular
phenomenon it was useful for understanding),
• A brief review of the background literature that informed my opera-
tionalization of this approach, and
• A description of the data (range, type, etc.) that were produced by an
individual study.
Analysis of this data appears in Chapters 4 and 5.
3.3.1 Preparation for Fieldwork
Collecting data of any kind requires a certain amount of familiarity with
the topic and subject that will be studied. This is especially important for
contemporary science studies where interdisciplinary research (Jirotka, Lee &
Olson, 2013). In preparation for doing fieldwork amongst experts in marine
climatology I undertook the following activities:
• In the Fall of 2012 and 2014 I enrolled in ATMS 591 Atmospheric
Sciences Seminar at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. This
is an open discussion and lecture series focused on emerging topics
in meteorology, atmospheric science, and earth systems science more
generally.
• I also completed four on-line (MOOC) courses with passing marks in
the following related subjects:
– “Marine Megafauna: An Introduction to Marine Science and Con-
servation” (Duke University)
– “Climate Literacy: Navigating Climate Change Conversations”
(University of British Columbia)
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– “Global Warming: The Science and Modeling of Climate Change”
(The University of Chicago)
– “Climate Change” (The University of Melbourne)
• During both residencies at NCAR (described below) I attended weekly
lectures at NCAR, including the Advanced Studies Program (ASP)
lecture series. This gave me the opportunity to both interact with
visiting scientists, and describe the research agenda that I was involved
in, further adding to my own competency in the science behind my
participant’s work.
3.4 Ethnographic Study of ICOADS
Two forms of ethnographic inquiry informed this project: In June of 2012 I
began by using an interactional approach borrowed from the field of Science
and Technology Studies (STS), and over time I also adopted a ‘historical
ethnographic’ approach as it is conducted in the field of Organizational Be-
havior. I describe each approach in detail below.
3.4.1 Participant Observation: Interactional Expertise
Methodological Intention
Participant observation is a mode of inquiry traditional to cultural anthro-
pology. This approach to data collection focuses on observation of a subject
in a natural or native context. My intention in using this method of data
collection was to capture the everyday lived experiences of developers, scien-
tists, and engineers engaged in the ICOADS community. As these individuals
are members of diverse academic, social, and cultural backgrounds they have
a very different view of the phenomena of governance. In observing these
individuals, participating in their discussions, and often arguing about news
in climate science research, I was able to better understand and interpret
behaviors within the community that I was engaged in studying.
The traditional focus of this type of participant observation is on “unob-
trusive observation” — that is, entering, observing, and leaving a site with
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minimal impact on the everyday lives of the participants (Fine, 1993). Some
of the earliest ethnographic studies of science and technology - including lab-
oratory cultures in STS - contested the value of this strict form of participant
observation. For instance, Woolgar and Latour argued that the need to be in-
conspicuous and innocuous while conducting observations was detrimental to
their participants own understanding and reflection on basic, routinized steps
in a research process (Woolgar & Latour, 1979, p. 40). My collection of data
in this setting follows what Harry Collins calls “participant comprehension”
(1998). This mode of inquiry is informed by traditional ethnomethodology
as found in cultural anthropology (e.g. Garfinkel, 1967) and science studies
(e.g. Lynch, 1997).
Background Literature
Harry Collins’ work on participant comprehension began in 1984 when study-
ing the material culture of gravitational wave physics he described, “an in-
terpretation of participant observation under which the field-worker tries to
acquire as high a degree of native competence as possible and interaction is
maximized without worrying about disturbing the field site” (1998, p. 297).
Collins’ motivation for developing the extended form of description that
participant comprehension generates is in pursuit of an “interactional exper-
tise,” or a third kind of knowledge that sits between formal or propositional
knowledge and informal or tacit knowledge (2004, p. 125-7). Collins’ ar-
gument is that during his time studying gravitational wave physics he was
able to achieve an expertise different from the kind that comes with for-
mally studying and being a part of a discipline as a practitioner. Through
linguistics socialization, traditional ethnographic observation and extended
field-work, Collins could read, participate in discussions, and defend his ar-
guments about physics, without having the ability to actually do the physics
himself.
My time working in this field as well as studying and using ICOADS data
has allowed me to develop something like an interactional expertise; I under-
stand the limitations and uses of the data in ways that allow me to converse
with its community of users. Six months into this project, I was elected to the
American Meteorological Society’s Board of Data Stewardship. After a year
and a half of interaction, I was even invited to give a talk at a biennial ma-
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rine climatology meeting (Weber & Worley, 2014). Neither of these accolades
mean that I am able to do marine climatology research, but they demonstrate
that I was able to develop a level of mutual respect within this community
and was able to eventually access, manipulate, and contribute to data cu-
ration activities in using an ethnographic mode of inquiry. These activities
all allowed my work to transcend tradtional observation-based ethnography,
and develop an “interactional expertise” with ICOADS.
Operationalized Study
Like Collins, my interaction was maximized by informally interviewing, talk-
ing with, and observing people who produce and use ICOADS. The opera-
tionalized study included the following periods of data collection:
• From June - August of 2012 I was an Advanced Studies Program (ASP)
fellow at the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) in
Boulder, Colorado. While there, I observed and interacted with a
team of four individuals that curate ICOADS at NCAR. I also infor-
mally interviewed scientists who used ICOADS, asking basic questions
about their experience and their interaction with the project over time.
During this time, I also established a formal relationship with one of
ICOADS original developers who was willing to become my “key infor-
mant” (Payne, 2004). This individual sponsored my project within the
ICOADS community and became a mentor to me in the field of marine
climatology.
• After leaving the site, I continued to work with a team of four NCAR
curators, exchanging emails and calling into teleconferences about their
work on ICOADS.
• In August, 2013 I returned to NCAR to collaborate with this team of
four individuals and a larger network of visiting scientists and ICOADS
partners in the Boulder, CO area.
• In August, 2014 I left NCAR, but continued to interact with broader
network, including regular participation in teleconference calls with
my main informant and a steering committee established to govern
ICOADS.
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• During this time I also attended the following meetings where I either
presented my on-going informetric work or observed my participants
presenting their own work: 2013 American Geophysical Union (AGU)
Winter Meeting; 2011-2014 American Meteorological Society (AMS)
Annual Meetings; 2012-2015 Earth Science Informatics Partners (ESIP)
Winter and Summer meetings; the 2014 Joint Technical Commission
for Oceanography and Marine Meteorology (JCOMM) Workshop on
Advances in Marine Climatology (CLIMAR-IV).
Data Collected
Forms of data collected in the ethnographic work included field and interview
notes, memos (which summarized my observations and were later refined and
shared with my participants for validation (Emerson, 2011); I subscribed to
an email list dedicated to ICOADS and participated in conversations there; I
gathered general documentation about the production of ICOADS, including
user manuals, production notes for programmers working on transformation
of different versions of ICOADS, as well as formally published proceedings of
meetings, meeting minutes, and journal articles describing the project dating
from as early as 1981.
I made a conscious decision not to record interviews conducted during this
stage of research. I came to this decision after initially attempting to record
conversations and observing discomfort of my participants in having their
conversations taped. I made every effort to announce and clearly communi-
cate that my participation was part of a dissertation focusing on ICOADS
governance. I also sent an email to project partners in ICOADS outlining
the major goals of my dissertation, which they approved and sent back their
encouragement.
3.4.2 Document Analysis: Historical Ethnography
Methodological Intention
In order to meaningfully answer research questions about the historical evo-
lution of ICOADS’ governance regimes, I also used an approach to gathering
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historical data from the field of Organizational Behavior research. Historical
ethnography is a technique pioneered by Diane Vaughn in her work with
NASA and a USA Presidential Panel in the aftermath of the Challenger
space shuttle crash (Vaughn, 2004; 2006). This approach requires balancing
archival work with present-day validation of participants’ memory of those
past events. It can be described loosely as a process of “digging into the
past, deliberately reconstructing history in order to identify and then track
the processes connecting past and present” (2004, p. 316). What makes my
work a historical ethnography, as opposed to pure history, is that it includes
a sensitivity to present day events and a deep commitment to tying those
events to the history out of which they were borne. This is the major source
of data for the “Background Environment” section of Chapter 4.
Background Literature
Vaughn’s work with NASA was based on what she called “documentary
practices” within NASA as an organization (Vaughn, 2004). Trying to bet-
ter understand on-going Congressional testimony, she sought an explanation
of how deviance - through risk-taking preferences and safety standards - di-
verged between engineering and management cultures. The breakdown of
communication between the two groups was traced through reports filed by
engineers in previous shuttle missions, as well as Challenger flight simula-
tions. By connecting these reports, their language, and the documentary trail
of decision making processes that informed NASA management decisions, she
could ultimately provide a more thorough explanation of the disaster based
on organizational breakdowns in safety reportage (Vaughn, 2004).
Another germane historical ethnography can be found in John Middle-
ton’s study of early Modern Era Swahili merchants. Middleton drew upon
Vaughn’s method of historical ethnography in order to show how certain arti-
facts (coins, dock locations, merchant societies, etc.) have persisted in struc-
tural shape throughout Eastern African. This continuity created a porous
boundary between present and past in divisions of class, race, and gender.
Middleton’s research, although based on historical documents, was grounded
by ‘collective memory’ of cultures he observed and lived within, and by ‘ex-
trapolation from modern ethnography’ in current mercantile society’s of East
Africa (Middleton, 2013).
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Operationalized Study & Data Collected
I conducted archival work in two physical locations: the National Center for
Atmospheric Research archives, as well as NOAA’s Earth System Research
Laboratory (ESRL), which has a small but useful set of papers related to
the COADS project; both are located in Boulder, Colorado. I also asked
each participant that I interacted with to provide me with email archives,
past meeting minutes, and any documentation related to previous ICOADS
development. NOAA has a number of digitized historical texts available
online at (http://www.history.noaa.gov/index.html), as well as links out to
historical material that covers marine climatology and its history. JCOMM
and NOAA digitally archive the proceedings of two major conferences related
to marine climatology (CLIMAR and MARCDAT) dating back to the first
meeting in 1999. Through my key informant, I was also able to obtain an
archived discussion forum that recorded early emails exchanged by ICOADS
developers.
In total, I gathered over 10 GB of digital material which I read through,
created memos, and used for discussion with my informants. This was also
an iterative process of tracing citations and trying to establish the prove-
nance of certain ideas or even ideologies. This process eventually led me to
Matthew Fontaine Muary, a USA Naval officer who played a key role in both
naval history and weather data standardization. Maury’s personal papers,
as well as valuable secondary sources, were digitized and are available on-line
through the Virginia Military Institute’s University Archives.1
3.5 Informetric Studies
One of the social dilemmas that we will see ICOADS face is related to evalua-
tion in that - like an infrastructure - the diversity of metrics defining success
of the project is one of its chief hurdles in securing reliable funding. The
informetric studies conducted in this dissertation are a heuristic attempt
to validate ideas that my participants mentioned in relation to the citation
practices of the ICOADS community.
The descriptions that follow are of imperfect studies in the traditional In-
1http://www.vmi.edu/archives.aspx?id=19209fulltext
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formation Science sense of having robust statistical measures of significance,
however I argue below that these are a data source that provides a means
for triangulation on what are a broader set of research questions about the
sustainability of a shared resource. I return to the discussion of metrics in
Chapter 5.
3.5.1 Citation Content Analysis
Methodological Intention
The premise of this study is that close reading techniques from critical analy-
sis can be used to better understand the context in which ICOADS has been
referred to in the formal literature of marine climatology (1985-2014). As a
result of failed experiments in calculating traditional forms of bibliometric
impact for the ICOADS project, this study was designed to give a more thor-
ough account of not only how frequently a research product is cited, but for
which reasons, and with what sentiment. This approach may be especially
salient for the earth systems science community, because of the tradition of
writing data “papers” which announce or describe a new data-related prod-
uct (Mayernik et al., 2014). These publications are seen as a way for data
producers to announce an update (newly digitized material, newly processed
or interpolated data points, new grid resolutions etc.), or to comprehensively
describe the process of aggregating and developing a new archive of software
and data. The context in which citations are made to papers about ICOADS
can offer a way to deepen an understanding of how the archive has been used
over time and how users have judged its quality, reliability, utility, and value.
A “data paper” may be cited in a number of ways; to document the use
of a certain data source (example 1 below), or it may be cited for the propo-
sitional content that the data paper contains - such as assertions it makes
about the coverage or completeness of the data being released (example 2,
below).
• Citation 1
The error properties of both input data in OA procedure are obtained
using Comprehensive OceanAtmosphere Dataset (COADS) (Woodruff
et al., 1998) ship observations as the base data. (Wheeler et al., 2008)
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• Citation 2
Thus, the B150% CFC supersaturation levels observed in the summer
of 1988 are probably the result of seasonal warming combined with the
substantially lower mean wind speeds in spring and summer (Woodruff
et al., 1998) allowing only partial re-equilibration of the upper water
during the warming. (Lee et al., 2002)
Background Literature
Similar informetric work has focused on developing a theory of citation
(Cronin, 1984; and Leydersdorff, 1984), or typing citations in a formulaic
way so as to describe their function in a scholarly communication system
(White, 2004). Attempts to type citations based on their function within a
formal publication dates back as far as the 1970’s with Small’s work in cita-
tion context (1982) and symbol (1978), Pertiz’s study of citation roles (1983),
and Moravcsik and Murugesan’s typology of citation functions (1975). These
early studies were conducted in the traditions of library and information sci-
ence, systems development and analysis, and applied linguistics. As such,
the classifications of these citation elements were often aimed at improving
the indexing of a document in an information retrieval system. In short,
previous works that analyzed the context and content of citations were, as
Zhang, Milosevic and Ding put it, “...constructed more from the perspective
of users needs and perceptions rather than from those of the citing authors,
especially in terms of authors citing motivations” (2013).
Recent work on extracting and coding the context of citations, based on
an author’s intention, has focused on sentence level content analysis to im-
prove abstracting services (Nakov, Schwartz & Hearst, 2013), as well as the
semantic and syntactic coding of citation contexts to create a comprehen-
sive schema of citation behavior (Zhang, Milosavic & Ding, 2013; hereafter
referred to as the CCA approach). Both of these studies use methods of qual-
itative inquiry to mark-up a text manually, and then use these annotations
to improve machine-learning algorithms that automate the classification of
citations.
Work at manually coding citation contexts had previously been popular
in fields like organizational theory (Anderson, 2006; Mizruchi & Fein, 1999),
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but there has yet to be a substantive use of this work to automate or improve
manual processes.
There have also been a number of citation typing, and scholarly communi-
cations ontologies developed for semantically encoding digital publications.
The most successful and fully developed of these are the SPAR (semantic
publishing and referencing) suite of ontologies. Included in SPAR are the
Citation Typing Ontology (CiTO) (Shotton, 2010) and the Scholarly Con-
tributions and Roles Ontology (SCoRO) (Shotton, Peroni & Vitali, 2013)
which provide an exhaustive vocabulary for typing the content of a citation,
and the roles played in producing a publication, respectively.
Operationalized Study
There are four major publications that have announced a new release, or a
substantive update to ICOADS.
1. Woodruff, S.D., R.J. Slutz, R.L. Jenne, and P.M. Steurer, 1987: A
comprehensive ocean-atmosphere data set. Bulletin of the American
Meteorology Society 68, p. 1239-1250.
2. Woodruff, S.D., H.F. Diaz, J.D. Elms, and S.J. Worley, 1998: COADS
Release 2 data and metadata enhancements for improvements of marine
surface flux fields. Physical Chemistry of the Earth, 23, p. 517-526.
3. Worley, S.J., S.D. Woodruff, R.W. Reynolds, S.J. Lubker, and N. Lott,
2005: ICOADS Release 2.1 data and products. International Journal
of Climatology (CLIMAR-II Special Issue), 25, 823-842.
4. Woodruff, S.D., S.J. Worley, S.J. Lubker, Z. Ji, J.E. Freeman, D.I.
Berry, P. Brohan, E.C. Kent, R.W. Reynolds, S.R. Smith, and C.
Wilkinson, ()2011) ICOADS Release 2.5: Extensions and enhance-
ments to the surface marine meteorological archive. International Jour-
nal Climatology (CLIMAR-III Special Issue), 31, 951-967.
Using the bibliographic databases Scopus and Web-of-Knowledge (WoK),
I retrieved all citations made to these publications as of August 1, 2013 and
then removed duplicate or overlapping citations. The result was a “citing
documents corpus” that contained 1,195 documents. I then used a systematic
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sampling technique to select documents evenly across the 30 years span of
ICOADS publications:
Citations Recieved Lapse Documents Sampled Per Year Study Sample
2011 57 2 7 15
2005 190 8 6 48
1998 162 15 3 41
1988 786 25 4 128
252
Table 1. Sampled records from citing document corpus.
Data Collected
Following the practice of Nakov et al. (2004; 2012) a colleague and I then
extracted the sentence in which each ICOADS document was formally cited
and instances where the project was mentioned by name (either formal or by
acronym) but was not cited.
We then coded the sentences in which ICOADS was cited or mentioned
using the following categories:
• Number of authors
• Relation to cited work: Is the citing publication related to the ICOADS
project in some way?
• Location of citations and mentions : Where in the publication is ICOADS
cited or mentioned?
• How ICOADS was referenced: Direct citation, endnote or mention
• How ICOADS was referred to, materially : What do the authors call
ICOADS? (i.e. a dataset, an archive, etc.)
• Function of the citation: Meant to answer why was ICOADS being
cited (Uses CiTO controlled vocabulary)
• Sentiment of the citation (and mentions) : A citation or mention could
be positive, negative, or neutral
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We chose a small sample (n=10) to initially code together and iterated
on this process for three rounds (n=40 total) until we achieved a consistent
inter-rater reliability. We then coded all 252 documents in the sample. The
result is a set of descriptive statistics for the categories that we coded. The
full coding schema and access to bibliographic records can be found in the
project repository.2
3.5.2 Data Usage Index
Methodological Intention
Federally funded research and development centers typically measure the
levels of service they provide to end users through descriptive statistics, such
as the number of times a data file has been downloaded over a given period
of time. To better understand the use of ICOADS in the climate science
community, I designed a study that drew upon user-log analysis techniques
from Information Science (Jansen, 2006; Nichols, Huntington & Watkinson,
2005), and in particular a Data Usage Index (hereafter referred to as DUI)
from biodiversity informatics.
Background Literature
The DUI was originally designed to measure the impact of institutional
contributions to the Global Biodiversity Information Federation Database
(GBIF) by using indicators of how data were discovered and accessed (i.e.
the number of downloads, page hits, files contributed by an institution, etc.)
(Chavan & Ingwersen, 2011). In the DUI indicators are extracted from user
query logs and combined in simple, but unique ways to calculate impact
factors.3
Operationalized Study
The intention of this study was to modify the DUI’s indicators from the
context of a biodiversity database to the Research Data Archive (RDA) at
2http://git.io/vJnPX
3For more detail, see repository with tables and data http://git.io/vJnPX
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Code Indicator Explanation
uu(ds) Unique Users Unique users that downloaded data during a time window
n(ds) Number of Datasets Number of Datasets assigned DS number by RDA
f(ds) Files DS Number of files in dataset per time window
d(ds) Download Frequency Total number of files downloaded per time window
hp(ds) Homepage Hits Home Page Hits of Data Set per time window
d(ds) /uu (ds) Download Density Average number of,les downloaded per unique user
d(ds) / f (ds) Usage Impact Total number of downloaded,les over total,les in dataset
d(ds) / hp(ds) Usage Balance Files downloaded by number of homepage hits per time window
hp(ds) / f(ds) Interest Impact Total homepage hits per number of,les in dataset
hp(ds) / uu(ds) Secondary Interest Impact Total Homepage hits over unique users
ss(ds) / d(ds) Subset Ratio Subset requests over total number files downloaded
Table 2. Indicators from the Data Usage Index
NCAR, which provisions a number of different climate data and software
resources (including ICOADS). To do this we developed a set of use cases
based on a researcher’s discovery, selection, and mode of access to different
data products from the RDA.
From the use cases we identified six key indicators that were captured in
the RDA’s logs (see Table 2 below).
The completed use cases also demonstrated that two user types could be
identified based on how data were accessed:
• Programmatic Users: accessed or downloaded data through a com-
mand line tool (e.g. ‘-curl [ˆcurl] or “wget” [ˆwget]) or through a
scripting language.
• Assisted Users: access data via the graphical user interface, or by
subset requests made through a separate tool developed by the RDA
staff.
Data Collected
To test the effectiveness of the modified DUI ,three RDA data products were
selected — including the most recent release of ICOADS (version 2.5). Indi-
cators from the completed use cases were then extracted from the user logs
of each dataset over a sixteen month period.
From the index of each dataset we then further calculated two impact
factors:
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Usage Impact Factor
(d(u)/f(u))/
n∑
1
d/
n∑
1
f (3.1)
where (u) is the given resource unit, (d) is the download frequency of users,
(f) is the number of files downloaded per user session, and (n) is the total
number of units (files available in the dataset) in the denominator.
Interest Impact Factor
(hp(u)/f(u))/
n∑
1
hp/
n∑
1
f (3.2)
which is identical to UIF except download frequency (d) of users is replaced
by the number of homepage hits (hp) a dataset receives.
This resulted in a composite index for each of the three datasets.4
3.5.3 Phylomemetics5
Methodological Intention
In the ethnographic work described above participants often explained that
ICOADS was reused in developing new climatology data products. However,
tracking the reuse of ICOADS through citation analysis proved limited by the
inconsistency in how the project is acknowledged and which research object
is subsequently cited (see Weber, Mayernik & Worley, 2014 for more details
on this dilemma).
To better understand the history of how ICOADS has been reused, I then
conducted a study using techniques from the field of evolutionary biology
(Page, 2009) and cultural analytics (Mace, 2005). This work produced a
genealogy of ICOADS.
4Found in http://git.io/vJnPX
5This section uses previously published work from Thomer & Weber, 2014, and Weber,
Thomer, & Worley, 2014.
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Figure 3: Edwards’ genealogy of general circulation models (2010) and
Knutti’s principle component analysis of coupled climate models (2007).
Background Literature
The inspiration for this work came from a set of studies that looked at the
history of climate models by tracing their relatedness (See Figure 3). The
figure on the left is from a study conducted by Edwards, who created a “fam-
ily tree” of Atmospheric General Circulation Models (AGCM) from archival
documents and oral histories (Edwards, 2010). The figure on right is a den-
drogram showing relatedness of climate models that participated in the 3rd
Climate Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP), constructed using princi-
pal component analysis on documentation available for each model (Knutti,
2007).
Quantitative phylogeny of digital artifacts
The approach is not without precedence: application of quantitative phy-
logenetic methods to linguistics and textual criticism is almost as old as
phylogenetic methods themselves. In fact, Platnick and Cameron argue that
similar methods were accepted as standard practice in both fields before biol-
ogists came to embrace them (1977). There has also been a recent resurgence
of interest in phylogenetic approaches to non-biological problems partly due
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to computational advances in bioinformatics, which not only allow for faster
and easier computation, but also support the use of molecular clocks to root
known speciation times (sometimes called divergence points) in ways that
were previously difficult or impossible (Mace & Holden, 2005; Mace, Holden,
& Shennan 2005).
To further emphasize the shift between biotic and abiotic studies of evo-
lution, Howe and Windram coin the phrase phylomemetics in lieu of phyloge-
netics, given the use of the word meme to refer to a non-genetic principle that
behaves in a genetic way (2011). Though the differences between memetic
and genetic evolution may have bearing on the models and algorithms used to
study these processes, in this work, we use methods and software developed
explicitly for phylogenetic work, and refer to our study as such. Previous
work in linguistics and textual criticism also borrows heavily from biogeog-
raphy in coupling an analysis of linguistic divergence how dialects differ from
one generation to the next with analysis of human migration routes (Rexov,
Frynta, & Zrzavy, 2003). Similarly, phylogenies of historical texts have been
constructed for literary works such as Chaucers Canterbury Tales (Barbook,
1998) and Little Red Riding Hood (Tehrani, 2013). These approaches typi-
cally focus on finding divergence points to estimate when texts were altered,
replicated or significantly changed by different authors or cultural groups.
Most immediately applicable to this study are phylogenetic applications
by archaeologists and anthropologists who conceptualize artifacts as, “com-
plex systems comprising any number of parts that act in concert to produce
a functional unit,” in which the “changes that occur over generations are
highly constrained, meaning that new structures and functions almost always
arise through modification of existing structures and functions as opposed to
arising de novo ”(OBrien, Lymen & Darwent, 2002). This systems view of ar-
tifacts is particularly applicable to digital objects, which may also be viewed
as complex systems comprising any number of interactions between layers of
information content and representation (Wickett et al., 2012). Bit sequences,
encoded information content and information systems work together to pro-
duce a functional unit, and the changes that occur over generations of use
are constrained by the practices and sociotechnical contexts of the groups
using them.
48
Qualitative phylogeny & the biography of artifacts
Just as quantitative phylogenetics has a long history of application to the
study of material and textual artifacts, so does the qualitative study of evo-
lution as cultural diffusion. Anthropologists, economists and sociologists
have each noted the importance of tracking the social “markings” of mun-
dane objects that personalize, and make a given object individual to a period
of time (Appadurai, 1986). In this vein, Igor Kopytoff proposed that track-
ing the movement of an artifact between different contexts of use required
a biographical approach that could see “a culturally constructed entity, en-
dowed with culturally specific meanings, and classified and reclassified into
culturally constituted categories ”(1986, p. 68).
Similarly, Williams and Pollock describe a technique called the biography
of artifacts, which takes a popular software platform as a unit of analysis
(e.g. Microsoft Sharepoint), and attempts to trace the way it was modified,
changed, and socially shaped by studying the different contexts in which it
was used. The ambition of the biography of artifacts approach is to show the
evolution of similar technical artifacts in different social contexts, including
their adaptability (or evolutionary fitness) across diverse software ecosystems
(Williams & Pollock, 2009). Dosi and Nelson (2003) similarly relate evolu-
tionary concepts from biology to behavioral economics and organizational
theory. In doing so, they relate technological change within private firms
to environmental pressures in an ecology, effectively equating these external-
ities as selection mechanisms for evolutionary processes. Dosi and Nelson
attempt to study links between organizational economics and evolutionary
biology through qualitative observations of the practices, policies and tech-
nological adaptations of a firm.
A quantitative phylogenetic approach can add another dimension to each
of these types of analysis. Though it cannot answer the same types of ques-
tions about how context or culture has shaped technical artifacts as used in
different social settings, it can more rigidly answer when and to what ex-
tent an artifact has changed between cultures, and this approach can also
visualize those changes over time.
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Operationalized Study
Our work on an ICOADS genealogy somewhat diverges from these previous
studies in that we aren’t making an evolutionary metaphor or analogy; we are
directly borrowing techniques and software from phylogenetics (Page, 2009).
Part of the ambition in taking a biological approach to studying material
aspects of ICOADS was to leverage the explanations and theories that this
field offers for cooperation (Novak, 2006). If ICOADS data products did have
a traceable evolution then it might be possible to use concepts like kin selec-
tion, fitness, group selection, and reciprocity (direct, indirect and networked)
to shed light on how data have been reused, shared, developed, or refined.
We were not trying to create a direct mapping between biotic reproduction
and abiotic data reuse, but we were taking seriously the ecological metaphor
that is often invoked in discussing the complexity of software / data intensive
enterprises (Weber, Thomer & Twidale, 2013).
Data Collected
To trace the genealogy of ICOADS, we searched for and harvested metadata
records from NASA’s Global Change Master Directory (GCMD) using the
ISO 19115 standard. We used queries related to ICOADS such as “Interna-
tional Comprehensive Ocean and Atmosphere Dataset” or “ICOADS” and
“COADS” to locate as many related ICOADS records as possible. In total,
we discovered 99 records, of which only 23 represented different versions or
subsets of the ICOADS project. The remaining (n =76 ) records represented
derivatives or offspring of ICOADS.
Next, we identified properties (or characteristics) of climate datasets
which we thought would be unique and important to signifying change from
one generation of ICOADS data to the next. This included things like for-
mat, encoding characteristics, or even the parameters of the data set (e.g.
Sea-Surface Temperature, Sea-Level Pressure, Wind Direction, Swell Height,
etc.). We then extracted fields containing these properties from the metadata
records. The fields harvested included: Entry Title, Entry ID, Summary, Ge-
ographic Coverage, Start Date, End Date, Geographic Resolution, Temporal
Resolution, Scientific Keywords (often dataset parameters), Geographic Key-
words, Sources (platform of data collection), and Instruments.
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Figure 4: Coding scheme for ICOADS phylogeny.
Next, we converted each field into binary codes for “presence” or “ab-
sence” of individual keywords (see Figure 4 below). In some cases we coded
additional “presence” or “absence” of characters based on the free text sum-
maries of the records (for instance, in some cases, resolution was stated in
the free text “Summary” field but not the “Geographic Resolution” field).
Outcomes
With the coded data, we then produced a maximum likelihood (ML) tree
(Felsenstein, 1981), by utilizing a statistical model specifically designed for
use with morphological or presence/absence data. Again, the assumption
that we were making in this process is that significant properties or charac-
teristics of the metadata records could be clustered - such that data products
that shared similar traits could be grouped together in the same way that
similar species are grouped together in a phylogenetic analysis (for a com-
plete discussion of this work see Thomer & Weber, 2014; Weber, Thomer &
Worley, 2014.)
Our preliminary efforts were successful in creating a tree that chronolog-
ically resembled the release schedule of ICOADS (e.g. the root node was the
earliest release of ICOADS and furthest nodes were latest releases). To eval-
uate the accuracy of this work, we presented a poster at the Fourth JCOMM
Workshop on Advances in Marine Climatology, which is a major event in the
ICOADS community. We asked participants to annotate our tree, and give
us feedback on:
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Figure 5: Poster presented at CLIMAR IV meeting, with participants an-
notations.
1. The accuracy of the clustering of related datasets, and
2. Datasets related to or derived by ICOADS that were missing from our
tree.
The feedback from the ICOADS community verified the accuracy of our
work. In particular, many scientists recognized the data products that were
clustered based on related features, such as derivative sea-surface tempera-
ture (SST) or arctic sea ice data products. However, a number of curators
from other data repositories were able to identify missing datasets and logi-
cal relationships between clusters that were not well represented by the tree
structure (See Figure 5 for annotations). We then manually added these
datasets and their coded characteristics and re-produced a maximum likeli-
hood tree.
3.6 Interpretive Interactionism
The final method of data collection was a series of interviews with mem-
bers of the ICOADS Steering Committee (ISC), a governance mechanism
adopted by the community late in my research process (year three). In total,
I interviewed six of the seven ISC members.
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3.6.1 Semi-structured Interviews
Methodological Intention
The approach taken for conducting ISC interviews differed from ethnographic
work for two specific reasons:
1. The ethnographic interviews were informal and opportunistic. Using
a semi-structured format would allow me to ask similar questions of
different individuals and compare their perspectives.
2. With the permission of my participants, these interactions were recorded,
partially transcribed, and analyzed for themes - allowing me to conduct
further analysis of key ICOADS members and their experiences in gov-
ernance roles.
Background Literature
The interpretive interactionist approach to qualitative research has two main
objectives :
1. To capture the thoughts and ideas of an individual in their own words,
recognizing that language is highly personal and that individuals place
meaning on the words that they choose, the descriptive metaphors that
they employ, and the narrative structures that they use in reference to
the world around them.
2. To abstract from individual level analysis in trying to understand how
personal meanings are shaped by interactions with people and tech-
nologies in real-world contexts. (e.g. Prust, 1996).
Operationalized Study
I interviewed six of the seven ISC members via teleconference. I used a set
of standard questions about ICOADS governance that I asked every par-
ticipant, but modified these based on the number of years they had been
involved with ICOADS and their professional background. The conversa-
tions lasted anywhere from 38 to 80 minutes. I began each conversation with
53
an overview of my research goals and by obtaining permission to record the
conversation. I had already presented research in front of these individuals,
and was attending regular ISC teleconferences, so they were already quite
familiar this work.
Data Collected
Each interview was recorded and partially transcribed for analysis. I also
created a profile of each individual which included their relevant ICOADS
publications, a CV, and a biographical sketch based on their personal web-
sites or my previous interaction with them as participants of my ethnographic
study.
3.7 Analysis of Case Study Data
The data collected through various methods in this dissertation has been
aggregated in a research repository which hosts the software, protocols, in-
terview tapes, and field memos written during ethnographic data collection.
After aggregating the various forms of data, I then created categories
(Background Environment, Attributes, Governance, and Patterns & Out-
comes) to code the various data. This consisted of re-reading material, lis-
tening to transcripts and assigning pieces of data to particular categories
from the framework.
In coding this data, I attempted to answer questions posed by each cat-
egory. For instance, using the Background Environment category I tried to
answer questions posed by Madisson, Frischman & Strandburg in their de-
velopment of a similar Knowledge Commons Framework (2014). Questions
included, “What is the background context (legal, cultural, etc.) of this par-
ticular commons?”; “What is the default status of the resources involved in
the commons (patented, copyrighted, open, or other)?”; as well as questions
particular to the ICOADS case study, such as “How was this default es-
tablished?”; “How well do participants understand this default?”; and “Has
the default changed?” I then iterated through each category of the frame-
work until I felt that I could reliably answer each set of questions. In some
cases I returned to participants to ask follow-up questions and clarify their
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statements or interpretation of events that I observed.
3.7.1 Analytical Frameworks Used for Organizing Analysis
IAD
The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework was designed
as a domain-agnostic tool that could, “simplify the analytical task con-
fronting anyone trying to understand institutions in their full complexity”
(McGinnis, 2011). The setting for much of this work was institutions that
operated with a mix of governance structures and had a need for longevity
or sustainability of a single shared resource. Various versions of this frame-
work can be found in the work of Kiser and Ostrom (1982), Ostrom (1990),
Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker (1994), McGinnis (2000), and Ostrom (1998;
2005; 2007b; 2010; 2011a). This was to be achieved by integrating data col-
lected by sociologists, lawyers, politicians, economists, and political scientists
in trying to understand “how institutions affect the incentives confronting in-
dividuals and their resultant behavior” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 8). Below, I sketch
out the most basic features of the framework.
The IAD framework is divided into three levels of analysis for studying
underlying factors of an intuition’s success or failure: exogenous variables,
action arenas, and outcomes and evaluations.
1. Exogenous variables include biophysical attributes of the shared re-
sources, community attributes, and structural governance policies (for-
mal or informal).
Exogenous variables are also considered the input to a complex system.
In an overview of the framework Frischmann gives a simple example of
this group, from a lobster fishing grounds
...attributes might include the relevant biological character-
istics of lobsters, such as the rates at which they age and
reproduce; attributes of the community of fishermen, such
as the proximity in which they live to others, the existence
of familial relationships, and the skill sets needed for lob-
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ster fishing; and the rules explicit or informal that govern
fishing. (Frischmann, 2013, p . 8)
The community attributes, using the same lobstering example above,
could include the owners of boats and docks, the distance fishers live
from one another, etc.
2. An Action Arena space where exogenous variables and actors interact,
cooperate, and conflicts emerge.
This level of the IAD studies the stakeholders and the resources of the
commons as inventoried by the Exogenous Variables in a particular
period of interaction, such as the harvest of a shared common field or
the fishing season of a particular coastal community. Using the under-
standing gained from cataloging the Exogenous variables, the analyst
observes this process and then identifies tangible outcomes, objective
results, and the way that conflicts from the past or the present are
voiced, contested, settled or deferred. This analysis can take place over
long periods of time or short site visits in a single time frame.
3. Outcomes and Evaluation
In the final stage of the framework an institution can be evaluated
based on outcomes of the action arena; that is, how well an institution
did or did not solve a collective action problem. Criteria for evaluation
will vary by institutional setting, but usually includes calculation of
costs, such as (1) information costs, (2) coordination costs, and (3)
strategic costs (Ostrom et al., 1993). At a higher level of analysis, such
as that aimed at developing policy, the sustainability of the shared
resource can be analyzed in terms of (1) efficiency in access and use,
(2) equity of distributed wealth or costs, (3) accountability for resource
management, or (4) adaptability of the institution in light of these
outcomes (Ostrom et al., 1993; Imperial & Yandle, 2007).
Over time the use of the IAD to study socioecological systems has
proven useful in comparing the outcomes of real world scenarios with
those presumed to outcomes addressed through public policy.
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Knowledge Commons Framework
Initially described in 2010 as the “constructed cultural commons, ”(Madi-
son, Frischman & Strandburg, 2010) the knowledge commons is both a con-
cept and a framework to describe institutional arrangements that govern the
community provisioning and production of resource systems made up of “cul-
tural” artifacts. The resources making up a knowledge commons might span
a range from complex sociotechnical systems (e.g. Contreras) to simple cas-
sette tape trading communities (Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, 2010).
The ambition of adapting the IAD to cultural sphere is to systematize inves-
tigations of sociotechnical phenomena, provide guidance for a more rigorous
set of evaluation criteria (especially as it relates to the matching of obser-
vation with existing theories and models), and to enable the integration of
findings from cases of intellectual property sharing found in various domains
of knowledge production (2014).
The proposed framework achieves this through three major innovations
with the IAD:
1. It emphasizes differences among distributed actors and the constructed
nature of the resources themselves (purposefully built objects as op-
posed to natural resources)
2. Where the IAD separates outcomes (level 2) and patterns of inter-
actions (level 3), the constructed cultural commons framework treats
these as iterative, mutually constitutive processes.
3. As a result of the more complex relationships between resources, partic-
ipants, and governance structures the relevant attributes of each may
not neatly divide into categories. In short, this is the acknowledgment
of a mutually constitutive socio-technical perspective.
The quintessential case for the Knowledge Commons are free and open
source software projects, such as Apache or Linux, where there is a mix of
proprietary rights, resource producers, users, and on-going tensions amongst
these participants in governing the project (Schweick & English, 2012). How-
ever, a number of diverse case studies beyond open source software have
emerged using this framework, including the study of patent pools amongst
technology firms (Madison, 2012), the Associated Press (Muarry, 2014),
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Wikipedia (Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, 2014), and notably, sci-
entific infrastructures supporting large-scale collaboration in biology (Contr-
eras, 2014), astronomy (Madisson, 2014), and biomedicine (Strandburg, Cui
& Frischmann, 2014).
In using the Knowledge Commons framework to organize my data anal-
ysis, I make two important modifications to previous works:
1. The first section titled ‘’Background Environment’ is expanded in scope
to include historic antecedents to the ICOADS project. Doing so makes
the overall narrative more intelligible for a reader unfamiliar with cli-
mate science, marine climatology, or marine surface data. It also al-
lows my analysis to demonstrate ways that historical events and in-
ternational policies governing meteorology impact the arrangement of
contemporary institutions for data production and exchange.
2. I describe regimes that govern an “Action Arena” rather than focusing
on specific sets of events. Through the different releases of ICOADS
data products, I demonstrate a co-evolution of norms and rules rather
than a causal relationship between, for instance, behaviors and sanc-
tions. This also allows for an investigation of governance issues over a
longer period of time, and overall I believe this lends to a more thorough
analysis of ICOADS governance.
3.7.2 Criteria for Interpreting Results & Answering Research
Questions
To review - the Knowledge Commons Framework (KCF) provides four high
level categories - Background Environment, Attributes, Action Arenas, and
Patterns & Outcomes - for analyzing data gathered through a case study de-
sign. The ambition of this work is to provide a way to systematically gather
data, and compare findings from various different domains of knowledge pro-
duction, looking for similarities and differences in the ways that institutional
arrangements are able to overcome social dilemmas in sustaining a commons.
As the designers themselves note, “...there is much work to refine and system-
atize this approach” (Frischman, Madison & Strandburg, 2014). One way
that the IAD has been systematized in the domain of socioecoligcal systems
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Variable Name Data Type
Begin date Text
End Date Text
Governance scale Categorical
Multiple levels Categorical
Institutional diversity Ordinal
Centralization Ordinal
Description Text
Causal level Categorical
Selective Pressure Categorical
Governance trigger Categorical
Knowledge type Categorical
External recognition Ordinal
Metric diversity Ordinal
Policy instrument Categorical
Scale match Binary
Table 3. This table includes the variables, and the data type to be recorded
in the case study of ICOADS governance.
Property Definition
Type Whether the variable is measured at the (1) interval, (2) ordinal, (3) categorical, or (4) open-text level.
Component Type What type of component in the Knowledge Commons (e.g. Background Environment, Attribute, Action Arena, etc) the variable describes.
Question What question(s) is posed to the user when they are measuring the variable for a case study
Select options The range of values that the variable can have
Unit For interval variables, the unit of measurement.
Role Records whether the variable describes components with a particular role (e.g. users, producers, provisioners, etc)
Importance Describes the theoretical implications, as well as the meaningful interpretations of the variable selections
Definition Provides a basic definition of the variable and what it is meant to achieve
Domain Records what sector(s) (e.g. scientific; cultural; etc) the variable is associated with, if it is specific to a particular sector.
Table 4. This table offers definitions of each variable property used in coding
ICOADS case study data.
is through the design of project specific databases, where case study data
can be uploaded and compared by a large number of collaborators. Out of
the necessity of creating a database structure the variables, properties, and
their resulting definitions are collaboratively developed to properly code case
study data.
I draw on this work to create a set of definitions, variables and their
properties for the governance of ICOADS. In particular, I draw on the Social-
Ecological Systems Meta-Analysis Database (SESMAD) project’s definition
of governance variables (Cox et al., 2014). Below I offer two tables:
1. Lists the variables to be coded for ICOADS governance.
2. Defines the properties of each variable.
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3.7.3 Validity: External and Internal
External validity was achieved through my presentation and sharing of find-
ings from this work with members of the ICOADS community (Weber et al.,
2013; Weber, Mayernik & Worley, 2014), and by my key informant who has
regularly read drafts of this work, made suggestions for improvement, and
clarified my writing for historical accuracy. Additionally, my key informant
worked with me in coding of variables related to governance. This included
exchanges about the proper definition of a variable, as well as what values
the variables should contain.
Internal validity has been addressed through triangulation of methods
used for collecting data and by comparing the results of my work to case
studies that have used the same framework in different settings,including
the genome commons in biology (Contreras, 2014), the Urea Cycle Research
Network in biomedicine (Strandburg, Cui & Frischmann, 2014), and the
Galaxy Zoo project in Astronomy (Madison, 2014).
3.7.4 Limitations
The case study design described above has a number of limitations, including;
• This is a single case and the results will be difficult to generalize from,
especially for large concepts like sociotechnical systems or knowledge
commons.
• Results from the informetric studies are heuristic when judged by tra-
ditional standards for Information Science research. It is argued that
instead of judging their significance with p-values or other statistical
tests, these studies are useful tools for collaboration with my partici-
pants and help support the internal validity of the case study overall.
• Governance is an important component of long-enduring commons, but
it is not the only set of variables necessary for a sustainable commons.
This dissertation’s focus on governance alone will limit the ability of
this work to provide comprehensive guidance on sociotechnical systems
sustainability. I further address this limitation in Chapter 6.
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3.8 Summary
This chapter has described the range of empirical research methods used to
collect and analyze data including the case study design, process of data col-
lection, as well as the analysis and organization of the results into a modified
knowledge commons framework. Results from this analysis will be presented
in Chapter 4 (following). In Chapter 5, I then compare these results to pre-
viously completed case studies and answer the stated research questions of
the dissertation overall.
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CHAPTER 4
ICOADS AS A KNOWLEDGE COMMONS
This chapter presents an analysis of ICOADS governance using the Knowl-
edge Commons Framework to organize data collected through a number of
empirical studies described in Chapter 3.
First, an overview of the arguments advanced from previous chapters is
presented. Next, an extended discussion of ICOADS as a knowledge com-
mons is framed through the four major categories of the Knowledge Commons
Framework: Background Environment, Attributes, Governance & Rules-in-
Use, and Outcomes. The overall argument advanced is that as a sociotech-
nical system, ICOADS has moved from a centralized command & control
governance structure to a “polycentric” form of governance which nests rule
making and enforcement at different jurisdictional levels. Various reasons for
this evolution of governance are discussed.
4.1 Knowledge Commons Framework: Overview
To briefly summarize the discussion from previous chapters:
1. In socioecological systems sustainability, the commons has proven to
be an effective institutional arrangement for sharing existing resource
sets amongst diverse peoples. In sociotechnical systems, commons gov-
ernance can also be used in creating, modifying, and remixing new
resources; the latter is often described as a knowledge commons (Madis-
son, Frischman & Strandburg, 2010).
2. Resource sets making up a knowledge commons tend to resemble public
goods - meaning they are non-rivalrous and non-exclusive. Governance
in knowledge commons often rely upon loose interpretations of juris-
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dictional law (patents, copyright, etc.) or unspoken norms and rules
that are learned over time (e.g. Contreras, 2014).
3. Both socioecological and sociotechnical systems overcome collective ac-
tion dilemmas related to sustainability (e.g. free riders, tragedy of the
commons, etc.) through these rules and norms (Ostrom & Hess, 2007).
However, as a result of differences in the way the two types of systems
are produced and provisioned they often face different types of social
dilemmas. Therefore governance effective in one domain may or may
not be effective in another. Categorizing and identifying the unique
social dilemmas of sociotechnical commons is a first step in systematiz-
ing the study of these institutional arrangements. The following case
study is focused largely on understanding how governance impacts sus-
tainability.
4. Unlike socioecological systems, sociotechnical systems are intentionally
created. Normative issues related to the planning, design, and deploy-
ment of sociotechnical systems is critical to understanding their cur-
rent and past states. History, narrative, and shared culture are recog-
nized as important factors for studying the evolution of knowledge com-
mons but are difficult to access via observation-based research meth-
ods (Frischmann, Madisson & Strandburg, 2014). Therefore, archival
resources and historical approaches are emphasized for developing a
comprehensive case study.
The Knowledge Commons Framework (KCF) is a recent attempt to use
socioecological frameworks for studying sociotechnical systems. In part, the
KCF is meant to help reduce the complexity of studying institutional arrange-
ments in shared resource systems (Frischmann, Madisson & Strandburg,
2014). KCF makes two major modifications to frameworks used to study
sustainability in socioecological systems, notably the Institutional Analysis
and Development (IAD) framework:
1. Interactions between the attributes of the community, it’s rules, and
the constructed nature of the resources being pooled are seen as mutu-
ally constitutive. This collapses a distinction made by the IAD between
these three components. At the crux of this modification is a differ-
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Figure 6: The Knowledge Commons Framework, reproduced from Madison,
Frischman, and Strandburg (2010).
ence between systems which are designed and built versus those that
naturally occur.
2. The KCF also collapses a distinction between “patterns of interactions”
and the outcomes that follow. This is to recognize that these interac-
tions are not finite, but instead iterate through cycles of production,
consumption, use, collapse, re-design, and eventually reproduction.
In the following sections I use the Knowledge Commons Framework to
analyze ICOADS sustainability across three governance regimes. I occasion-
ally draw upon interview data from the “interactionist” studies described in
Chapter 3. Where this is the case, I distinguish between participants with
the following convention - ICOADS Steering Committee (ISC) and randomly
assigned number (e.g. [ISC-06]). Participants are not identifiable through
this coding nor the selection of transcribed interviews used in this chapter.
The Knowledge Commons Framework analysis is organized in the follow-
ing order:
1. Background Environment
2. Sociotechnical Attributes
3. Governance & Rules-in-Use
64
4.2 Background Environment
Knowledge Production in Climate Science
To better understand the historical precedence of ICOADS it is important to
first explore some of the unique aspects of the background environment from
which this project emerged. This includes some preliminary words about
differences between weather and climate data, and the types of research that
each facilitate.
An overly simplistic explanation might be that climate data are just
weather data aggregated and then averaged over long periods of time. This
is partially true in that a basic understanding of the climate is necessarily
dependent on past weather related observations, but the coverage and com-
pleteness of those weather records are, for reasons I describe below, highly
variable, and the calculations of past events hardly average.
Understanding and studying climate is based on inference, calculation and
interpretation of past weather observations, which are heterogeneous in type,
of variable quality, and often subject to different and sometimes conflicting
property rights regimes. Joseph Fletcher, the first PI of COADS, put the
problem of data access for the study of climate this way:
In laboratory science we can often formulate the question our-
selves and design experiments to test possible answers. For geo-
physical systems nature defines the behavior we seek to under-
stand and we learn what that behavior is by observing nature.
We must, also, test our hypotheses against this observed behavior.
This is not as neat as a laboratory experiment but is unavoidable.
The problem of understanding climate change is further exacer-
bated by the long time scale. We have no choice but to look
backward in time because we cannot afford to wait for the future
to unfold. (Fletcher, 1992)
To bound this overview, I’ll first answer two basic questions related to
the enterprise of climate science research:
1. Where do historical weather records come from?
2. How is knowledge about the climate produced from these records?
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Following this section, I then turn to the historical events leading up to
ICOADS.
Where do historical weather records come from?
As Fletcher described above, the earth and environmental sciences depend
on observational data to produce new knowledge. Contemporary sources of
observational data include platforms such as networked censors, land-based
observing stations and data loggers, radiosondes and aircrafts capable of
sampling in the upper-atmosphere, satellites, drifting and moored buoys,
and many manual forms of data collection such as a graduate student sitting
in a field digging up fossils as evidence of a species occurrence event.
Climate science, like many of the natural sciences, depends on histori-
cal records that have been preserved, archived, and made available for reuse
in doing large-scale analysis. Because we cannot travel backwards in time
to re-sample weather events of the past, the enterprise of climate science
has developed a number of ingenious techniques and strategies to overcome
limitations of spatial and temporal gaps in historical records. These innova-
tions include finding new sources of data, such as geophysical indicators of
weather events taken from the cores of trees or coral reefs; the digitization of
analog resources such as weather logs kept aboard sailing vessels from past
centuries; or, through sophisticated computational techniques that stretch
existing data to cover geographic regions and time periods with sparse data
coverage.
When it comes to data the field of climate science is entrepreneurial - it
takes whatever resources are available, and where there are none, develops
new techniques to produce a best estimate of climatological history.
How is knowledge produced from historical weather data?
Climate science is a slow moving and increasingly conservative domain of
knowledge production. This is due in part to it’s recent politicization, but
also due to the fact that it relies upon the steady improvement of a pre-
existing set of observations. Like historians who rummage through the
archival records of man, climate scientists are the archival scavengers of the
earth’s record. As Edwards describes this view,
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Their work is never done. Their discipline compels every genera-
tion of climate scientists to revisit the same data, the same events
digging through the archives to ferret out new evidence, correct
some previous interpretation, or find some new way to deduce
the story behind the numbers. Just as with human history, we
will never get a single, unshakable narrative of the global climates
past. Instead we get versions of the atmosphere, a shimmering
mass of proliferating data images, convergent yet never identical.
(2011, p. 431)
The “convergent yet, never identical” nature of climate science described
by Edwards is partially what makes comparison, sharing, and cooperation so
incredibly important to the generation of reliable knowledge in this domain.
As such, the sharing of datasets, the creation of centers of excellence around
one particular type of model or physical system are commonplace.
Unlike other domains of knowledge production, climate research results
are regularly summarized in national and international reports that act as
“consensus” documents about the state of climate knowledge. These high-
level documents serve as the basis of policymaking and international polit-
ical and economic action related to climate change. This includes highly
publicized documents such as Assessment Reports (AR) issued by the Inter-
national Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), as well as national level reports
that are more regionally focused on extreme weather events and their societal
or economic impact.
4.2.1 History and Policy of Meteorological Data
In this section I’ll cover two important aspects of ICOADS background en-
vironment:
1. Early international cooperation and standardization efforts by Lt. Matthew
Fontaine Maury, and
2. A set of international resolutions, treaties, and bills in the US Congress
that address the commercialization of meteorological data.
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4.2.2 Early International Cooperation
Early meteorological efforts to improve the reliability of weather data in-
cluded efforts to both increase the speed at which information was exchanged
and coverage of observations. For instance, the foundation of the US Postal
Office in 1792 included expedited services for weather related information
(John, 1998), and as early as 1849 the Smithsonian began issuing meteo-
rological devices to telegraph companies in hopes of increasing the speed at
which weather observations could be collected and exchanged (NOAA, 2011).
At this time, most data sources were land-based observations, or lower
atmosphere measurements taken through rudimentary meteorological instru-
ments. A critical dimension of this expanding network were the weather
records of the sea - which posed a considerably more difficult challenge for
data collection. In the middle of the 19th century a U.S. Naval lieutenant,
Matthew Fontaine Maury, would attempt to organize an international net-
work of ocean-based weather observation, and in the process set the stage
for what is now a robust marine climatology enterprise.
4.2.3 Maury’s Rubbish Data
Like many tales of heroism Lt. Matthew Fontaine Maury may have fallen
into greatness rather than chosen it for himself. On his honeymoon in 1839,
Maury was thrown from a stagecoach and badly fractured his leg. The injury
prevented him from returning to a regular post at sea for twelve months.
Maury spent that year writing a series of anonymous publications about
strategic military directions for the US Navy and agitating for new and im-
proved marine charts. His letters garnered the attention of many naval offi-
cers and congressmen, eventually leading to his identity being revealed, and
his appointment to a new post, the director of the NAVY Depot of Charts
and Instruments.
In this post Maury sought to improve the reliability of naval weather
records. In doing so, he operationalized a massive effort to create charts of
winds and sea currents from old log-books that “had been stored away in the
Hydrographic Department as rubbish” (Corbin, 1888). The processes he put
in place for creating these charts, described in many accounts of this period,
are similar to contemporary data curation; similar resources are aggregated,
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their measurements are normalized and recordings are quality controlled, and
summary documents are produced for reuse.
Having circulated and promoted the resulting charts widely, word began
to rapidly spread of their usefulness. By 1854, the charts were used regularly
by shipping vessels the world over (Lewis, 1996). A merchant’s magazine
of the time calculated that the total amount of money that the shipping
industry could save using Maury’s charts was on the order of $2.25 million
annually (Corbin, 1888, p. 56). A British report issued the following year
estimated the savings to all British vessels at around £10 million.1
After reports of the economic impact of his work, the Secretary of the
Navy wrote to Congress pleading for remuneration on Maury’s behalf. One
letter draws particular attention to the free and open exchange that he “un-
selfishly” initiated. The secretary goes on to say that “...Mr. Maury might
have secured a copyright” for the charts which were “sitting unused,” but
instead Maury created a free resource that would allow ships to “sail more
safely and quickly than ever before.” The letter emphasizes that Maury had,
through salvaging rubbish data, created a “common property of the world”
(VMI as summarized by Corbin, 1888).
Along with the “Charts and Winds” publication Maury also distributed
blank logs, and in the margins he prescribed a method of recording measure-
ments such as wind direction, temperature, etc.
The impact of Maury’s approach to data aggregation and analysis was
further cemented by a publication entitled “The Physical Geography of the
Sea and its Meteorology” which went through over twenty printed editions
garnering Maury a small amount of international fame.
In 1853 Maury coordinated an international congress on meteorological
observations in Brussels, Belgium. Participating nations included Germany,
Austria, UK, Netherlands, Sweden, Norway Spain, as well as Brazil, Chile
and Prussia (Corbin, 1888 p. 72).
At the 1853 Congress Maury made two proposals:
1. “...all maritime nations should cooperate and make these meteorologi-
cal observations in such a manner and with such means and implements,
that the system might be uniform and the observations made on board
the public ship be readily referred to and compared with the obser-
1Both calculations are in dollar amounts of 1853, and 1854.
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vations made on board all other public ships, in whatever part of the
world.”
2. “...it becomes not only proper, but politic, that the forms of the ab-
stract log to be used, with the description of the instruments to be
employed, the things to be observed, with the manipulation of the in-
struments and the methods and modes of operation should be the joint
work of the principal parties concerned.”
Each participating nation agreed to carry out these specific terms and to
broad and sustained meteorological cooperation more generally. In a letter
to USA Congress, Maury notes his success as well as the precedence of this
meeting:
Rarely has there been such a sublime spectacle presented to the
scientific world before all nations agreeing to unite and cooperate
in carrying out according to the same plan one system of philo-
sophical research with regard to the sea. Though they may be
enemies in all else, here they are friends. Every ship that navi-
gates the high seas with these charts and blank abstractlogs on
board may henceforth be regarded as a floating observatory a
temple of science. (Corbin, 1888. P. 275)
Commenting on this foresight 150 years later, the director of the World
Meteorological Organization (WMO) saw Maury’s contribution as providing
a normative framework for the field, lying down principles that were “...so
basic to our understanding of how meteorology should be done; (a) all nations
should cooperate; (b) observations should be standardized; (c) the enterprise
should be global; and (d) the parameters measured, the data recording and
exchange, and the instruments and methods of observation should follow an
agreed plan” (Rasmussen, 2003).
In summary, Maury’s legend teaches us two important things about con-
temporary work in climate science:
1. He demonstrated the immense value in aggregating and summarizing
previously existing data, and in the process developed schemes to stan-
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dardize the recording and observations of data, greatly reducing nor-
malization and aggregation efforts in the future.
2. Maury established the principal of international cooperation for the free
and open exchange of marine data. Twenty years after this congress,
the International Meteorological Committee (today the World Meteoro-
logical Organization) was founded to institutionalize this international
cooperation. It would take another century before the principal of free
and open data exchange would be cemented in policy.
I turn now to the historical moments in which the WMO was formed and
the continued creep of commercial interest in this domain.
4.2.4 WMO and the Principle of Free and Unrestricted
Exchange
In the wake of the cooperative agreements made in Brussels during the 1853
congress, many nations began to establish national meteorological offices
and weather services. In 1953, exactly 100 years from the first international
congress in Belgium, a group of cooperating nations articulated the following
conventions for a World Meteorological Organization (WMO):
• To facilitate worldwide cooperation in the establishment of networks
of stations for the making of meteorological observations or other geo-
physical observations related to meteorology and to promote the estab-
lishment and maintenance of meteorological centers charged with the
provision of meteorological services;
• To promote the establishment of systems for the rapid exchange of
weather information;
• To promote standardization of meteorological observations and to en-
sure the uniform publication of observations and statistics;
• To further the application of meteorology to aviation, shipping, agri-
culture and other human activities; and
• To encourage research and training in meteorology and to assist in
coordinating the international aspects of such research and training
(WMO, 1953).
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In the following years, two critical resolutions from the WMO were passed
- both of which hold implications for the sustainability issues facing contem-
porary climate science research infrastructures.
Resolution 35 - 1963
In 1963, WMO Resolution 35 established the open exchange of data among
WMO members, including maritime log-books for processing historical weather
observations. The resolution was non-binding, but set out recommendations
for how data should be formatted for exchange, including International Mar-
itime Meteorological (IMM) punched card and tape (IMMPC and IMMT)
formats. This resolution was significant, because it establishes a “principle
of free and unrestricted exchange of meteorological data” between members
of the WMO. Like precedence in judiciary law, this principle will be continu-
ally referenced by WMO members advocating for the WMO to enforce open
exchange of data through rigid policy language.
Resolution 40 -1994
In 1994 there was a strong lobby from a WMO working group on the com-
mercialization of weather data to revise Resolution 35, along with a number
of other previous resolutions guaranteeing the open and free exchange of data
between all WMO member nations. The resolution draft was titled “WMO
policy and new practice for the exchange of meteorological and related data
and products including guidelines on relationships in commercial meteorolog-
ical activities.” The proposal outlined criteria for two tiers of WMO member
data:
• The first tier would include all data required to carry out WMO pro-
grams - including extreme weather event monitoring, etc.
• The second tier included all non-essential data. This was to be ex-
changed at the discretion of individual nations (Co-Data, 1997).
By creating a broad “non-essential” tier of resources, the proposal would
allow commercial vendors to reach distribution agreements with individual
nations and in turn privatize the loosely defined non-essential data products.
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As a result, Resolution 40 became highly contested and a rift within WMO
opened between free market advocates and those who would defend a “prin-
ciple of free and unrestricted exchange of meteorological data” (Flemming,
2013).
The resolution that the WMO eventually voted on, and passed in 1995
states the following:
“As a fundamental principle of the World Meteorological Organization
(WMO), and in consonance with the expanding requirements for its scientific
and technical expertise, WMO commits itself to broadening and enhancing
the free and unrestricted international exchange of meteorological and related
data and products.” (WMO, 1995)
The two separate tiers of resource access were eliminated, but there re-
mained an ambiguity in the resolution’s language which read that, “data (and
related products) required for carrying out WMO program “shall” be made
available by all members”, and all other data ““should” be made available”
(WMO, 1995). This caused a considerable amount of confusion about what
constituted data required for WMO programs, including data that could
have an intellectual property claim by individual scientists. On this matter,
minutes from a CO-DATA working group at ICSU are telling - summariz-
ing the somewhat strange wording they note “Group members argued that
it was inconsistent to urge full and open access and yet establish a policy
whereby scientists can have proprietary rights for a period of time” (1997).
These distinctions also did little to clarify how WMO members from devel-
oping countries could develop a cost-recovery model that charged for access
to data.
Although Resolution 40 avoided creating a commercialization of “non
essential” meteorological data it did create ambiguity in what was considered
to be a viable method of cost recovery. What’s more, it did little to quell
the potential of enclosure for the meteorological data commons. The impact
of this ambiguity is also important for understanding why meteorological
projects so often speak in collective terms, and why historical events, such
as Maury’s 1853 Congress, are so often described in the formal literature of
marine climatology: these events are a subtle reminder that although policy
creates the opportunity to act otherwise, it is the historical precedence of
cooperation that should guide contemporary actions.
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4.2.5 Continued fight over intellectual property
In the broader legal and political arena of the 1990’s similar debates over
copyright and intellectual property of data were taking place. I’ll summarize
three of these events relevant to ICOADS: 1. Language from a rejected
WIPO treaty on intellectual property protection for database creators; 2.
The failed bill H.R. 3531; and 3. A second failed bill, H.R. 2652, both in the
US Congress.
In 1996, an international treaty was developed and put up for consid-
eration by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to make
databases a patentable intellectual property (including data held in weather
and meteorological data centers). The proposal included consideration for
the following key points related to climate data, and environmental informa-
tion more generally:
• Prohibit unauthorized extraction, use, or reuse of any database, or any
substantial portion of a database (as defined by the database vendor),
and effectively establish the basis for a pay-for-use system,
• Any ruling by WIPO should apply to both privately generated data
and repackaged U.S. government data (value-added curation)
• Establish strong civil and criminal penalties, including penalties for
third-party liability (liability incurred by an unwitting intermediary or
disseminator). (NCAR, 1997)
After much debate, the WIPO rejected the language of this proposal, in
part, because it lacked a firm definition of what could be considered “intel-
lectual effort” in assembling a collection of facts into a database. Instead,
the “Berne Convention” which creates international copyright of digital ma-
terials, not including scientific data, includes the following language “pro-
tection of intellectual property rights may extend to compilations of data or
other material (databases), in any form, which, by reason of the selection
or arrangement of their contents, constitute intellectual creations. (Where a
database does not constitute such a creation, it is outside the scope of this
Treaty.)” (WIPO, 1996).
In response to the both the WIPO’s decision and Resolution 40, NCAR’s
then president Richard Anthes wrote the following,
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Despite the recent successes with WMO and WIPO, few peo-
ple believe the debate is over for good. The issues involved in
using the Web for dissemination of data, and in balancing the
rights of the commercial sector with the legitimate needs of the re-
search and educational communities, are pervasive and challeng-
ing enough to ensure continued discussion. Perhaps the biggest
victory in the recent bout is that the arena for this discussion
has expanded significantly. The atmospheric sciences community,
which has written so persuasively in recent months, will remain
engaged as the debate unfolds. (1997)
And indeed, these debates continue up to present day WMO activity. For
instance, in 2013 a panel of experts was commissioned by the WMO Exec-
utive Council to draft a report outlining the need for Resolution 40 to be
revised. One of the panel’s main questions was whether or not the “principle
of open and free exchange” was being honored in the Global Framework for
Climate Services (GCFS), a UN-led initiative to guide the development and
application of science-based climate information and services in support of
decision-making2 (WMO, 2015).
Two other important attempts at privatizing meteorological data are
worth noting:
1. In 1996, H.R. 3531 “Database Investment and Intellectual Property
Anti-piracy Act” was introduced to the US House of Representatives.
This bill sought intellectual property protection for digital technologies,
including the patenting of scientific databases. Debate about the im-
pact of the bill included extended discussion about how patents might
affect the USA’s ability to participate in the exchange of scientific data
supporting international research agendas. The bill never made it out
of committee and expired with the 104th Congress (Sarewitz, 2010).
2. The 105th Congress would try again. H.R. 2652, titled “The Col-
lections of Information Anti-piracy Act, ” was a broader bill that in-
cluded a number of different ways for data and software to be patented.
This bill was eventually passed by the House Representatives, but its
2As of May, 2015 this panel has yet to report its findings.
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language was folded into the Senate’s “Digital Millennium Copyright
Act ”(DMCA). Like its predecessor H.R. 2652 expired with the 105th
Congress. Through Senate negotiations around DMCA, language in-
cluding the protection of scientific databases and data was eventually
dropped (Sarewitz, 2010).
Conclusions from Policy & History
The review of relevant policy and historical events sketched above provides
important background for the development of ICOADS - both from an eth-
ical, as well as a legal prospective. The default settings of cooperation
are made clear with two conceptual turns of phrase: 1. The description
of Maury’s standardization work as providing a “common property of the
world,” and 2. The commons sentiment being further codified in WMO
policy that protects a “principle of free and unrestricted data exchange.”
At a broad level, the WMO resolutions described above establish a basis
for the governance of exchange and access to marine surface data. However,
to focus on formal policy alone would be to overlook a wealth of innovation
and ingenuity in the design of cooperative institutions for the production and
provision of these resources. The collaborative communities responsible for
producing these resources are nested within a number of different organiza-
tional settings, and bound to different disciplinary and cultural norms that
make their effective collaboration anything but intuitive or predictable. In
fact, an overlap of institutional commitments has required each new climate
or meteorological collaboration to reflect back upon the established norms
of the WMO, Maury, and their principles of free and open data. Few of
these institutions are bound, legally, to cooperate or share resource with one
another and yet many of them do so successfully over long periods of time.
4.2.6 Goals and Objectives
The initial goal of the COADS project was to fill a gap in the historical
climate record through creating a systematic and high quality archive of ma-
rine data. An early publication notes that the impetus for COADS is a well
understood but under-appreciated fact: “The world ocean covers over 70 per-
cent of the earth’s surface. The history and future of global climate therefore
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cannot be understood without ocean weather observations” (Woodruff et al.,
1987).
COADS ambition then was to be a “...readily accessible archive of global
climate information” not simply a dataset, as the name implies (Woodruff
et al., 1987). This is an important distinction as it has ramifications for the
definition of the resource set and the property rights claimed by ICOADS
users, developers, and provisioners.
Critically important to this development was the inclusive nature of the
project. A more contemporary publication from the core team of ICOADS
developers summarizes the sentiment of this project nicely, “This is an open
community and new participants are welcomed” (Woodruff et al., 2011).
In an interview with a longtime international partner of the project, I asked
about early work in developing a public good, and she replied this way, “...its
not, this isn’t something that we specifically talk about, but it underpins
everything we do. It is this idea of creating a public good, making everything
accessible. Making it easy for people really underpins everything we do. I
don’t think we ever talk about it... but we’re in the business of creating
public goods.” [ISC-02]
4.3 Attributes
This section includes an overview of characteristics defining the COADS re-
source set and community members.
4.3.1 Resource Characteristics
In the most basic sense, ICOADS is a set of computational infrastructures
and databases containing historical marine surface records from the 17th
century to the present day, available for download from two data centers
(NCAR’s Research Data Archive, and NOAA’s National Climate Data Cen-
ter). The resource set - that is, the various resources needed to make meaning
of these records - is considerably more complex and includes documentation
and metadata records about the data, software for accessing and sub-setting
the data, and services for curating and provisioning ICOADS databases (as
well as producing new versions of the databases).
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Surface Marine Data
Surface marine data include physical phenomena observed and captured at
the Ocean and Atmosphere interface - typically considered to be 15 me-
ters into the atmosphere from the sea surface. Data points might include
any of the following variables: Air Temperature, Cloud Amount/Frequency,
Cloud Height, Cloud Types, Dew Point Temperature, Humidity, Ice Edges,
Precipitation Amount, Pressure Tendency, Sea Ice Concentration, Sea Level
Pressure (SLP), Sea Surface Temperature (SST), Surface Winds, Swell Vis-
ibility, Wave Frequency, Wave Height, and Wave Speed/Direction.
Historically, surface data have been collected using a variety of measure-
ment techniques, including on-board ship instrument, moored and drifting
buoys, radiosonde, and satellite. The processes of data collection in each
of these platforms has changed significantly over a period of coverage which
reaches back to the middle of the 17th century. For this reason the quality,
reliability, coverage, accuracy, and accessibility of these historical records are,
to say the least, variable.
As such, doing climate research with marine surface data requires cov-
erage that is both spatially and temporally significant. Spatially significant
means that data points are sampled equally across the ocean’s surface. Tem-
porally significant means that data are recorded at regular intervals of time
across those spaces. The infrequent and unsystematic nature of how data
were collected by sea-faring vessels, which are the overwhelmingly dominant
observing platform for marine data until the 1970’s, are an artifact of the
rudimentary practices of sailing in the seventeenth and eighteenth century:
ships took indirect routes between ports and often recorded weather data
infrequently or haphazardly as a result.
To overcome limitations in the historical record, data are often interpo-
lated or “gridded” (converting scattered individual data points from a single
observed surface into a regular grid or raster of derived values). Gridded
data are produced in monthly summaries so as to make large volumes of
data accessible to end users.
Data centers or individual research teams may each take a different ap-
proach to correcting errors, resolving gaps in spatial and temporal coverage,
or quality controlling marine surface data. This means that although the
same historical records can be used as inputs by different data centers, they
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can and do develop appreciably different blended data products. Taking dif-
ferent approaches to quality control also means that one archive, or research
team, can specialize in a particularly difficult aspect of the historical cli-
mate record, and even build a reputation internationally for producing high
quality, reliable products based on a single variable.
Unlike the laboratory sciences, datasets in meteorology are not built from
a single source, but are instead drawn from a common pool of data products
that are beyond the capabilities of any one institution alone to collect. These
derivative products require substantive intellectual efforts to improve. This
often makes claims on property rights related to marine surface data unclear,
and occasionally contested. The “common property of the world” sentiment
espoused by Maury largely carries over to the sharing of data products in
this domain, however, as described in detail below, these issues are a form of
social dilemma which threatens the sustainability of these resource sets.
ICOADS
As described above, ICOADS was meant to be a comprehensive archive of
historical marine surface weather information. In an early project meeting,
the lead PI of COADS put this directly, “When we look backward in time
we find the observational record frustratingly incomplete. We have satellite
records for only a couple of decades and very incomplete radiosonde coverage
for about four decades. To document longer term behavior we have only
surface observations and for reasonable spatial coverage of this water planet
they must include data from the ocean domain” (Fletcher, 1992).
The first release of COADS in 1983 included 11 different data products
and their processing history (Jenne & Woodruff, 1986), a Fortran 77 pro-
gram on magnetic tape used to read the packed binary-data (Woodruff et
al., 1987), as well as a number of publications describing the statistical trim-
ming methods used to create derived variables (monthly summaries) of the
aggregated data (Slutz et al., 1985; Fletcher, 1983).
Below I describe four key components of the ICOADS resource set: 1.
Data, 2. Metadata, 3. Standards, Software & Statistics, and 4. Computa-
tional Infrastructure.
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Figure 7: The expanding coverage of ICOADS over each new data release.
Data Products
ICOADS data products have increased in size, and sophistication over time.
The first release of COADS in 1983 included 71.9 million records. Release
2.5 of ICOADS includes over 250 million records. As new resources are dis-
covered, digitized, or reanalyzed for improvements, the coverage of ICOADS
data products continues to improve in terms of historical coverage. The first
release of COADS included records dating back to the 1850’s, but continued
international cooperation, as well as recent contributions from projects like
the Recovery of Logbooks And International Marine data (RECLAIM), and
citizen science initiatives such as the Old Weather project, have extended
the records back until the middle of the 17th century (1662).
Metadata
Use of surface marine data requires extensive documentation and metadata.
This includes formal manuals developed by the WMO to code ship, instru-
ment, and data types, but also less formal documentation, especially for
historical data, such as the marginalia in sailing logs, or even the journals
kept by crew members that may have noted irregularities in weather during
particular days.
The accuracy of some observing platforms are well understood - such as
drifting buoys which are rarely recovered and repaired and so their measure-
ment accuracy may drift undetected and result in decreased accuracy over
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time (Woodruff et al., 2011, p. 17). Other platforms, such as data collected
aboard early sailing vessels, may have limited metadata and are not well un-
derstood in terms of accuracy or quality. This variability in platform quality
and metadata, as well as the discovery of new data sources (i.e. logbooks
that have not been digitized, contextual documentation that is found in an
archive, etc.) requires a slow but nearly constant revision of the historical
record.
Additionally, blending these different platforms into one cohesive data
product is a non-trivial exercise that requires consistent applications of qual-
ity control and a robust source of computing power to process and homogenize
these records. For instance, in announcing the first release of COADS the
project partners make this iterative process clear in warning that,
Any conclusion drawn from the historical record should be qual-
ified by the fact that the observation, reporting, collection, and
digitization of these data have been subject to a great deal of
methodological change. Besides introducing more or less un-
known inhomogeneities into many variables, these changes have
sometimes been processed incorrectly. The resulting errors, as
well as simple recording or transmission errors, occur very fre-
quently. While a major effort has been made to indicate reports
containing errors, some kinds of errors cannot be trapped by sta-
tistical methods. A very common error in the original data was
incorrect representation of latitude and longitude, and only in
extreme cases were these identified. Thus it must be remembered
that while millions of errors have been identified and eliminated
from the trimmed summaries, the resulting data are still far from
clean. (Slutz et al., 1985)
Some project partners have made their entire career around improving
metadata to marine surface data and contributing those corrections and im-
provements back to international projects such as ICOADS (e.g. Kent et al.,
2007).
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Standards, Statistics & Software
Finally, two other products important to the ICOADS resource set are the
standards it has developed for the documentation and exchange of marine
climate data, and the statistical approaches it has created to summarize
these types of data. Additionally, the software written and traded amongst
community members for accessing and analyzing subsets of ICOADS data
are becoming more important to the future work of this project. I’ll briefly
describe each of these products below.
• As marine surface records became more valued in climate reconstruc-
tion projects there also emerged a need to standardize the format of
exchange for historical marine data. Until 2000 no uniform, interna-
tionally agreed upon format existed. Through a series of proposals,
the International Maritime Meteorological Archive (IMMA), was rec-
ommended for a standard format for exchanging marine meteorological
data, developed and used extensively for the 2.5 release of ICOADS. As
a standard IMMA and its broader adoption, facilitates the exchange
of many international projects that model their work after ICOADs,
such as the Climatological database for the World’s Oceans (CLIWOC).
More broadly, it is a contribution endorsed by JCoMM and was one of
the most successful innovations of the project beyond the provisioning
of data.
• The ICOADS community, like much of contemporary science, produces
and uses a number of unique software packages for accessing and mak-
ing use of subsets of ICOADS data. These include anything from simple
scripts to fetch data from shared servers, to large Fortran libraries for
reading and analyzing data in the IMMA format.
• The summary statistics developed to grid ICOADS data are a non-
trivial aspect of the innovation of this project. Originally meant to
reduce the space that the data would take up on tape reels, the process
of calculating monthly summaries and gridding data at 1 x 1 resolution
remains in use today largely for convenience of the community of end
users - innovating with this scheme would be both inconvenient and
costly with uncertain payoffs.
82
4.3.2 Community Members
Data Users
Users of ICOADS data are diffuse. In the climate science community, ICOADS
data have been used to produce a variety of new data products, and used
within a number of different international climate assessment reports. This
includes staff scientists where ICOADS is archived (NOAA’s NCDC, and
NCAR’s RDA), as well as scientists and graduate students at universities
around the world.
ICOADS data are occasionally used outside of climate science; examples
include a digital historian who traced naval operations during World War I
(Schmidt, 2012), and a Silicon Valley entrepreneur giving a commencement
address at the Naval Academy (Ondrejka, 2014).
Data Producers
Data producers in the ICOADS community are of three types:
1. Historical Curators, including individuals whose research agendas are
based around bias corrections in the historical climate record.
2. Contemporary Collectors, including institutions that contribute data
to the GTS through moored buoy censor networks, as well as ships
which participate in the WMO’s Voluntary Ship Observation (VSO)
program.
3. Contemporary Curators, including software engineers that both de-
velop new and provision existing data. This includes normalizing new
data from the GTS, correcting minor errors in existing data, and pro-
viding improved software for sub-setting ICOADS data products. Cu-
ration also takes place during the production of new ICOADS re-
leases, including the cleaning (normalization and quality control), pre-
processing, and scheduling of tasks on NCAR’s supercomputers. ICOADS
data curators are also the individuals that update and make improve-
ments to publicly facing metadata, send reports or emails to current
users to announce known errors, and fulfill individual subset requests.
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Data Provisioners
In this section I focus on two institutions which serve ICOADS data, docu-
mentation, and software to end-users.
NOAA/ Earth Systems Research Laboratory (ESRL) Physical Sciences
Division (PSD), Boulder, Colorado, USA (and) National Climate Data Cen-
ter, Asheville, North Carolina, USA
NCDC is a relatively new partner in the ICOADS project and has taken
on the service of ICOADS data for the sake of end-users within the federal
government (for reasons described below).
A major contribution to the provisioning of ICOADS data from the
ESRL’s PSD is made through the project primary investigator, Scott Woodruff.
Until the winter of 2012, he and one other FTE are responsible for coordinat-
ing the documentation, updates, and software development for all on going
ICOADS work. The responsibilities of these individuals also includes han-
dling much of the design and implementation of new releases or enhancements
to existing data products served by NCDC.
The Research Data Archive (RDA) National Center for Atmospheric Re-
search, Boulder, Colorado, USA
The RDA is a repository of atmospheric and oceanographic observational
data, weather prediction model output, gridded analyses and reanalysis, cli-
mate model output, and satellite derived data that has been curated by
staff in the Computational and Information Systems Laboratory (CISL) at
NCAR since the mid 1970’s (Jacobs & Worley, 2009). The RDA is unique
amongst earth science data archives in that it serves almost exactly the same
amount of data as it stores; meaning that the RDA last year contained about
1.3 Petabytes of data, and in total it also served users, located all over the
world, about 1 Petabyte of data.
A major component of NCAR’s mission is to serve the entire atmospheric
science research community - from government scientists to undergraduates.
As a result, the RDA’s provisioning of ICOADS has focused on serving end-
users of varying skills and technical competencies. For instance, over the last
84
thirty years, the RDA’s staff has developed a robust graphical user interface
(GUI) allowing for unique subsets of ICOADS data - and also offer curation
services to create unique subsets for users who cannot manage the GUI. The
RDA has developed a number of metadata elements that are meant to help
users discover the dataset more easily. The RDA also provides a suite of
Fortran software that allows for observations made in the IMMA (Interna-
tional Maritime Meteorological Archive) format to be read and used in a
variety of applications, and they also provide a global archive of year-month
observations. In short, access to a number of different ICOADS products,
and additional services surrounding the dataset leads to the RDA serving
a majority of all ICOADS users on an annual basis (the rest being served
through NCDC).
4.4 Governance & Rules-in-Use
Governance and rules, as argued throughout Chapter 1 and 2 of this disser-
tation, are critical aspects of effective institutions for collective action. Gov-
ernance and rules are studied through what the IAD and KCF call “action
arenas,” which are analyzed by observation, participation, or archival works
about how “individuals (acting on their own or as agents of organizations)
observe information, select actions, engage in patterns of interaction, and re-
alize outcomes from their interaction” (McGinnis, 2011; see also Contreras,
2014).
In the sections that follow I divide ICOADS governance and the evolution
of its rules into three distinct regimes of governance; the events around the
formation and dissolution of a governance regime can be seen as an “action
arena.” Within these “action arenas,” I identify action situations where
rules are proposed, enacted, or negotiated amongst participants in both the
provisioning and production of ICOADS.
I draw on the ethnographic and interpretive interventionist data in con-
structing the narratives below. In particular, these sections attempt to tie
events of the past to contemporary issues through the actions, words, and
writings of ICOADS community members. I characterize the outcomes and
patterns of interaction for each separate regime, but note that a full synthesis
of the findings across all three regimes is found in Chapter 5.
85
4.4.1 Three Regimes of ICOADS
When I began interviewing ICOADS Steering Committee members, I asked
each participant a variation of the following question: “If you were to look
back at the history of ICOADS, what would meaningfully separate one period
of the project’s development from any other ?”The first four interviewees all
offered the same time periods - COADS ( 1980 - 2000), ICOADS (2000-2011),
and the later (often difficult to name) period that resulted from funding
problems beginning at NOAA (2012 - present). These periods were also
named because they align, somewhat crudely, with each new data release
(version) of ICOADS. In further interviews I corroborated these periods with
other ISC and ICOADS community members who, by and large, agreed that
these were meaningful divisions to make in the evolution of the project.
4.4.2 Regime 1: 1981-2001
Three important contextual factors that led to the initial realization of COADS:
1. In the late 1970’s, many earth science disciplines had seized upon the
opportunity of increased computing power and decreased cost of data
storage to further a climate research agenda. Climate models were just
beginning to couple separate physical systems (i.e. ocean and atmo-
sphere, land and atmosphere, etc.) and the potential to create earth
system models was bringing with it the need for more authoritative
and more complete historical weather data resources (Trenberth et al.,
2002). In the case of early COADS work, innovations with “blending”
different data sources and with “trimming” statistics to create monthly
summaries made the potential for a historical data-set a reality.
2. Similarly, the geo-political landscape was becoming more peaceful and
cooperative than it had been in nearly half a century. Riding the suc-
cess of the International Geophysical Year (1957-58), the exchange of
archival data among cooperating nations became common-place. A mi-
nor WMO resolution, 35 (Cg-IV), passed in 1963, further normalized
this practice. During this period NOAA was able to obtain a number
of international collections of punched card decks from major maritime
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counties - including archives from the Dutch, British, Japanese, Nor-
wegian national meteorological offices, as well as a collection of rare
Russian whaling logs from the 19th century. By the late 1960’s ef-
forts to combine the different logs had resulted in a series of “Tape
Deck Families” (TDF) that could be shared amongst cooperating na-
tions (Woodruff et al., 1987). Recognizing the potential value in this
exchange, the WMO then initiated an international effort to improve
bias in these records through the Historical Sea-Surface Temperature
(HSST) Data Project; with the NSF later supporting the USA’s par-
ticipation through a funding program titled, National Science Inter-
national Decade of Ocean Exploration (Woodruff, 1987). Because the
records were so large, and processing so computationally intensive, the
HSST divided the project up by Oceans - the USA responsible for Pa-
cific, Germany for the Atlantic, and the Netherlands for the Indian
Ocean. This initial effort generated a new set of SST data products,
as well as new techniques for both processing and combing different
data sources (buoys, ship logs, etc.). Notably, this was one of the first
WMO projects to use magnetic tape reels to store data which made it
considerably easier to access and use larger volumes of the archive.
3. Advances in supercomputing were enabling data processing tasks, in
particular the calculation of floating point operations, at speeds that
were previously unimaginable. Although still prohibitively expensive
to most research projects this new calculative power brought with it the
possibility to create comprehensive records by processing a large num-
ber of inhomogeneous datasets at a single location (Jaffe & Woodruff,
1983).
Pre-assembly
While each of these factors was important for COADS to be initially as-
sembled, it was perhaps the last point, which proved most fortuitous to the
ongoing HSST effort to create a comprehensive archive. In 1980, Wilmot
Bill Hess left NOAAs Environmental Research Laboratory (ERL) to become
the Executive Director of NCAR. Shortly after his appointment Hess secured
funding from DOE for NCAR to purchase a second supercomputer, a used
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Figure 8: NCAR’s supercomputing history, including the early CRAY 1a.
Cray-1A.3 Since NCAR purchased the Cray 1A used, it came with a trial
period that allowed NCAR engineers to calibrate and verify the machines
capabilities making certain that it met predetermined performance bench-
marks.
Before moving to NCAR, Hess had worked with J.O. Fletcher and was
sympathetic to the need for a comprehensive marine based climate record.
Having seen the value of such an archive during the HSST project, Hess
decided to allocate a full third of the new Crays trial time to the processing
TDF data, that could be made into a single, homogeneous dataset. In a
previously recoded interview Fletcher described how difficult ICOADS data
processing was, “just to read through it without doing anything to reformat,
or anything else, at that time was about $100,000 worth of computer time,
just to read through the goddamn thing once” (Shoemaker, 1997).
In total, the donation included over 1000 hours of Cray-equivalent CPU
time (Woodruff et al., 1987). In the initial publication that announced
COADS to the climate community, Slutz et al. acknowledge this debt, saying
“Throughout the effort, the support and encouragement of Dr. Wilmot N.
Hess was crucial, as Director of ERL during the early stages and as Director
of NCAR during the later stages” (1985).
3Besides having about 4.5 times the throughput of NCARs current computing infras-
tructure, the Cray 1A also included the first automatic vectorizing Fortran compiler (En-
abling many GCMs to be used and tested by NCARs community while they were devel-
oping the Community Climate Model 1 (Bath et al., 1987)).
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COADS versions 1, 1a, 1b, & 1c
Having collaborated widely on the initial assembly and processing of the data,
NOAA, NSF (through NCAR) and the Cooperative Institute for Research
in Environmental Sciences (CIRES) at the University of Colorado, began a
formal cooperative agreement to maintain and distribute the Comprehensive
Ocean and Atmosphere Dataset (COADS) into the future (Fletcher, 1983;
Woodruff et al., 1987).
In a foreword to one of the first COADS related publications, Fletcher
describes the process of creating the archive, saying:
It has taken four years and much effort by many individuals and
several institutions to obtain and process the hundreds of tapes
containing the basic data input. All of this effort was provided
from ongoing activities; there was no appropriation identified for
the task. It is a tribute to the spirit of cooperation among the
participating organizations that the task has been successfully
completed. (Slutz et al., 1985)
The fact that no direct government appropriations were used for the initial
creation of the COADS meant that there was also no expectation about how
it was to be served to end-users, updated, or maintained. While having no
funding meant that this work was somewhat sporadic in being completed, it
also meant that there were no cost-recovery expectations by federal funding
agencies.
It is important to note the historical context of this work; I’ve already
covered the WMO resolutions which described a moral imperative to freely
share marine data, but there were also a number of other legal and political
pressures at the time to monetize scientific research. In particular the 1980
Bayh-Dole Act had amended existing patent law so that the intellectual prop-
erty rights of inventions stemming from government funded research were no
longer re-assigned to the federal government (Mirowski, 2011). Universities,
small businesses, and non-profits, including FFRDC’s, were allowed to re-
tain ownership of inventions and monetize these resources as they saw fit.
While it would have been a contentious move to try to capitalize on the in-
ternational cooperation that resulted in COADS being assembled, the spirit
of entrepreneurship around basic science research was pervasive in the early
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1980’s (Gibbons, 2002). The decision of whether or not to create an artificial
barrier to entry (i.e. a price or membership model for access to COADS)
should be seen through this historical lens - the archive could have either
been distributed for free; or NOAA, NCAR, and CIRES could attempt to
recoup some expenses incurred in devoting labor and resources to creating
COADS.
The UKs Meteorological Office had been simultaneously processing and
developing a similar set of historical weather observations, the Main Ma-
rine Data Bank (MDB). The MDB was nearly as extensive in geographic
coverage as COADS, and included a number of unique datasets that were
not present in the initial release of COADS. At the time the UK Met Office
was, like many nations in the 1980s, selling these records to recoup the costs
of production and service. COADS partners felt the best way to achieve
an authoritative record was to combine efforts of the two different projects
(Woodruff, personal communication). The UK partners agreed but asked
COADS to purchase the MDB. COADS partners initially rebuffed the offer
and decided to focus instead on creating a free and openly accessible archive
in the spirit of Maury’s “common property of the world.”
In announcing the initial availability of COADS, early contributors often
described this decision on ethical grounds. For instance, an early publica-
tion that detailed the first release of COADS stated that the project would
consistently attempt to be authoritative and to further to, “make this record
available to the individual investigator in a form that is reliable and easy to
use for anyone interested” (Slutz et al, 1985).
COADS 1 (1979-1887)
The first release of COADS included a date range beginning in 1854 and
continued up until NOAA began processing data from the set of Tape Deck
Families described above (1979). In total, the tapes assembled for the ini-
tial release contained more than 71 million unique observations. Release 1
would include 11 different data products and their processing history (Jenne
& Woodruff, 1986), a Fortran 77 program on magnetic tape used to read
the packed binary-data (Woodruff et al., 1986), as well as a number of pub-
lications describing the statistical trimming methods used to create derived
variables (Slutz et al., 1985; Fletcher, 1983).
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COADS 1a, 1b (1992-1999)
COADS Release 1a, and 1b simply update and improve the coverage of in-
terim data products that were developed until 1992. This release also saw
the adoption of a systematic way to add newly collected data to the existing
records - a practice that would continue until 1995. COADS 1a was also
the first release to make electronic documentation available for download
through an anonymous FTP server. Release 1b improved data quality issues
discovered in records from 1950-1979 and included a set of Russian marine
logs from Arctic explorations. These interim releases also marked a point of
controversy in the early project. Biases discovered in the blended products
were numerous, and this led to disagreements about how the records should
be updated to reflect known errors. The re-processing of gridded data would
be expensive, and time consuming, but establishing COADS as a credible
source was one of the foremost early goals of the project.
Review of Governance in Regime 1
The blending of different data sources to create an authoritative record of
marine surface data was enabled by three factors:
• WMO Resolution 35 (cg XI) and the success of the IGY in 1957-
1958 created a more cooperative international exchange of marine data
sources.
• The HSST project serves as a proof of concept - a comprehensive and
authoritative historical record of marine weather was not only possible,
but would be exceptionally valuable to the climatology community
• Supercomputing facilities and statistical trimming techniques were avail-
able to make such a historical archive readily exchangeable and useful
to ongoing research.
4.4.3 Governance Variables
The production of early versions of COADS follows a very traditional self-
organized model of governance. The discretionary spending used to fund the
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initial project and the appeal to WMO resolutions for governance principles
(i.e. free and open exchange, no hierarchy of contribution) contributed to the
creation of a resource set that had low-rivalry and low degrees of excludability
- which was in opposition to competitor products which were being sold,
excluding a broader climate community from accessing these resources. In
short, this regime establishes a marine data commons that is to be informally
governed through provision and production.
4.4.4 Regime 2: 1999-2009
Three institutional features are prominent in COADS second governance
regime:
1. The project is renamed to ICOADS in recognition of international con-
tributions to release 2.
2. A governing body, The Joint Technical Commission for Oceanography
and Marine Meteorology (JCOMM) is established by WMO, further
nesting ICOADS work in the international climate and weather data
enterprise, and providing a closer link to WMO as an international
governing body for meteorological data.
3. A set of meetings, the JCOMM Workshop on Advances in Marine Cli-
matology (CLIMAR) and the Workshop on Advances in the Use of
Historical Marine Climate Data (MARCDAT), exchanged results from
recent research in marine climatology and coordinated future improve-
ments and enhancements to the historical marine climate data record
more generally.
When asked to describe this period, a participant characterized this as a
...time when other users of ICOADS started collaborating and
feeding back on the project. So, people like, big people in the
field, started doing a lot of work with ICOADS and using it for
various new products that they were doing and feeding all of that
back, what they learned, to project PI’s - that is really the start
of the evolution of ICOADS. [ISC-04]
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ICOADS Release 2
In 1997, after incremental improvements to COADS 1, 1a, and 1b were made
publicly available, planning began for the development of a second release.
The attention and enthusiasm that a decade’s worth of science had produced
for COADS brought with it new sources of data and funding (Woodruff et
al., 2001). Producing a new release of COADS included reprocessing and re-
analyzing all existing data, as well as blending new sources discovered in the
interim period (since 1979). This is a somewhat unique aspect of the produc-
tion process in ICOADS new releases; in order to properly compare duplicate
records, and integrate new data sources in existing gridding schemes, each
data source has to be completely reprocessed, using new algorithms and new
quality control benchmarks. This requires a substantial amount of coordi-
nation, and dedicated computing resources over what is typically a two to
three year process of producing a new release.
During this period of data processing, developers of COADS and the
UK Meteorological Office’s MDB negotiated terms upon which the two data
products would merge - improving known errors in both datasets as well as
moving towards a single, authoritative resource for the climatology commu-
nity to use. In describing the negotiations around this period, every commu-
nity member that I interacted with emphasized that this was not a natural
progression or a necessarily cooperative one.
One participant explained the state of data access in the following way,
For whatever reasons, it is much harder to prohibit data access
in the US. The UK, you know the MET, the Marine Data Bank,
they have a lot of overhead to make data easy to use. And if they
understood it they didn’t need to create those extra services.
They don’t. They couldn’t invest in it. When you look back
at the literature, pre-COADS, people use whatever. Sometimes
those TDFs, but there is nothing very authoritative there. The
Germans used their archive. I couldn’t use MDB because I didn’t
work at the Met. Nobody had to share. And they didn’t. So why
did they merge? They had to. The science wasn’t getting better
without it. [ISC02]
Although there was widespread agreement that the combination of the
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Figure 9: Records in ICOADS as shown by contributing nations (from
Woodruff et al., 2011).
two data sources would create a better product, another participant described
the process as contested,
It was heavily debated...COADS was a NOAA project, and it was
US centric I don’t want to say insular, but it was very “Boulder”
oriented. And the debate was... that is a lot of money, a lot
of resources went into collecting this data through the Voluntary
Observation Ship program, and that is supported by individual
nations. Not from a pool of funds. Those are investments...So
that debate really focused attention on the fact that COADS
should be looked at as an International dataset, because you know
a lot of other countries were putting money and data into it.
A single graphic from Release 2.0 emphasizes the point made by this
participant; In the figure below we see a breakdown of the nations that con-
tributed archival data to the project. Looking backwards in time to the early
20th century, almost all of these records come from nations other than the
USA and UK. What’s more, HSST data makes up a bulk of the mid-century
data products, and as was described above, that project was an international
“proof of concept” for the cooperation required in producing comprehensive
marine data products.
The proceedings of the first MARCDAT workshop, where the name change
would be voted upon by JCoMM members (described below), describes the
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process as follows,
In its final plenary session, the Workshop voted in support of the
name International Comprehensive Ocean-Atmosphere Data Set
(I-COADS) for the new blended observational database. This
name recognizes the multinational input to the database while
maintaining continuity of identity with COADS, which has been
widely used and referenced. (Diaz et al., 2001)
The very next sentence in the workshop proceedings invokes the history
of this enterprise, and is worth including here,
The Workshop was an appropriate lead-in to the conferences
planned by JCOMM for September 2003 in Brussels, to com-
memorate the 150th anniversary of the conference convened in
Brussels in 1853 by US Navy Lt. Matthew Fontaine Maury to
establish, inter alia ,the standardization of meteorological and
oceanographic observations from ships at sea. Maurys work (see
Lewis, 1996) remains the foundation of much operational and
research maritime meteorology and oceanography. (Diaz et al.,
2001)
The process of renaming the project is particularly useful example of
the difference between rules-in-form and rules-in-use. From my participant’s
perspective, the process of deciding to rename the project was contentious,
but necessary to advance the science being done. And yet, not one of them
remembered that the matter was put to a formal vote. In their minds, the
decision although contentious politically, was about scientific progress - as
my participant said “...the science wasn’t getting better without it” [ISC-06]
ICOADS Release 2.0 & Interim Products
In September of 2002, a second full release of COADS, and the first to be
titled I-COADS, was made publicly available. The data in this release would
initially include two archives, one of which was a real-time mode that included
a blending of data coming from the GTS, and the second was a delayed mode,
which would apply stricter quality controls to newer data, adding it on to
existing historical records (Worley et al., 2003). The delayed mode archive
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therefore encompassed Releases 1a (1980-97), 1b (1950-79), and 1c (1784-
1949), but reprocessed and improved by the addition of new data sources,
including the entirety of the Marine Data Bank.
Three additional innovations are important to this release period:
1. Documentation was put on an ICOADS dedicated website (eDocs).
This signaled a further move to decentralizing the knowledge of COADS
- users could also now submit bugs or report errors through this website
instead of via personal communication with developers. This is a subtle,
but important innovation that creates an ICOADS identity, instead of
a NOAA or NCAR identity.
2. Interim products would now be labeled like software releases, with a
decimal point signifying a new incremental improvement (e.g. 2.1, 2.2,
etc.). Interim products during this period occurred on regular intervals,
meant to show responsiveness to a new international community of
participants.
3. Release 2.1 in 2003 would adopt the new ASCII IMMA format, an
innovation which would standardize the exchange of marine data, and
influence policy about data sharing at both the national (NOAA) level
and the international (WMO) level. This further demonstrates the
influence of ICOADS as an international authority and marks a certain
reputation amongst international partners as a standards bearer.
Release 2.1 would also see the resolution of the ICOADS gridding scheme
improve, with “2 degrees latitude x 2 degrees longitude and 1x1 boxes begin-
ning in 1800 and 1960 respectively” (Worley et al., 2005). While this seems
like a minor improvement, the change in resolution enabled easier integration
with other environmental data available at the time (Woodruff et al., 2006).
JCoMM
Until 1999 the World Meteorological Organization coordinated data man-
agement and observing systems related to meteorology and oceanography
through two different governing bodies - the Commission for Marine Meteo-
rology (CMM) and UNESCO’s IOC jointly with WMO, through the Commit-
tee for the Integrated Global Ocean Services System (IGOSS). Citing a need
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to combine overlapping expertise, the WMO wrote that “While enhancing
safety at sea remained the primary objective of marine forecast and warning
programmes, requirements for data and services steadily expanded in volume
and breadth during the preceding decades. Moreover, many other applica-
tions required observational data sets and prognostic products for both the
oceans and the overlying atmosphere”(2011). To better coordinate the col-
lection and curation of data in these two domains, the Joint Technical Com-
mission for Oceanography and Marine Meteorology (JCOMM) was formed.
To reflect the shared responsibility of this commission, it is co-chaired by
both a meteorologist and an oceanographer.
The combined domain expertise of JCoMM directly preceded the inter-
national relabeling of COADS, which blends oceanographic and atmospheric
datapoints. The formalization of the governance of this domain in part helped
the ICOADS project partners realize the international scope of their work,
especially through the founding of marine climatology workshops described
below.
CLIMAR & MARCDAT “Sustaining the International Community”
In parallel with the formation of JCoMM as an international governing body
of the WMO, two related workshops were designed to bring together stake-
holders of the marine climate data community. Advances in Marine Clima-
tology (CLIMAR) brought together a community of developers and users
of surface marine climate data, while the Advances in the Use of Historical
Marine Climate Data (MARCDAT) workshop focused specifically on users
of historical weather data for climate research. CLIMAR and MARCDAT
are important to cooperation within those domains and often results in con-
certed efforts to improve known errors or in collaboration around on-going
projects.
For example, through early international coordination at MARCDAT,
ICOADS project partners agreed to coordinate their work at reducing biases
related to Sea Surface Temperature (SST) variables, and to increase (where
possible) data coverage in order to contribute to planned international cli-
mate assessments. Diaz et al. write about this process in the proceedings of
the 2002 MARCDAT, “A staged timetable for implementation was agreed:
firstly, a two-year period would lead to the third C20C Workshop around
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April 2004; and, secondly, a period of about five years would lead to the
Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC)” (2001). ICOADS partners successfully met these targets,
and the contribution to AR4 was noted by lead authors of Working Group
1, who used these SST measurements extensively (AR4, 2007).
Review of Governance in Regime 2
ICOADS second regime developed an institutional capacity to collaborate
more broadly and to systematize a release schedule. During this period,
the formalization of an international governing body for meteorology and
oceanography (JCoMM) had a nesting effect for ICOADS own governance;
it placed organizational pressure on ICOADS to conform to certain models of
distribution promulgated by the WMO, but JCoMM also took on the respon-
sibility of coordinating stakeholders through the MARCDAT and CLIMAR
workshops. Additionally, the founding of JCoMM brought with it the oppor-
tunity to promote ICOADS own standardization work, such as the IMMA
format for exchanging marine data, and to gather consensus on future direc-
tions of the archive so as to best meet broader climate assessment goals.
This regime marks a clear division from an initial COADS governance
which was “self-organized ” to a “polycentric” model which nests rule making
and enforcement at different levels, and creates jurisdiction or institutional
overlap in promulgating new rules.
4.4.5 Regime 3: 2009- Present
The defining features of ICOADS third (on-going) regime is the release of a
valuable interim product, ICOADS 2.5, and the continued formalization of its
governance body. In early 2012, funding was partially eliminated for critical
members of the ICOADS team at NOAA. This caused disruptions for planned
enhancements to the archive, but overall the focus of the ICOADS community
remains on: 1. Coordination of ICOADS release 3.0 and the ICOADS Value
Added Database (IVAD) which brings with it a new contribution mechanism
for ICOADS stakeholders; and 2. Making a formal application to the WMO
for ICOADS to be recognized as a Center for Marine-Meteorological and
Oceanographic Climate Data (CMOC).
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Figure 10: As Woodruff et al. (2011) state, “Annual percentage ocean area
sampled for SST for R2.5 (red curve) compared to R2.4 (blue curve) (right
axis). Annual percentage increase in global ocean area sampled for R2.5,
compared to R2.4 (bars, left axis).”
ICOADS 2.5
In late 2009 data processing began for an interim ICOADS release 2.5. This
product would further enhance real-time access to end users, substantially
reduce the burden of sub-setting ICOADS, and included a number of im-
proved bias adjustments. Previously released interim products (2.1 -2.4)
had incorporated some new data, but a substantial amount of new digitized
products from international partners was now available, including newly dig-
itized data from the RECovery of Logbooks And International Marine data
(RECLAIM). A journal article describing this new release indicates the fur-
ther international cooperation in this process, “Data provision, collation, and
distribution remain the responsibility of the founding partners, but other
countries and international organisations including the Joint World Mete-
orological Organisation (WMO) Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commis-
sion (IOC) Technical Commission for Oceanography and Marine Meteorology
(JCOMM) now make noteworthy contributions” (Woodruff et al., 2011). As
a result, release 2.5 made substantive improvements in the coverage and com-
pleteness of data sampling over the ocean as shown in the figure below.
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ICOADS role in Climate Reanalysis
Climate reanalysis are a relatively new approach to data assimilation in earth
systems science. The major goal of a reanalysis project is to give a numerical
account of the very recent past (10, 20, or 40 year time steps) using a combi-
nation of archived climate and (very recent) weather data with whole earth
models. Because the “inputs” for reanalysis assimilations require broad cov-
erage (both space and time), ICOADS has been used regularly in reanalysis
projects that include an ocean component (e.g. Trenberth et al., 2002). Re-
analysis datasets are some of the most important and valuable resources that
the climate science community has produced in the last 20 years (Edwards,
2011, p. 323-8).
One participant described her work on input datasets for reanalysis projects
in the following way,
My career would have been a lot different if I had focused on
the exploitation of the data rather than the improvement of the
data. And that is why citations are important. If you start out
with my metadata publications, it gets tens of citations, ICOADS
papers get hundreds, but the gridded datasets, and especially the
reanalysis stuff those get tens of thousands of publications. And
you do look upwards and think tens of thousands of citations?
[ISC-06]
This is to note that while the financial value of reanalysis datasets has
been enormous, these research products have also paid dividends to those
with their names attached. So, while individual scientists working to improve
parts of ICOADS records fail to garner much attention, the project as a
whole has been recognized throughout the climate community as a high-
quality resource partially as a results of its continued use in climate reanalysis
projects. This is an important outcome for the project, as developers of
ICOADS 2.5 note in their description of enhancements to the archive,
...NOAA, the European Center for Medium-Range Weather Fore-
casts (ECMWF), the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA), and
the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
have all taken advantage of ICOADS for their reanalysis. Com-
munication between reanalysis centers and the ICOADS devel-
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opers is excellent. Each new reanalysis is based on the most
recent ICOADS update, thereby taking advantage of any im-
provements in data quality or quantity based on the efforts of
marine data experts. ICOADS therefore reduces efforts required
for data preparation and quality control for reanalysis projects.
In a complimentary manner, reanalysis efforts (e.g. Compo et
al., 2006) also uncover data problems in ICOADS that feedback
to the developers and lead to future improvements. (Woodruff et
al, 2011).
Defunding of NOAA Partners
Amid political turmoil around federal budget allocations for FY 2013, NOAA
announced in the winter of 2012 that it would eliminate future support of
ICOADS through the Climate Program Office (CPO). A public announce-
ment made in February of that year reads:
For budgetary reasons, stemming from pending large cuts at the
NOAA Climate Program Office (CPO), ESRL Directors have de-
termined that it is no longer feasible for its Physical Science Di-
vision (PSD) to continue supporting any further ICOADS work
effective immediately. (NOAA, 2012)
Even though ICOADS acts as an input to many downstream data products,
it is viewed as a research project by federal agencies. In an extended conver-
sation about this decision, a long-time ICOADS project partner explained
this reasoning:
The number one thing to recognize from that period is, one of the
drawbacks for most soft-money produced data products, whether
its ICOADS or something similar, these are not sanctioned data
products like the National Weather Service, these are done un-
der research funding and most people think of research funding
being time limited, and often times the folks that develop these
products are not the best marketers, and they’re not very adept
at or even equipped to trace how they are used... [ISC-04]
In response to this decision, ICOADS project partners were able to secure
letters of support from prominent international partners. The initial impact
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of this defunding has been minimal to end-users who have experienced little
disruption on their access of ICOADS, but this controversy greatly delayed
work on a third release, and stunted the development of a new valued added
database (IVAD).
When asked about gathering support from the international community,
a long-time project partner offered the following description:
I think what happened was a funding cut came down from NOAA...and
whoever was making that decision did not understand how im-
portant ICOADS is to the research community. How widely used
it is... because there was no statistics, there is no metrics of how
many people would all of the sudden have their data products dis-
rupted if ICOADS goes away, and that resulted in a very quick
and fairly effective outpouring of letters of support, from major
agencies around the world that used ICOADS...There were di-
rectors of major research institutes and operational institutions
around the world that said ‘Hey, we need this product continued.’
[ISC-03]
In the late fall of 2012 NOAA agreed to restore partial funding of ICOADS,
but shifted financial support from the Earth Systems Laboratory (ESRL) to
the National Climate Data Center (NCDC). This event had four substantive
impacts on ICOADS and its governance model:
1. After the Winter of 2012 defunding announcement, project partners
immediately began negotiating the terms of a “Letter of Intent (LOI) to
Enhance Support for the International Comprehensive Ocean-Atmosphere
Data Set (ICOADS) Program through International Partnership.” The
letter of intent is a non-binding document, similar to a memorandum
of understanding, which has no legally enforceable obligations, but in-
stead spells out the terms of cooperation between project partners in
order to, “more formally recognize existing and planned international
contributions that build on the ongoing investment in ICOADS.” Signa-
tories include: the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) National Climatic Data Center (NCDC), Cooperative Insti-
tute for Research in Environmental Sciences (CIRES) University of Col-
orado, National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR), Deutscher
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Wetterdienst (DWD), Center for Earth System Research and Sustain-
ability - University of Hamburg, UK Met Office, Climatic Research
Unit (CRU) - University of East Anglia (UEA), and the UK National
Oceanography Centre (NOC).
2. An international steering committee (ISC) was formed in order to es-
tablish ICOADS future goals, including “new tasks and their prioritiza-
tion; cooperation on identifying partner-specific experts for each task;
and facilitation of expanded international cooperation.” The ISC in-
cludes a representative from each of the signing institutions of the letter
of intent. The steering committee is to have the following structure:
led by a chair on a rotating basis between signatories, each member
will hold a formal voting right (how voting is conducted, who calls a
vote, etc. is not described), and institutional entrance or exit from the
committee will require a 30 day notice to other members.
3. The letter also formalizes roles that each project partner should take
on. These roles are defined in agreement with a set of ICOADS project
goals, which include “cooperation and collaboration on the rescue, dig-
itization, assembly, processing, quality control (QC), and archival of
surface marine meteorological and oceanographic data, for the express
purpose of making such data openly and freely available. This avail-
ability will be accomplished primarily through the joint completion and
issuance of major new ICOADS Releases, and intermediate products,
together with their accompanying technical documentation and jour-
nal publications.” The importance of these formally stated goals is
that individual partners are assigned specific tasks in completing or
contributing to these development efforts.
4. The move from ESRL to NCDC greatly impacted the dynamic of the
ICOADS’s leadership. The longtime PI of the project, based at ESRL,
moved to part-time and has since announced he will retire in Spring
2015. Additionally, three key resources - a full time programmer,
remote-access systems for NetCDF users, and a set of virtual servers -
were not replaced in the shift of responsibilities from ESRL to NCDC.
All of this greatly impacted the speed at which work on a third release
could proceed.
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CMOC
ICOADS partners, after signing the letter of intent, were encouraged by
JCoMM to seek out status as a Centre for Marine-Meteorological and Oceano-
graphic Climate Data (CMOCs) from the WMO. As a CMOC, ICOADS
could be recognized formally by JCoMM and the WMO as an essential
research infrastructure for the weather and climate data enterprise. This
would encourage a greater number of international partners to formally sign
ICOADS letter of intent for cooperation and allow project partners to more
easily appeal to national funding agencies for financial support to contribute
to ICOADS development. In my interviews with ISC board members, status
as a CMOC was widely endorsed but often came with caveats of the draw-
back to further entrenching ICOADS in the bureaucracy of the WMO. A
participant explained the tradeoffs in applying for CMOC status as follows:
...one of the drawbacks to getting quote unquote recognized by
JCoMM and WMO is they have a very heavy bureaucracy, they
have a very heavy bureaucratic structure because JCoMM and
WMO are both a part of the United Nations... the diplomatic
structures there, it takes a long time to get things done... a single
document can take years to get approved. One of the pluses, at
least this is the way we see it, if you are recognized by this in-
ternational body as being an important part of the either the cli-
mate or weather infrastructure, that data infrastructure gives you
leverage in your individual countries to get dedicated resources.
[ISC-01]
Another drawback is that the WMO’s Vision for a Marine Climate Data
System (MCDS) is relatively new, and there is little administrative support
for the initiative within JCoMM. As such, ICOADS would be the first CMOC
recognized by the WMO. Many participants expressed concern that it is
unclear what responsibilities the status will hold within the WMO, and what
kinds of resources will be available to CMOCs for impacting broader WMO
policy.
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ICOADS Release 3.0
The letter of intent signed by project partners emphasizes the following point,
“By signing, partners agree to work closely with the common goal of enhanc-
ing and internationalizing ICOADS, including the near-term goal of complet-
ing the next major delayed-mode update, Release 3.0.”
As a result of new sources of data becaming available through the At-
mospheric Circulation Reconstructions over the Earth (ACRE) project, and
dedicated supercomputing time at NCAR making it feasible for records pro-
cessing, ICOADS partners had been planning the next full data release since
2011. The defunding of ICOADS came at an inopportune time as developers
at ESRL were planning to improve IMMA software for formatting ICOADS
3 data. Work on blending contemporary GTS data continued, but the de-
lay in a new software package for IMMA formatting greatly delayed the re-
processing of older records. Originally scheduled for completion in December
of 2014, ICOADS partners have now targeted early 2016 as a release date.
Release 3 will include a number of major improvements, but there are
two important innovations to note:
1. For the first time, unique report identifiers (UID) system will be used
to assign ids to individual records in ICOADS historical archive. This
means that all 295 million records would be serialized and will be more
easily accessed by end users. Further, the scheme adopted for UIDs is
also in use by other community projects (upper-atmosphere datasets),
and is intended to greatly reduce the burden of integrating ICOADS in
future reanalysis projects (Freeman et al., 2014).
2. In 2011, the design of a new product called the ICOADS Value-Added
Database (IVAD) was funded by NOAAs Climate Observation and
Monitoring Division. The concept is a novel design for aggregating
different bias corrections and improvements in the ICOADS archive
so that users can “select” which corrections they want at a point of
download. IVAD is an important scientific innovation, but this prod-
uct also changes the nature of ICOADS division of labor in producing
new resources.
In the IVAD model, end-users will be able to follow an established
protocol to submit bias corrections and volunteer to do peer review for
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submitted corrections. Eventually these new datasets will be integrated
into the existing archive such that an end user, for instance, looking for
SST could pose a query and get bias corrections with different features,
select which features were important to her, and then download original
and processed records side-by-side. This moves ICOADS from a real-
time “develop and release” dataset to a peer-produced resource that
improves incrementally with direct user contributions.
This process... I mean, this is very unique - this is a concept
that has not been implemented for the in-situ observing sys-
tems. Most of the datasets out there - the data quality is
assessed by a single organization. And they put the quality
flags on data points, they decide what’s a good value and
what’s a bad value - not always very clear either. There is
not a whole lot of feedback loop on these products. [ISC 03]
IVAD’s model of contribution, as described above, has been modeled
after open-source software projects working in distributed settings. In
some sense IVAD will turn ICOADS releases into a common pool and
from this shared resource concert a primary resource to a “kernel” - one
which can be developed around and on top of. Like the governance of
the second regime, the impact of IVAD on the ICOADS project is that
of nesting one system inside another. In this case, ICOADS will further
establish itself as a platform on which others develop and innovate with
applications that make it more accessible, and easier to use in different
contexts, by different users. I return to the larger implications of this
nesting process in the following chapter.
Review of Regime 3
Regime three includes the very recent past of ICOADS governance and its
on-going work to develop an innovative new release. Although much shorter
than the two previous regimes, this period has two significant implications
for an evolving ICOADS governance model:
1. A letter of intent, signed by seven international project partners, es-
tablishes a number of formal governance mechanisms, including policy
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instruments and positional rules.
2. The design and integration of IVAD will dramatically change the pro-
duction process of ICOADS, and in turn will create a new set of benefits
and costs for the governance model to balance.
4.5 Summary
This chapter has summarized the differences between two frameworks, the
Institutional Analysis and Development and Knowledge Commons Frame-
work, and justified an innovation with both of these frameworks to present
an analysis of the ICOADS case study data. Background information on
ICOADS history was provided to develop a better understanding of the con-
text in which ICOADS was developed, including a number of formal policies
at the international level and failed legislation at the national level. Many
of these policies not only act as precedence for future actions within the
domain of marine climatology, but also provide a moral framework which
guides the broader cooperation of individual actors and institutions within
this domain. ICOADS various resource sets and community member roles
were thoroughly described in justifying the division of the case study into
three separate governance regimes - each representing a major difference in
one of these resources or member roles. In the next Chapter the major find-
ings of this analysis are described and answers to the dissertation’s research
questions formally stated in Chapter 2.
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CHAPTER 5
A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO
GOVERNANCE IN THE KNOWLEDGE
COMMONS
This chapter begins with a review of the claims made in Chapter 4 which
focused on the evolution of governance in the ICOADS project. A set of
“systems state” variables are developed to reliably compare aspects of each
governance regime that contributes to the overall sustainability of ICOADS.
Three broad themes are discussed in detail: 1. The evolution of governance
models, 2. The periods leading up to and following a regime shift, and
3. the set of variables that correlate with a governance shift. To further
test the efficacy of system state variables for explaining the effectiveness
of governance the ICOADS case is then compared to data gathered from
three previously completed case studies. This cross-case comparison reveals
important differences in the effectiveness of governance in the knowledge
commons - including factors of age / maturity, resource type, and funding
mechanisms. The results of both analyses are used to answer the overall
research questions of the dissertation.
5.1 Case Study: ICOADS
The case study data organized by the Knowledge Commons Framework in
Chapter 4 included the following categories: background environment, com-
munity attributes, governance and rules-in-use. The Governance sections of
Chapter 4 were divided into three “action arenas,” each consisting of a set of
governance outcomes. In the following sections this data is reviewed in the
form of coded state variables for each regime.
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5.1.1 System State Variables
State variables simply characterize a system at a particular period of time
(Walker et al., 2006). When defined through consensus or formal standard-
ization processes they can be used to compare different types of systems
at the same state or similar systems at different states. Research on so-
cioecological systems has shown that this comparative approach to studying
complex systems allows for sustainability analysis that is both reproducible
by other researchers and reusable in new contexts (Cox, 2014). The process
of developing a coding scheme for these variables took the following steps:
1. Identifying relevant variables from the Socioecological Systems Meta-
analysis Database (SESMAD) project (Cox, 2014) for a sociotechnical
system.
2. Identifying relevant literature to generate variable definitions.
3. Coding each regime based on relevant data from the ICOADS case
study.
4. Reviewing the codings with my key informant for the sake of external
validity.
5. Iteratively editing definitions for consistency.
The outcome of this work is summarized in the table below which codes
all three periods of ICOADS governance described in Chapter 4:
Variable Name Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3
Begin date 1981 2001 2011
End Date 2000 2010 Present
Description In Text In Text In Text
Multiple levels Single-Level Governance International Governance International Governance
Institutional diversity Low Medium Medium
Centralization 4 (Highly Centralized) 3 (Somewhat Centralized) 2 (Somewhat Decentralized)
Governance scale State-based International International
Scale match No-Match Match Match
Selective Pressures Competition, Resource Availability Competition, Technological Innovation Obsolescence, Resource Availability
Articulation Medium Low Low
Capital High High High
Coordination Low High High
Governance trigger Slow Continuous Change Slow Continuous Change Sudden Disturbance
Diagnostic Capacity Neither Treating proximate causes (symptoms) Treating underlying drivers
Autonomy High- complete autonomy Moderate- some autonomy Moderate - some autonomy
Metric diversity Low- no metrics for success Medium- some metrics for success Medium- some metrics for success
Rules-In-Use Position, Authority Information, Payoff Boundary, Aggregation, Scope
Policy instrument Incentive Based Instruments Incentive Based Instruments Input and Output Based Standards
Table 5. Coded State Variables from the each regime of the ICAODS case
study.
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The process of generating codes for this data and further contextual infor-
mation on the testing and refining these variables can be found in Appendix
A. Below, the results of this analysis and three broad themes are used to
structure a discussion of the role that governance has played in sustaining
ICOADS as a knowledge commons.
Summary of Rules and State Variables
The systematic approach to characterizing state variables shows a number
of important relationships between these variables and their impact on gov-
ernance.
• Governance scale, scale match, and the sub-variable articulation all
correlated strongly with governance triggers. These are not causes for
but contexts of state changes such as a regime shift.
• Selective pressures and the sub-variables articulation, capital, and co-
ordination are illustrative of both the ways in which governance states
experience and react to disturbances. In ICOADS case these variables
are strongly related to the rules-in-use and policy instruments used by
each regime.
• Diagnostic capabilities help explain the effectiveness of a governance
model in understanding the underlying causes of governance triggers,
and in turn, provide helpful context for understanding the impact of
selective pressures.
• The analysis of rules-in-use shows how rule types accumulate over time,
and that as a governance system is formalized, more bureaucracy is
added to specify not just who holds power or authority, but how that
power is transferred (boundary rules), and how responsibilities assigned
by an authority are directly mapped to outcomes (aggregation rules).
• I caution against judging the addition of new rules, and the expansion
of existing rule types ( e.g. authority rules in Regime 3) as either pos-
itive or negative evolution of the governance system. The more impor-
tant variable related to sustainability is the match between governance,
stakeholders, and resource sets.
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In each section below I explore a broad research theme. I first summa-
rize the main argument of each theme and then support these assertions by
comparing different variables that describe a period of ICOADS governance.
5.1.2 Case Study Theme 1: Different Governance Models
Used by ICOADS
ICOADS moved from a monocentric governance model, with a single center
of authority, to a polycentric model, which nests rule making at various insti-
tutional levels and scales. The polycentric model has a comparable effect as
the “comedy of the commons” where public goods are efficiently provisioned
by encouraging actors to sustain a resource set through co-production of its
resources. However, polycentric models are not a panacea. The nesting of
authority at different levels may create interdependencies among institutions
that proves costly to the sustainability of long-term cooperation.
Supporting narrative
ICOADS governance evolved steadily over its thirty year period, with only
three definitive shifts in models. Each shift is marked, as a I described in
Chapter 4, by the need to produce a new data release, but also by unique
forms of selective pressures and disturbances to the status quo of research in
marine climatology.
ICOADS first regime relied upon a mono-centric system of governance.
This model assigned rules and coordinated actions between only the part-
ners that produced COADS release 1; namely NOAA, NCAR, and CIRES. A
monocentric system can be defined as a “... single decision structure that has
an ultimate monopoly over the legitimate exercise of coercive capabilities”
(Ostrom 1972; as quoted in McGinnis 1999, p. 556). This is evidenced by
the types of rules that are established; Position and authority rules are each
aimed at establishing a basis of power: Who is in charge? What responsibil-
ities do those positions then hold for the governance of the resource set? In
regime 1 the power of authority was not distributed evenly, there was a lack
of governance and resource scale match and the policy instruments (which
were incentive-based) each led to the monocentric governance model failing.
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ICOADS second regime was marked by the introduction of a parent or-
ganization, JCoMM, and a set of formal workshops —MARCDAT and CLI-
MAR. In effect, these semi-formal institutions shifted the regime from a
monocentric to self-governance model which can be defined as the, “capac-
ity of communities to organize themselves so they can actively participate
in all (or at least the most important) decision processes relating to their
own governance.” (McGinnis, 2011) This is evidenced by the monocentric
governance model being, at least symbolically, voted upon by stakehold-
ers at CLIMAR 1 (1999). Introducing a new name and a new system of
releasing data, communicating with end-users, and coordinating the tasks
of improving ICOADS data for use in large-scale climate efforts was done,
almost exclusively, through informal participation of community members.
This combination of formal and semi-formal served nonetheless to shift the
power structure from a centralized to a decentralized form.
The shift between ICOADS second and third regime includes a nesting of
its self-organization into a polycentric model. Although ICOADS governance
model formalized it did not move towards a command control, or centralized
model; instead, the rules and enforcements mechanism that guided actors
behaviors became nested within a number of national, international, organi-
zational, and disciplinary jurisdictions of authority.
Polycentricity is defined by Aligica and Tarko as “structural feature of
social systems of many decision centers having limited and autonomous pre-
rogatives and operating under an overarching set of rules” (2011). The idea
of a polycentric order was first offered by Michael Polanyi in the “The Logic
of Liberty” (1951) and later used by Vincent Ostrom in the 1970’s during
debates about the efficiency of administrative structures in American mu-
nicipalities (Aligica & Boettke, 2009). Critical to the study at hand is the
fact that Polyani originally developed the idea of polycentricy to describe
the governance of science - which pursued knowledge in a variety of different
disciplines and was hence subject to a variety of different value systems. But,
what Polanyi described was the oddity that such a large enterprise could ef-
fectively function with no appeal to an ultimate power authority. Instead,
informal rules and norms are learned through initiation, apprenticeship, and
the evolution of social orderings. He was, in some sense, identifying this
mode of knowledge production as a form of knowledge commons whereby no
one in particular owned or governed the pool of ideas and theories that each
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individual discipline drew upon in making their own unique claims.
A passage from Aligica and Tarko clarifies an important point about
Polanyi’s writing of polycentric systems in science, “...an abstract and un-
deroperationalized ideal cannot be imposed on the participants by an over-
arching authority. Thus, the authority structure has to allow a multitude
of opinions to exist, and to allow them not just as hypotheticals, but as
ideas actually implemented into practice. The attempt to impose progress
toward an abstract ideal is doomed to failure, as progress is the outcome
of a trial-and-error evolutionary process of many agents interacting freely”
(2011).
Polycentricity then is the absence of a centralized power, combined with
a nested structure which allows the “many centers of authority” to cooperate
effectively through trial and error. The emergence of cooperation through
interactions is the crux of both Ostrom’s work and that of David Axelrod in
his seminal work on game theory (1982).
In contemporary science settings, such as ICOADS, the division of la-
bor is becoming increasingly dependent upon collective action and thus the
emergence of peering, including peer production, is itself a stylized form of
a polycentric model of governance. The “trial-and-error evolutionary pro-
cesses of many agents interacting freely” that mark cooperative institutions
like ICOADS allows them to organize complex processes of knowledge pro-
duction across differences in time, space, and organizational cultures. In
ICOADS, this nesting of authority takes the following shape:
At the uppermost level is the World Meteorological Organization1 which
promulgates resolutions and standards for all of meteorology to follow. Nested
within the WMO is the Joint WMO-IOC Technical Commission for Oceanog-
raphy and Marine Meteorology (JCOMM), an intergovernmental body that
promotes standards and coordinated marine observation systems, as well as
data management. Nested within JCoMM are a series of workshops, CLI-
MAR and MARCDAT, which coordinate the research activities and agendas
of the field of marine climatology. As Kent et al. put it, the “backbone of
this work” is ICOADS (2001), a knowledge commons whose governance is
now shaped by a steering committee with representatives from seven different
international research centers and universities. Each representative is further
1The WMO is, itself, nested within the United Nations
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nested within laboratories, research groups, and the various sub-fields that
their research contributes to.
ICOADS polycentric system of governance operates efficiently because
there is no one authority that transcends any one level of governance. Each
level is able to appeal to a different level for directions on standards, operating
procedures, or guidance. There is no polycentric police, judge, or jury. There
is no legal or financial obligation, for example, if the organizations that signed
a “letter of intent to cooperate” choose to leave ICOADS. But there are rules,
and there are social repercussions for violating norms related to the historical
background from which a commons emerges. In the case of ICOADS, the
polycentric governance model creates a freedom to operate within one’s own
nation, discipline, or technical competence, but at the same time provides a
rule set, and an enforcement strategy at various levels, types, and sectors of
governance.
The polycentric model of governance has two important implications for
sustainability within knowledge commons:
1. As Carole Rose explained in the “comedy of the commons” (1986),
public goods are successfully provisioned, in part, because the users of
these resource system are made complicit in their maintenance and up-
keep. Such a complex system of duty and responsibility is impossible
to design without some amount of rules, authority, and norms being
nested within a community structure. Similarly, the polycentric model
of governance in ICOADS has become successful because it enables
loosely connected stakeholders, even those that are not formally part
of the governance body to contribute through letters of support, at-
tendance and engagement in CLIMAR and MARCDAT, and through
contributions to improving biases in the data -either formally by mak-
ing submissions to IVAD, or informally through filing bug reports to
ICOADS data curators. Like the comedy of the commons description,
the efficiency of such a complex institution would be difficult to predict
and even harder to purposefully design. By creating a symmetry to
operate within the commons, the polycentric model is able to achieve
a high level of efficiency.
2. Nesting governance at different levels creates a certain amount of pro-
tection from disruptive disturbances by the very fact that the commons
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is coordinated across different levels and scales of governance. But,
these interdependencies are also dangerous for the very fact that fail-
ure at a high level has the potential to cascade negative effects down
to each subsequent level. For instance, federal budget disagreements
about funding for basic science research cascaded down to the ICOADS
project level in a rather dramatic fashion. In the reverse, information
asymmetries that exist between users and producers of ICOADS data,
also promulgate through systems of aggregation - as was demonstrated
by errors in ICOADS metadata records that were then harvested and
published by the Global Change Master Directory (Weber, Thomer &
Worley, 2014).
5.1.3 Case Study Theme 2: Regime Shifts in Governing the
Knowledge Commons
Regime shifts are analyzed by how a knowledge commons to coordinate re-
sponses to selection pressures. A regime shift is related to selection pressures,
diagnostics, and a number of other state variables - but ultimately, a regime
will shift either out of opportunity (to improve upon the current model) or
our of necessity (to avoid collapse). The ability of any system to respond
to pressures and return to a functioning state can be described as resilience.
ICOADS, in responding to selective pressures, has demonstrated an ability
to reconfigure its governance model in order to adapt to a variety of different
selection pressures. This is due, in part, to its flexibility in adopting new rules
as well as its ability to formalize its governance when faced with pressures
related to financial support. It is unclear how, or to what extent, this find-
ing holds true in other sociotechnical systems facing similar circumstances.
Transitions between governance regimes and adaptivity are suggested as a
future direction for sociotechnical systems research.
Supporting Narrative
Following Smith, Stirling, and Berkhout (2005), I will explain a regime shift
as a combination of:
1. Selection pressures bearing on a governance regime.
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2. The coordination of the current governance model to adapt to these
pressures.
In the following sections, I characterize the regime shift in ICOADS gov-
ernance between the first and second, and the second and third regimes. I
then describe the implications of these processes on ICOADS sustainability.
Regime Shift 1 to 2
In Regime 1, selection pressures where characterized as “competition” and
“resource availability.”
Niche competition within the climate science community for an ocean-
atmosphere dataset resulted in significant conflict between the UK Meteo-
rological Office, and the USA partners that were producing COADS. While
both offered high quality data products, COADS could not make up for the
temporal and spatial coverage of records that MDB held, and MDB con-
versely did not have the data processing capabilities, nor a sufficient cost-
recovery model to significantly expand MDB.
COADS partners originally drew upon a principle of “free and unre-
stricted exchange” from the WMO Resolution 35, as well as the legacy of
Lt. Matthew Maury in producing an open access resource. The cooperating
COADS institutions forfeited their intellectual property claim to these early
resource sets, and over time model of distribution helped COADS establish
itself as a high quality data source within the climate science community.
However, it was not a principle of openness, a resolution from a governing
body, nor a naval legacy that would cause COADS to merge with its main
rival, the MDB; instead, as my participant explained, “So, why did they
merge? They had to. The science wasn’t getting better without it” [ISC -
02].
The shift from a monocentric governance model to a self-governance
model was a result of a collective desire to improve upon the current state
of knowledge. This manifested itself in selective pressures like competition
and resource availability and the development of information rules regard-
ing what information must be shared amongst which partners. Payoff rules,
which specified who was to receive what benefits and when, were also first
developed during this regime. An example of this type of rule can be seen
116
in a scenario where the UK MET office would receive an advance copy of
ICOADS processed data, with enhanced statistical subsets related to SST.
This gave the UK MET the ability to capitalize on their shared data, and be-
gin working towards valuable secondary ICOADS data, such as the HadSST
products.
Regime Shift 2 to 3
A shift between regime 2 and 3 was precipitated exclusively by the loss of fi-
nancial support to NOAA partners. This sudden disturbance created a threat
that ICOADS would no longer be a reliable source of marine surface data.
The major selection pressure in this regime is “obsolescence”, as ICOADS
is forced to coordinate a broad network of actors in response to mounting
pressure that it will not be able to serve end users, and produce a valued
third release.
In coordinating a response, ICOADS project partners in the USA for-
malized agreements with international partners through a letter of intent
to cooperate which had the effect of further decentralizing the governance
model. This letter of intent also added a new set of boundary, authority,
and scope rules that would assign decision making power, establish voting
mechanisms, and introduce new policy instruments for use by specific actors.
This regime shift, like the one previous, had a nesting effect and contributed
largely to ICOADS shifting from self-governance to a polycentric model.
Causation
The explanations above make use of descriptive state variables which I argue
can help reduce the complexity of understanding a sociotechnical system’s
response to pressures. However, these descriptions are not pointing out direct
cause and effect mechanisms even where relationships between variables are
observed. With this in mind, two broad conclusions can be drawn about the
process of regime shifts in ICOADS:
1. As a sociotechnical system, ICOADS was able to absorb the effects of
these pressures, and to coordinate responses which allowed for success-
ful regime transitions. In this sense, ICOADS is a robust sociotechnical
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Figure 11: A system - whether biological, ecological, organizational, etc. -
is said to go through an adaptive cycle, where the ability to move between a
back loop (e.g. alpha to omega ) to a fore loop (e.g. r to K) is a function of
a system’s resilience. Figure from Holling (1973).
system by the very fact that it was able to effectively respond to these
pressures. However, not all selective pressures and effects of a shift are
equal. In the shift from regime 2 to 3 it is evident that there continue
to be difficulties in producing a third release and in fully realizing the
potential of planned enhancements, such as the ICOADS value-added
database (IVAD).
2. Cycles of adaptivity, and system’s level resilience are an important
future direction for knowledge commons scholars interested in sustain-
ability. In Chapter 1, I offered a definition of resilience as the “measure
of the persistence of systems and of their ability to absorb change and
disturbance and still maintain the same relationships between popula-
tions or state variables” (Holling, 1973). But, the linear description of
moving from one state to another is likely to have intermediate steps
glossed over in this initial analysis. A move towards an adaptive cy-
cle model, as pictured below, may be more helpful in understanding
the ways in which sociotechnical systems, and knowledge commons in
particular, respond to selective pressures. More broadly, resilience con-
cepts may help to understand howhow sociotechnical systems success-
fully transition between governance regimes. I return to this proposal
in Chapter 6.
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5.1.4 Case Study Theme 3: Resilience and Vulnerabilities to
Disturbances
ICOADS current vulnerabilities are due to a lack of both institutional and
metric diversity. Over time, ICOADS has proven an ability to increase its
resiliency through a governance model that accommodates regenerative dis-
turbances. Future work is suggested for the identification and further clari-
fication of disturbance types and responses.
Supporting Narrative
Disturbances are simply changes to a system state. A definition used in this
thesis for a scientific cyberinfrastructure is that, in part, they allow for the
“smooth operation of scientific work at a distance” (Jackson et al., 2007).
Disturbances in a sociotechnical system like ICOADS can then be seen as
phenomena that effect the “smooth operation” of their functioning.
In this analysis, I’ll focus on two types of disturbances:
1. Regenerative disturbances build the capacity of a system to withstand
future change.
2. Disruptive disturbances cause damage to a system, some of which may
be irreparable.
Regenerative Disturbances
As ICOADS moved from a monocentric to a self-organized governance model
it became less centralized and matched its governance model with its resource
scale. This in turn allowed ICOADS to develop a capacity to respond to se-
lective pressures such as competition, resource availability and technological
innovation. Controversies over name changes, infighting over future direc-
tions of the project, the introduction of new international governing bodies,
and the discovery of known errors in the dataset caused initial changes to
state variables, but ultimately helped ICOADS to refine the types of rules
it was adopting to meet these needs. The responses and transitions between
states due to regenerative disturbances should be seen as ICOADS building
capacity to withstand change.
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Disruptive Disturbances
In shifting to a polycentric model ICOADS faced a number of stresses includ-
ing a partial loss of funding, the use of servers hosting a valuable subset of
ICOADS, and three dedicated full time employees to the development of soft-
ware crucial to a third release. An interesting correlation between variables
when there is a sudden disturbances is that incentive-based policy instru-
ments were replaced with input and output standards. This might imply
that instead of simply trying to entice cooperation from partners, boundary
and aggregation rules were put into place to assign responsibilities for pro-
ducing a third release, restrict what institutional privileges came along with
signing a letter of intent to cooperate, specify who was entitled to vote on
future directions of the projects, and more generally specify expectations for
future contriburors.
One of ICOADS vulnerabilities across all three regimes is a lack of met-
ric diversity. As Cox notes, this leaves socioecological commons particularly
vulnerable to change because it, “optimizes system performance around cri-
teria which may be indicators of short term success, but poor predictors of
long term sustainability” (2014). The same is likely true of sociotechnical
systems, which may optimize around certain metrics of success (e.g. citations
in academia) which indicate, but do not predict a system’s robustness.
When asked about the loss of funding, one participant explained:
“...whoever was making that decision did not understand how important
ICOADS is to the research community. How widely used it is ... because
there was no statistics, there is no metrics of how many people would all of
the sudden have their data products disrupted if ICOADS goes away.” [ISC
06]
What bibliometric indicators that are available to quantify ICOADS im-
pact are incomplete and often misleading. For example, in a small sample of
the documents that cite ICOADS,2 we found that 24% (n=79) had cited the
wrong ICOADS release paper for the data that the study was purporting to
use (Weber, Worley, & Mayernik, 2014). This gives the illusion that COADS
release 1 remains widely used in contemporary research,3 when in fact that
2For clarification, to “cite ICOADS” simply means that a paper which announced a
new release, such as ICOADS 2.5 is cited. This data comes from the citation content
analysis described in Chapter 3.
3We controlled for the fact that these studies may have indeed been doing historical
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Figure 12: Distribution of citations to four major releases of ICOADS
(COADS Release 1: 1987; ICOADS Release 2 1998; ICOADS Release 2.1:
2005; ICOADS Release 2.5: 2011)
particular data release hasn’t been available to end users since the late 1990s.
Additionally, when we look at the total number of citations to these
data papers, they are disproportionate to the number of unique users that
download ICOADS data. For instance, ICOADS data release papers re-
ceived a total of 201 citations from 2010-2012. During this same time period,
12,519 unique users downloaded at least 10 megabytes of ICOADS data from
NCAR’s Research Data Archive. This gives ICOADS a unique user download
to citation rate of 0.016.
A final vulnerability that ICOADS faces, which fits neither the regenera-
tive nor disruptive disturbance typology, is related to the selective pressure of
obsolescence. In the sociology of science, Merton coined the phrase “obliter-
ation by incorporation” (1948, p. 278) to refer to processes where an original
idea gains rapidly in popularity and use, and quickly becomes incorporated
into a common stock of domain knowledge. Occasionally, this results in a
failure to recognize the idea producer because the idea becomes so widely
understood that acknowledging its creator would seem redundant. The most
immediate example is “Einstein’s theory or relativity”, but less iconic scien-
tists have created lasting ideas only to be forgotten by way “obliteration” of
credit through rapid “incorporation” of their work in the stock of common
scientific knowledge. Garfield refined this idea with citations in describing
how a novel idea, technique, or concept is occasionally so broadly and quickly
studies which used release 1 data.c
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Figure 13: Number of Unique Users that Downloaded more than 10mb of
ICOADS data, 2010-12
adopted that it is fails to be formally cited at a comparable rate (Garfield,
1975).
ICOADS continues to be used as an input to large-scale reanalysis projects,
and simultaneously is subset into innumerable smaller-scale products, many
of which receive more citations and funding than ICOADS. It suffers from
obliteration by incorporation into the climate record - failing to be recognized
properly at either scale. Frischmann has similarly described the process of
public infrastructures being subsumed into public good categorizations - they
provide the valuable inputs into downstream innovation, but receive little of
the upstream attention of investment firms or private sector support (2005).
And indeed, we see ICOADS take on many infrastructure-like features in-
cluding the salient fact that it is rarely paid attention to until it breaks down
(Star & Ruhleder, 1996).
5.1.5 Limitations of Case Study
The case study presented above has answered three case study specific re-
search questions largely by data collected during ethnographic and informet-
ric studies of ICOADS community. There are a number of limitations to the
results presented here, including the small sample size (n = 1), the scale of the
informetric work, and the ability to demonstrate causative effects of changes
in state variables. Establishing causation for regime shifts, or disturbance
response should not be seen as the goal of the approach taken in this case
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study. Systematically coding state variables simply allows for the complex-
ity of a system to be reduced, the different components of the system to be
accurately described, and the findings of this work to be meaningfully com-
pared to other cases. To overcome some of these limitations I next compare
the findings of this case study with those from three additional knowledge
commons.
5.2 Cross-case Comparison
In this section I synthesize findings from across four different case studies
of the knowledge commons, their evolution, and the background environ-
ments out of which they emerged. I begin first with an overview of three
previously completed studies and then describe the ways in which these dif-
ferent domains produce knowledge. I use a set of state variables developed
in the ICOADS case study to compare the current governance models of all
four commons. Finally, I use these comparisons to answer the dissertation’s
research questions.
5.2.1 Knowledge-Commons Framework
Madison, Frischmann, Strandburg have over the last five years developed a
research agenda and framework around the idea of a knowledge commons.
Their argument turns on the assumption that “innovation and creativity are
matters of governance of a highly social cultural environment” (2010, p. 669).
That is to say that a state vs. market model choice creates a false binary
for governance in the cultural sphere, and further, these two approaches are
incompatible with innovation required of collective action institutions.
Their response is to adapt and extend the Institutional Analysis and
Development (IAD) framework as it has been used in environmental stud-
ies. The result, a “knowledge commons framework”, provides a method to
empirically challenge the accepted wisdom that intellectual property rights
and state governance provide the best options for sustaining a knowledge
commons. The following case studies are focused exclusively on knowledge
commons in scientific research and development settings.
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Genome Commons Urea Cycle Net. Galaxy Zoo ICOADS
Domain Biology, Life Sciences BioMedical, Public
Health
Astronomy Climate Science
Year Established 1996* 2003 2007 1983
Funding Mechanism Mixed Portfolio NIH Sloan, Oxford Univer-
sity, Johns Hopkins
University
NOAA, NSF, Na-
tional Oceanographic
Center (NOC - UK)
Method of Data Collection (for KCF study) Document, Policy
Analysis
Document, Policy
Analysis, Survey, In-
terview, Observation
Document, Policy
Analysis, Interview
Document, Policy
Analysis, Interview,
Observation, Partici-
pation, Informetric
Commons Resource Set(s) Data, Databases Data, Patients,
Reagents, Literature,
Infrastructure
Data, Software Plat-
forms
Data, Metadata, Soft-
ware, Stat. Tech-
niques
Table 6. Studies of Knowledge Commons in the Sciences
5.2.2 The Genome Commons
Contreras contribution to the knowledge commons literature is a rich and
detailed history of what he calls the genome commons (2014); databases
and digital archives of genomic data (DNA nucleotide base pairs) that have
emerged thanks to a lowered price of DNA sequencing technologies and large-
scale international collaborative efforts to “map” entire species genomes.
Through policy analysis, Contreras demonstrates, “the evolution of the genome
commons from what was initially a public domain vehicle established to deter
the proprietary designs of emerging biotechnology companies, into a unique
polycentric governance institution for the growth, management, and stew-
ardship of a massively shared public resource” (2014, p. 102).
Contreras draws our attention to early controversies over the patenting
of databases, and the private sector’s attempts to compete with large public
sector projects like the Human-Genome Project (HGP) (e.g. Collins et al.,
1998). This conflict, in part, leads to the generation of thousands of pages of
policy written about the rules that data producers must follow, how archives
are to guarantee access for potential users, and what scientific societies should
do to create institutions for provisioning these resource sets over the long-
term. The major contribution of Contreras work is twofold:
1. The genome commons demonstrate how, in an international setting
with fierce competition for semi-rivalrous resources, a polycentric model
of governance can emerge to nest institutions within a highly functional
framework of cooperation. This is due largely to what Contreras iden-
tifies as the Mertonian norms upon which science, its actors, and the
design of its institutions are based.
2. In practice the genome commons are effective because of policy instru-
124
ments like “embargo periods” for archived data are able to grant “right
of first access” to genomic data contributors. In previous works, Con-
treras describes the need for a “latency analysis” to better understand
how the rapid dissemination of research results are balanced with lim-
ited exclusive rights to access (Contreras 2010a; 2010b). These dimen-
sions, he suggests, are critical to the design of future policy governing
knowledge commons.
5.2.3 Galaxy Zoo, and the Astronomy Commons
Madison uses the knowledge commons framework to explore the intersec-
tion intellectual property rights, crowdsourcing, and “big data.” (2014). He
pursues a comparative project asking “How do the outcomes produced by
commons governance differ from outcomes that might have been available
if alternative governance had been employed?” (2014, p. 231). To do so,
Madison’s main contribution is a case study of Galaxy Zoo and its model of
sharing credit amongst a large number of crowd workers and astronomers.
He uses findings from this work to compare the institutional arrangements
of Galaxy Zoo with the Nearby Supernova Factory project, whose organiza-
tional structure resembles that of a traditional firm.
Like Contreras, Madison suggests that the Galaxy Zoo project succeeds in
part because of a broad appeal to the Mertonian norms of science. Madison
also claims that this knowledge commons exemplifies Hagstrom’s claim that
science is a “gift culture” (1968) trading in ideas instead of material gains.
This is a claim supported by an observation that the project’s designers,
exemplified by Chris Lintott, forfeited personal claims to data transcribed
by crowdworkers, as well as the Galaxy Zoo’s commitment to the credit
and acknowledgment of these contributions in resulting journal publications
(2014, p. 235).
Madison makes an important point that the openness of a resource set,
both those produced and provisioned by an entity like Galaxy Zoo, is not
a binary distinction; it is instead a continuum. The data and underlying
software that produces Galaxy Zoo is free and openly accessible, but data
were only released to the public after an initial round of project specific
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publications were in press.4 (2014, p. 215)
Another major conclusion from this work is that “...institutional order
and knowledge governance, such as commons, are mutually constitutive. One
largely exists because of the other” (Madison, 2014, p. 211). Madisson ar-
gues that the emergence of crowdsourcing, peer production, and big data
management in science are creating new orders of power. These new or-
ders are also democratizing access for many different (and new) knowledge
commons stakeholders. In turn, the social dilemmas arising from broad col-
lective action are poorly understood and deserve continued attention of those
concerned with knowledge commons in science and technology settings.
5.2.4 Urea Cycle Disorder Research Network Commons
Strandbrug, Cui and Frischmann apply the knowledge commons framework
to a rare disease research context, which consists of patients, caretakers,
biomedical researchers and life scientists, as well as public policy experts
across a number of cooperating institutions in the USA (2014). As they
note, the need to share resources such as patient data, outreach materials,
study protocols, reagents, diagnosis, and even patients themselves creates the
need for a commons approach to open exchange and resource pooling. This
however, does not mean the research coordinating networks that participate
in a commons are absent of rivalry; there is intense competition for funding
from the NIH, for locating and managing patients to participate in a cohort
study, and for longitudinal data collection that one institution may bear the
majority of costs to produce and provision.
Although embedded in the a biomedical field which often has strong pri-
vate sector interests the authors note that there is a strong incentive to
openly share resources in this domain, “‘Open’ approaches are particularly
attractive in the rare disease context, given the small numbers and geograph-
ical dispersion of potential research subjects and the inapplicability of the
“blockbuster drug” business model” (2014, p. 155). Pharmaceutical com-
panies may have little financial incentive to produce drugs for rare diseases
because they are rare and represent a relatively small market. As a result,
rare disease research and treatment comes with the need to conduct clini-
4Describing how these kinds of distinctions in “open” and “free” access effect long-term
sustainability is described a major open question for knowledge commons scholars.
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cal trials, rapidly share results, and work closely with private industry to
produce effective drugs. The rare disease research context therefore nests
clinical, academic, pharmaceutical / private industry, as well as the NIH and
a number of other non-profit organizations.
5.3 Answers to Dissertation’s Research Questions
This dissertation has pursued answers to two broad research questions:
1. What are the effective institutional arrangements (governance) for sus-
tainable scientific knowledge commons?
2. And, how do these arrangements differ between domains of knowledge
production?
In the following section, I compare and contrast the previously described
case studies based on the contexts in which they produce and provision a
knowledge commons. This analysis provides answers to how knowledge com-
mons differ between domains of knowledge production. In the following sec-
tion I characterize the effective governance of sustainable commons across
these different domains using coded state variables.
The following table summarizes the characteristics of knowledge commons
that will be compared.
Potential for Commercialization High Med / High Low Low
Resource Type (s) Common Pool Re-
source
Common-Pool Re-
source / Public Goods
Public Good Public Good
Governance Regime Polycentric Self-organized Self-organized Polycentric
Discount Rate High Low High Low
Model of Peer Production (Haythornthwaite) Heavyweight Heavyweight Lightweight Heavyweight
Task Uncertainty (Whitley) Low Low Low Low
Mutual Dependence (Whitley) High High High High
Latency Requirements High Medium Low Low
Table 7. Comparing knowledge production and provisioning in different
knowledge commons
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Mutual Dependence and Task Uncertainty
One way to initially compare across these different knowledge commons is
to ask what the background environment supplies in the way of a “default”
assumption about the production and sharing of resources. Since each case
study is embedded in a scientific domain of knowledge production, the disci-
pline or field specific to this context is likely to have some influence on these
practices. Whitley’s work on the differences of knowledge production prac-
tices in a“ field” of science provides a helpful framework for understanding
these issues. In this work, Whitley has described “the nature” of intellectual
fields through variations in two dimensions: mutual dependence and task
uncertainty (2000).
1. Mutual Dependence describes the degree to which one field relies upon
another for validation of findings or for inputs to new work. Fry and
Talja point out mutual dependence also accounts for “...the extent to
which a field adopts evaluation criteria and standards from other fields
for the assessment of work externally produced, rather than developing
its own criteria” (2007, p. 118).
2. Task Uncertainty is the degree to which members of a field under-
stand and articulate problems to be solved and agree on methods or
techniques needed to solve those problems. For instance, high task un-
certainty means there is little coordination, results are based on loosely
constructed criteria for acceptance or standards for significance.
For a commons to form in the first place there should be a low degree
of task uncertainty. Producing a shared resource, in some ways, is agreeing
upon the validity or meaning of that resource. And, it should be expected
that each domain invested in commons-based work has a high degree of
mutual dependence, as commons are often formed for the express purpose of
collective action.
All four case studies exhibit high mutual dependence and low task uncer-
tainty. This classification, which is the only agreement across all four cases,
is helpful because it makes clear some of the initial conditions that a field
should have in order to most effectively use a commons governance.5
5Other combinations may result in an effective commons, but these are not as readily
obvious as the high mutual dependence and low task uncertainty combination.
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Peer Production
Each of these case studies demonstrates that the division of labor needed
to reliably sustain a knowledge commons depends, in part, on peer pro-
duction models. Increasingly, peering occurs in not just the production of
new resources, but also in the provisioning of shared infrastructures, and
the preservation of existing resource sets. To differentiate between models
of peer production, I’ll use Haythorthwaite’s notion of “heavyweight” and
“lightweight” peer production described in Chapter 2 (2009). The Genome
Commons, The Urea Cycle Disorder Network, and ICOADS all use a form
of heavyweight peer production, where strongly connected and highly com-
mitted experts make contributions to a common pool of resources which
require peer review before acceptance. Galaxy Zoo on the other hand uses a
crowdsourced form of data annotation which resembles the lightweight peer
production model; a large number of weakly connected novices perform sim-
ple tasks that are aggregated and quality controlled in producing complex
resources.
These characteristics of peer production effect a number of other ways in
which the resources and governance of a knowledge commons can be charac-
terized; including, the resource type, the governance model that results, the
latency requirements for protecting producers / innovators, and the discount
rate that users of a commons adopt.
Resource Types, Commercialization, and Latency Analysis
Resources produced by these knowledge commons are largely the results of
scientific research processes and as such they have some degree of rivalry.
This means that categorizing the type of good being pooled will be inexact;
each of these commons has a shared resource system made of goods that
fit somewhere between common-pool resources and public goods. Only the
Genome and Urea Cycle disorder commons have the realistic capability of
being commercially exploited, and this leads to their having a need for la-
tency in the release of these data resources to a broader community of users.
In Galaxy Zoo and ICOADS6 limited monopolies are not likely to be institu-
tionalized, although both have at times informally delayed immediate data
6This was observed in major data contributors receiving early access to new releases
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release for this purpose. In the future, this may require Galaxy Zoo and
ICOADS to adopt new rules, or design new approaches to data access.
Discount Rate
In Chapter 2, I described characteristics of successful commons in the socioe-
cological realm Ostrom (1999; 2000) argued that one of the most important
factors in sustaining a commons is those who are most dependent on the
resource have a “low discount rate” in approaching the common resource; in
other words, they have a “willingness to sacrifice current payoffs for higher
payoffs in the future” (Acheson, 2011). In the knowledge commons, dis-
count rates can be observed in the willingness of individuals to cooperate,
contribute, or responsibly consume resources so that they exist for future
generations to use.
Contreras discussion of the Genome commons shows that a high potential
for short-term profit - either through commercialization or through credit of
discovery - creates the need for formal strict regulatory policies and norma-
tive enforcement of rules in the genome commons. Another dimension of
discounting important to the genome commons is related to the rapid tech-
nological advancement of the field. Differences between first, second, and
third generation sequencing data quality has meant that these technologi-
cal advancements create data archives which decay in value rapidly. This is
the direct opposite of ICOADS, where historical weather records mature in
value over time. Actors within these two domains have different approaches
to valuing the future of a resource set: Genome commons actors will have a
high discount rate while ICOADS actors will have a low discount rate.
The Urea Cycle Disorder network curiously mixes high and low discount
rates; the limited nature of its funding (5-year NIH renewable grants) requires
the rapid production of research results but also requires a sustained effort to
keeping the network effectively functioning for future rounds of funding. This
tension leaves actors sometimes discounting a future which might not exist
and others carefully preserving resources for long-term use (see Strandburg,
Cui & Frischmann 2014, p. 165 for further discussion).
The Galaxy Zoo, and crowdsourcing in general, coordinate crowd workers
with high discount rates, as users will likely not be involved in the future
of the research project beyond data transcription. As a result ties between
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actors are typically weak. High discount rates are a cost of the crowdsourcing
approach to data transcription, and is likely to be important to address in
sustainability planning.
Governance Model
Given the characterizations described above, which models of governance
do these knowledge commons actually use? The Genome Commons and
ICOADS are both nested within a number of different institutions of decision
making power and authority. This is partially due to the fact that they are
both international in scope, have existed for a long period of time and receive
funding or infrastructure support from a number of different institutions.
They can both be seen as adopting a polycentric governance model, with
nested levels of authority and rule enforcement.
The Urea Cycle Disorder network most closely resembles a self-organized
governance model; it receives only partial direction from the NIH for govern-
ing its shared resources and all institutions directly involved in the network
have equal authority in establishing and enforcing rules. Similarly, Galaxy
Zoo receives partial direction from its project partners at Oxford University
and the Sloan foundation as a funding agent, but by and large the project
remains self-organized; reporting informally to a board of directors assem-
bled to vote and establish by-laws. All project partners having a relatively
equal role in shaping future directions of the project, but the overwhelming
power of authority is held by a few individuals.
5.4 Governance Variables
In this section I further characterize the effective governance of sustainable
knowledge commons using a set of state variables developed in the case study
of ICOADS. These states are summarized in the table below, but my analysis
focuses on only a subset of these state variables.
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Genome Commons Urea Cycle Dis. Galaxy Zoo ICOADS
Multiple levels Coordination among
multiple levels
Coordination among
multiple levels
Single-level gover-
nance
Coordination among
multiple levels
Institutional diversity High High Low Medium
Centralization 2- Somewhat Decen-
tralized
3- Somewhat Central-
ized
4- Highly Centralized 2- Somewhat Decen-
tralized
Governance scale International Sub-national State International
Scale match Match No-match No Match Match
Metric diversity Medium Medium High Low
Rules-In-Use Information, Aggrega-
tion, Scope, Payoff
Boundary, Infor-
mation, Authority,
Aggregation, Scope,
Payoff
Information, Payoffs Boundary, Position,
Information, Au-
thority, Aggregation,
Scope, Payoff
Table 8. The systematic approach to coding system state variables, as
applied to different knowledge commons.
5.4.1 Centralization
The degree of centralization in any governance system impacts how its deci-
sions are made, how outcomes are achieved and how the commons is man-
aged. Both ICOADS and the genome commons are decentralized (e.g. their
administration and points of service are distributed across numerous institu-
tions) including rule-making structures which extend to a number of national
and international scientific agencies. The Urea Cycle Disorder network is
somewhat centralized, as its decision making focuses largely on PI’s named
in its founding NIH grant. Similarly the Galaxy Zoo is highly centralized,
with governance located almost exclusively within its founding institution
and small board of directors.
5.4.2 Governance Scale and Scale Match
ICOADS and the genome commons are in a state of governance match, where
the institutions coordinated and the resources produced or provisioned are
international in scope (as is the governance scale). The Urea Cycle Disor-
der network governance is exclusively national in its governance model, but
the patients they manage and the resources they produce are global in scope.
Similarly, Galaxy Zoo has a state-level governance model but coordinates the
work of a large international crowd, whose interests and use of data includes
experts and non-experts. Both Galaxy Zoo and the Urea Cycle Disorder net-
work governance do not have a scale match, which may impact their growth
and stability. However, it is worth noting that early in ICOADS tenure it
too lacked a scale match. The Urea Cycle Disorder network and the Galaxy
132
Zoo are the two youngest knowledge commons being analyzed; a mismatch
in scale and governance may simply be an artifact of their governance rather
than a serious fault of either commons.
5.4.3 Metric Diversity
Galaxy Zoo is the only knowledge commons with a high diversity of metrics.
This is partially a result of the broad success of the project, which has been
able to redefine it’s goals and mission a number of times as the platform
for crowdsourcing rapidly evolved. As a knowledge commons, Galaxy Zoo
has also proved to be capable of hosting and designing novel transcription
projects outside of astronomy. Thus, the resource set expanded from data,
to software, to even the community of crowd-workers themselves that mi-
grate from project to project. Each of these shifts has allowed Galaxy Zoo
to set new goals and consequently describe the success of those project’s
on terms that are appealing to potential funding agencies. A non-trivial
spillover effect, is that this diversity of metrics allows Galaxy Zoo’s spokesper-
son to quote convincing statistics of success throughout his many speaking
engagements around the world - adding substantively to the reputation of
the project (Madisson, 2014 p. 255)
ICOADS, the genome commons, and the Urea Cycle Disorder network all
have medium to low diversity of metrics. A strong tie to funding agencies at
national scales and the academic nature of these research communities locks
them into bibliographic and informetric (usage-based analytics) evaluation
tools which are, as described throughout the ICOADS case study, limited
indicators of a commons’ success.
5.4.4 Rules-in-Use
All four knowledge commons share information and payoff rules in common.
At a broad level, these are likely the most essential rules for a successful
knowledge commons to adopt, as they specify not only what information
must be shared, and with whom, but also how resources are to be distributed
amongst stakeholders. In this sense, entitlements (either through production
or provisioning) are a prerequisite for engaging in a commons, both at an
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institutional and individual level.
The Urea Cycle Disorder network, the genome commons, and ICOADS
also share aggregation and scope rules in common. These may be rule types
of a mature commons and may be an artifact of those commons having faced
controversies in the past, such as the genome commons enclosure or the
defunding of ICOADS, which exert pressures related to governing outcomes.
ICOADS is the oldest institution and is also the only knowledge commons
that, in its current state, has some version of all seven rules as a part of its
governance structure. As the case study demonstrated, these rules have
accrued over time; each new regime added a new set of rules while retaining
some or all of the functions of the previous rule set.
5.4.5 Summary of Answer to Research Questions
Based on a cross-case comparison, effective governance models for sustain-
able scientific knowledge commons include polycentric and self-governance
models. These two methods of governance allow for what commons scholars
have long recognized as a key to effectively functioning shared resources sys-
tems; they allow “...a group of principals to organize themselves voluntarily
to retain the residuals of their own efforts” (Ostrom, 1990). In ICOADS
and the genome commons we see that as a project matured it becomes em-
bedded in networks of rule making authorities. The ability of the commons
to effectively nest institutions in overarching policies that provide directions
for particular actions while simultaneously allowing individual actors and
organizations to “retain the residuals of their own efforts.”
The Urea Cycle Disorder network is a complex and valuable study of the
limit of commons governance at a national scale. Quite obviously, the disease
is international, so how this group effectively cooperates in a local context,
and maximizes their ability to self-govern is an important case study for the
NIH, as it approaches the design of a “big data” commons. And yet, the
centralization of its rule-making, and the lack of scale match presents poten-
tial dilemmas for future sustainability efforts. It should be noted that this
particular network had its NIH funding renewed in late 2014, and will effec-
tively be operating until 2020, providing the opportunity for a longitudinal
case study of self-governing, centralized commons governance.
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The Galaxy Zoo case study is unique to science commons, but provides
a potentially valuable link to other lightweight peer production platforms
governed as commons. The relatively centralized governance, which also
lacks a scale match between its resources and rule-making, is nevertheless the
most visible and diverse of the four case studies. Its has effectively ported its
transcription model to annotation in a number of different fields, including
the climate data from old log-books which are feeding into ICOADS Release
3.
What the diversity of case studies here indicate, is that commons gov-
ernance is multi-faceted. It requires a match between the resources being
shared, the management structure of the provisioning institutions, and the
production model of the resource contributors. As the Urea Cycle Disorder
network and Galaxy Zoo point out, the effective combination of rules in use,
and a diversity of metrics communicating success can help to overcome initial
mismatches in these criteria. Over time it will be important to understand
the long term effects of these mismatches and whether or not they lead to
instability of the cooperation in the commons. This is especially important
to Galaxy Zoo, as the discount rate of its potential contributors are quite
high.
Traditional notions of “field” specific knowledge production, although
not exhaustive, remain helpful to the analysis of knowledge production in
commons-based institutional settings. Whitley’s mutual dependence and
task uncertainty works as kind precursor to success - without which it is un-
likely that a commons could easily succeed. But, the case studies described
above also demonstrate that there are a number of important variables to
consider besides simply the default background assumptions of an intellectual
field. The use of networked information communication technologies increase
the ease at which collaboration can take place across space and time; this,
coupled with a the decrease in available funding for basic science research
creates an environment of necessary innovation in science and technology
research. The knowledge commons frameworks described here points to im-
portant state variables but there are a number of other dimensions, each of
which may be equally as important as governance, that have not been ad-
dressed in this study. In the next chapter, I summarize these limitations and
point to future directions in this research.
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5.5 Summary
This chapter has summarized research findings from a case study of ICOADS
governance, and answered three broad questions related to the effectiveness of
ICOADS’ governance. The major result of this work is a preliminary frame-
work, which helps to reduce the complexity of studying ICOADS evolution
from a centralized regime to a polycentric governance model. To further
explore the efficacy of this model, findings from three previously completed
case studies were analyzed and compared with ICOADS. The synthesis of
these four studies was then used to answer the overall research questions of
this dissertation. In doing so, this chapter demonstrated how a systematic
approach to coding state variables could be adapted from socioecological to
sociotechnical settings. In the final chapter, the limitations of this work are
re-stated, and the implications of this research for policy, practice, and theory
of the commons are offered.
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CHAPTER 6
IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS & FUTURE
WORK
In this chapter the limitations of this work are further explained. The impli-
cations of this dissertation’s findings for policy, practice, and theory of the
commons are restated. A set of themes that include the future directions of
studies for sociotechnical systems sustainability are offered including a re-
search agenda in governance models for commons.
6.1 Summary of Main Findings
This dissertation began by noting the differences between scientific knowl-
edge and the objects that result from knowledge production: On the one
hand, scientific knowledge is assumed to be a public good with low rivalry
and costly excludability; On the other hand, the products of scientific re-
search (data, software, journal publications, etc.) are assumed to have many
incentives for creating barriers to access (exclusion) which in turn requires
state intervention or privatization for managing sustainable access and use.
Analysis found in Chapters 4 and 5 has demonstrated that the efficacy
of a hybrid model, the commons, used for knowledge production in contem-
porary research and development settings. Under the right circumstances
the commons can be an effective model for balancing interests between pri-
vate and public sectors (e.g. genome commons and Urea Cycle Disorder
network), creating long-enduring institutions for producing and provisioning
valued databases (e.g. ICOADS and genome commons), and sustaining order
and cooperation between large numbers of individuals competing for access
to resources (e.g. observations made across all four cases).
The case studies reviewed in Chapter 5 are an initial step in providing
empirical findings about those right circumstances ; including, how knowledge
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commons efficiently operate, how they evolve and change over time, and the
ways that governance of sociotechnical systems differ in sustaining shared
resource sets.
This research indicates sustainable knowledge commons in science settings
have the ability to:
• Match scales between governance regimes and resource sets.
• Find ways to diversify institutional arrangements as resource sets and
stakeholders grow in scale.
• Articulate selection pressures and diagnose underlying drivers and symp-
toms of those pressures.
• Draw upon social and technical capital and coordinate relevant stake-
holders in response to selection pressures.
• Define and optimize activities for a diversity of metrics.
• Balance policy instruments that are regulatory and incentive-based.
• Adapt quickly to sudden disturbances and draw on social and technical
capital when disturbances are slow and continuous.
• Seek out and absorb “regenerative disturbances”, and consequently
build a capacity to withstand “disruptive disturbances.”
• Accrue and revise rules-in-use. Information and Payoff rules were recog-
nized as an essential baseline for successful knowledge commons across
all four cases.
Some of these results may seem self-evident but without empirical studies
to clarify precursory assumptions sociotechnical systems will, like socioeco-
logical systems, fall prey to oversimplifications of what works when, where,
and for whom. This work also helps us understand which dimensions of
sustainability should be explored in more detail such as how the design of
effective policy can encourage a match in governance scales, or how institu-
tions might be encouraged to diversify institutional arrangements and metrics
through incentives. This is to say that the type of research presented here
may be preliminary, but it is also foundational: it picks out systems features,
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names them, and puts standardized categories on them so that they can be
compared with other similar systems in order to build reliable knowledge.
In the next section I extend some of these observations to the polycentric
system of governance.
6.1.1 Polycentric Models of Governance
Research and development activities in the sciences can be divided into many
axises of categorization: basic vs. applied, theoretical vs. practical, induc-
tive vs. deductive, etc. In contemporary research settings, a distinction
that cuts across many of categorizations is that of collective action; research
and researchers increasingly collaborate, share resource sets, and divide up
labor in pursuit of grand challenge science problems (Atkins, 2003). Even
mathematics has turned to peer production to solve difficult theorems (Ball,
2014).
Governing these new arrangements for sustainability will be an important,
but difficult challenge for their stakeholders. The case study of ICOADS, the
genome commons, and the Urea Cycle Disorder network has demonstrated
that as a project matures it comes with a need to formalize certain gover-
nance issues through rule making procedures of self-organized groups. In the
case of the Urea Cycle Disorder network, matching the scale of governance
with the resource sets provisioned has proven difficult for a disease that is
funded almost exclusively by USA federal agencies. The genome commons
and ICOADS both present cases where international cooperation is required
for both the provisioning, and the production of resource sets. Over time
these two knowledge commons have found ways to match those scales, al-
though each initially struggled to do so.
The polycentric governance model observed in ICOADS and the genome
commons developed as a result of growth and evolution over decades. The
regime shifts that mark ICOADS changing from a self-governance model
to a polycentric model was a response to selective pressures - such as a
loss of funding from a major sponsor and the need to formally embed itself
in a number of different bureaucratic structures - that played out over the
course of thirty years. This time scale will bring with it many challenges of
adaptation and ingenuity - such as the polycentric model.
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As scholarship and understanding of governance in the knowledge com-
mons begins to mature an important next step is further investigating the fea-
tures of successful long-term polycentric governments: What types of nested
levels can be observed across various polycentric models? When do transi-
tions between self-governance and polycentric models occur? What are the
negative externalities (the unintended consequences) of having an interde-
pendent governance system like a polycentric system? How, and in what
ways do the negative (or positive) externalities of a polycentric system differ
from that of federalism?
Limitations of the Polycentric Model
While I have focused largely on the positive aspects of polycentric systems
having multiple levels of jurisdiction this may also create multiple sources of
friction and redundancy. This is especially evident in science and technology
where a mix of self-governance and state-based hierarchical systems create
policies which are too broad to be useful, or too specific to be followed with
intended fidelity. This is the current case with data management planning,
and data sharing initiatives promulgated by federal research funding agencies.
Borgman characterizes the “conundrum of data sharing” this way:
An investigator may be part of multiple, overlapping communi-
ties of interest, each of which may have different notions of what
are data and different data practices. The boundaries of com-
munities of interest are neither clear nor stable. In the case of
data management plans, an investigator is asked to identify the
appropriate community for the purposes of a specific grant pro-
posal and for the proposed duration of that award. (2011)
This characterization sounds much like a polycentric system of gover-
nance, but one in which there is a mismatch between resource sets, actors,
and rule making procedures. Friction and confusion result from funding
agency mandates aimed at governing data management at a project level
and practices around sharing data for reuse at a field or discipline level. The
success of broad programs like a “data management” initiative will require
a match between scales, rules in form and rules in use, as well as the ex-
ploration of polycentric models of governance. Otherwise the provisioning
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of important resource sets will continue to be “conundrums” rather than ef-
fective public policies for increasing the impact of science and technology on
society.
6.2 Limitations
Research in a sociotechnical setting, such as a knowledge commons, will
inevitably suffer from a limited view of what are complex systems, and this
research project is no exception. This work has been limited by a number of
factors, including:
• The small sample size (n=4) of this work limits its generalizabilty. Ad-
ditionally, the partial description of what are large and complex inter-
national institutions is limited by my own knowledge of these systems.
• The frameworks applied here are relatively new and require a broader
set of case studies to test their efficacy for generating reliable, compa-
rable results.
• A majority of the analysis in this document has focused on the gov-
ernance of knowledge commons. Other components briefly described
here, such as actor groups or the characteristics of a resource set, may
be equally important to sustainability.
• The approach used to systematically coding state variables is also rela-
tively untested in sociotechnical systems research. With a small sample
size the limits of this approach are not well understood.
• Sociotechnical systems include many more context than research and
development in science and this may impact the applicability of this
approach to new contexts.
6.3 Future Work
Future work in the study of sociotechnical systems requires a number of
important modifications to this initial study which I describe in detail below.
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I focus first on two open research questions from the comparative case study
found in Chapter 5, and then expand to more general items of future interest.
• Both Contreras and Madison relied on an account of Mertonian norms
otherwise known as CUDOS - Communalism, Universalism, Disinter-
estedness, and Organize Skepticism (1973) - to explain their case study
subjects being committed to openness and sharing. Although the con-
cept of “communalism” seems a good fit for this context, Merton’s
norms in general are an awkward framework for a research agenda like
the knowledge commons. This is because Merton’s normative theory is
grounded in functionalism; he sees the actions, behaviors and adopted
rules of a culture through latent and manifest functions that are, above
all else, constructed for the sake of preserving a culture (1974). Func-
tions explain how cultures organize and act in order to remain the same
(how they continue to function), not how and why cultures evolve. This
seems to conflict with the major goal of the knowledge commons re-
search agenda, which is to provide an alternative to the functionalist
accounts of institutions, especially those that rely on intellectual prop-
erty rights protections (see, Madisson, Frischmann and Strandburg,
2010 p. 665-78).
I have few answers for how this can be accomplished, but I suggest
below that careful attention to differences between domains of knowl-
edge production, their norms, and their practices is needed within the
emerging knowledge commons framework.
• Findings from the institutional level case studies presented here run
somewhat counter-intuitive to previously published literature about
the culture of science being “gift giving ”(Hagstrom, 1965) and col-
laboration having a propensity that is subject to bounded-rationally
(Birnholtz, 2005), or a matter of individuals using a limited monopoly
for rent extraction (Birnholtz and Bietz, 2003; Harvey, 2009).
Traditional notions of rent are effective only when the costs and benefits
of collaboration are symmetrically distributed amongst stakeholders.
Collective action dilemmas, which emerge when resources are pooled
to accomplish basic tasks, such as calculating historical weather trends
or sequencing a species genome, pose a different set of problems than
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property-based concepts like “rent” or bounded-rationality can pro-
vide explanations for. And this is because institutions for collective
action suffer from social dilemmas where costs are not symmetrically
distributed. This is not to say that behavioral theories are inapplicable
to the commons context; quite the opposite - there is a need to under-
stand how those traditional notions of limited monopoly (rent) effect
commons when nested in polycentric governance structures. Contreras
offers “latency analysis” but this describes only one temporal aspect of
the social dilemmas of sharing resources and receiving credit.
To continue advancing a robust empirical account of sustainability in
sociotechnical systems I also suggest that further work is needed on resilience
and adaptive cycles.
6.3.1 Resilience, Vulnerability & Adaptive Cycles
The work presented here describes how a knowledge commons effectively
transitions between different governance regimes over time. It suggests a need
to turn away from functional integrity explanations of sustainability, and
instead adopt a framework of analysis that is more congruent with studying
knowledge production and the governance of knowledge products through
systems-thinking concepts like adaptivity and resilience. Future work can
and should go in a number of directions. I will summarize two below:
• Adaptive cycles focus on two phases or transitions between system
states: Phase one, the foreloop, is characterized by growth and accu-
mulation; and phase two, the backloop, is a rapid response for reorga-
nization and renewal (Holling, 1973).
In a broadly used model of resilience, Holling shows that resilience can
be described as follows: If a system does not develop a capacity to
complete a backloop (from Omega to Alpha), it fails to renew and will
collapse, hence it is not resilient to change and is unsustainable. How-
ever, if a system is able to regularly transition between these different
states it is said to be sustainable and its capacity to move (efficiently)
between these states is a function of its resilience (1973). The sociotech-
nical systems described here all had the ability to complete a backloop,
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Figure 14: Holling’s adaptive cycle (1973), with four state changes and
tranistions (loops) between different states
although with varying degrees of success, and over different (longer and
shorter) periods of reorganization and renewal. As Holling pointed out
in socioecological systems, a path towards ecosystem collapse begins
by extending foreloops (2007). Often times this means that capital is
spent treating the symptoms of a problem, delaying the initial regen-
eration and increasing the likelihood that a system won’t continue to
respond quickly or efficiently to external pressures.
• To move towards a model of sociotechnical systems resilience and adap-
tivity, future work might begin by characterizing states of change, such
as those from Holling’s model, and the transitions between those states.
In the state variable coding developed in this dissertation, I partially
addressed adaptivity through the “diagnostic” variable where either
the symptoms or the underlying drivers of a disturbance are treated.
Future work on resiliency and adaptive cycles for sociotechnical sys-
tems should also investigate this closer - trying to both characterize
and better understand responses to selective pressures, disturbances,
etc.
Geels and Schot (2007) have developed a concept they call “pathways
to transition between sociotechnical regimes.” Like foreloops and back-
loops in the above socioecological model, the transitions approach con-
ceives of regime change through four sustainability pathways: transfor-
mation, reconfiguration, technological substitution, and de-alignment
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re-alignment (Geels and Schot, 2007). These do not conceive of state
changes as cyclical and so are not meant to connect any one state to
any other. Future work in this area should try to characterize how tran-
sitions, whether on Geels and Schot’s terms or otherwise, connect to
identifiable, general states of a sociotechnical system. It as at that point
that collapse or resilience can be better conceived in the sociotechnical
realm.
6.3.2 Future work on economic concepts of this dissertation
In the final section I sketch out a number of relevant ideas from the literature
of economics and commons theory that may be applicable to the study of
governance, sociotechnical systems, and sustainability more generally.
• Comparative Advantage in the Commons: One of the economic
laws of optimization is comparative advantage, which attempts to ex-
plain how profits of individual firms or people are the result of maximiz-
ing their natural endowments (i.e. skill-sets native to their company,
person, etc.) (Hunt & Morgan, 1995). A principle argument for peer
production as an organizing model is that it allows for comparative
advantage to emerge in cooperative settings (Benkler, 2006), but this
fails to explain how it is that individual actors identify the skill-sets
that are best suited to what project, and how it is that information
systems can be designed to facilitate, improve, speed-up, or generally
assist comparative advantage without being exploitive. A future direc-
tion of this work is to better understand the emergence of comparative
advantage in cooperative, non-commercial settings.
• Law of One Price: Another economic law which has much to do
with cooperation and communication in shared resource systems is the
‘law of one price’ which holds that when information exchange works
efficiently there should be a price equilibrium reached across markets
(Isard, 1977). A fascinating example of how ICTs effect the ‘law of one
price’ is found when new technologies are introduced to a market, such
as cell phones used by small-scale fishing businesses in India (Jensen,
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2007). What this work shows is that, in a relatively short amount of
time, the ability of producers and consumers to better coordinate their
exchanges led to the emergence of stable and universal price for fish
within various Indian markets. This is an exciting finding for under-
standing how innovation impacts the ability of information networks to
reach pricing equilibrium. We need not think of prices in this context
as simply financial; an approach to the ‘law of one price’ in cooperative
institutions could look at the efficiency of exchange between consumers
and producers of content as having cost / benefit prices that have to do
with equality, access, reliability, etc.. In this sense, one could ask how
new technologies, new opportunities for cooperation, or even the intro-
duction of new rules impact information exchange. A law of one price
for informational goods will require a reliable set of measurements, but
in the same way that fisheries can have diverse indicators of health
based on landings and market prices, so too might we find measures
like downloads, bug fixes, ports, forks, etc. in informational commons.
• Spillover Effects of Information Infrastructures: One of the key
insights from Carol Rose’s work is that infrastructures create positive
spillover effects (externalities) which are difficult to quantify in tradi-
tional economic analysis of public goods (1986). Informational infras-
tructures, including those that underpin much of peer production work,
similarly suffer from difficult to quantify value. Future work based on
this dissertation could look at instruments used to quantify intangible
goods, such as environmental resources, as a way to understand the
economic value of an informational resource like ICOADS, or an in-
formational infrastructure like the DataGrid. A similar approach has
been taken with Wikipedia where Band and Gerafi looked at market
value, replacement costs, and consumer value using proprietary ency-
clopedias as a baseline for financial comparison (2013). Similar work
has also been done by USGS scientists looking at the economic value
of satellite data (Raunikar, Forney & Benjamin, 2013).
• Latency Analysis: Copyright law sets a clear, although contentious,
limit on the monoploy that individuals are granted in creating new
products. What is far more complicated to understand is what the
most efficient latency might be for any given informational good not
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necessarily bound by copyright protection; research data from different
scientific domains, software produced by publicly funded institutions,
computational innovations produced by private industry may all re-
quire different periods of embargo for sustainable innovation that pro-
tects creators. Relevant work in this area can be found from Contreras
(2010) who has previously looked at how common pool resources, such
as genomic data, might be analyzed to better understand the ways that
latency in data release effects propensity for data sharing. A future di-
rection might be to look at the impact of latency in access to public
goods and latency in private and public sector cooperation. My future
work in this area might include a latency framework or latency ana-
lytic technique that could be used to develop repository policy around
embargo periods.
• Shirking Variables: Discount rates, that is how individuals calculate
trade-offs of current actions based on the likelihood of future interac-
tions, have been critical to success of socioecological systems and my
work indicates that this holds true in sociotechnical systems as well.
But what happens when we look at the these variables in fields that
advance rapidly, or perhaps even domains of illegal activity? For in-
stance, the Pirate Bay1 or other torrent sites trade illegally pirated
informational goods (e.g. movies, music, books, etc.) and yet the illicit
nature of the goods has little impact on the massive cooperation that
is achieved to keep these systems functioning (Beyer, 2014). So, why
don’t people shirk when faced with uncertainty of illegal pirates? That
is to say, organized crime holds interesting lessons to be learned about
future discount rates of individual actors. A future direction for my
work is to take variables related to sharing within scientific institutions
for collective action and compare them to other - illicit or not - col-
lective action institutions. Some preliminary questions might include:
What is it about the design of peer-to-peer platforms that encourages
people to freely share music that they have purchased? And why don’t
they feel the same way about personal data? Under what contexts do
they feel compelled to share personal information based on the prospect
of future interaction (with other individuals or organizations)?
1www.thepiratebay.se
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• Peer Provisioning: The division of labor in peered institutions, such
as those described in this dissertation, is no longer aimed exclusively at
producing new goods but also in maintaining existing resource systems
over long periods of time. This longevity brings with it a concern for
what it means to produce, innovate, and sustain shared informational
resources - which are often described in terms of their rapid develop-
ment, and fragility instead of their longevity. A related concept may be
the peering of resource provisioning. The sustainability of long-term
cooperative relationships brings with it a number of interesting and
important questions that might be answered through concepts related
to peering, and peer-to-peer designs.
• Close reading techniques for citation data: The ability to read the
context of citations made to ICOADS was critical to understanding how
users valued this resource. A future direction of the informetric work
from this dissertation is to extend close reading techniques to other
contexts of knowledge production, and other resource types. That is,
to extend traditional “close reading” techniques from the humanities
to that of citation data, looking not just for motivation, but similar to
Small’s work on citation context (1982), to more thoughtfully engage
with how arguments are built from citations. Typing these citations
with exiting ontologies (e.g. Shotton, 2010) is another direction that
could lead to important understanding of how, for instance, Latour’s
work on claim making in the late 1980’s (1987) extends to contemporary
“hyper authorship” publishing practices.
• Anti-commons, semi-commons, comedy of the commons: Much
of this dissertation’s literature review (Chapter 2) focused on the rel-
evance of commons theory to sociotechnical systems - and did so by
drawing on socioecological commons. A number of other concepts,
equally compelling, from the commons literature could be explored
and expanded to fit the ICT domain. A typology of commons, the
differences between them, and the major findings relevant to ICTs is a
potential contribution of this work.
• Environmental and Sociotechical Sustainability: Finally, much
of this work has focused on differences between sociotechnical and so-
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cioecological systems, but the work of Dourish (2010), Blevis (2007),
and Tomlinson et al. (2013) demonstrates that the two systems are in-
creasingly interrelated. My work here demonstrates that commons as
well as systems theory can aim to generalize to both sociotechnical and
socioecological settings. Future work from this dissertation will focus
on how variables related to sharing might be tied to broader socioeco-
nomic indicators of health - such as the impact of municipal open data
on population’s vulnerable to climate change.
The work presented here also suggests that beyond science commons,
the sustainability of sociotechnical systems should be treated as a col-
lective action dilemma. The groundwork for this approach in design
based fields was laid by Paul Dourish (2010) in HCI where he argues
that design interventions for environmental sustainability are often fo-
cused on individual choice, which has (intentionally or not) “trans-
formed the problems of sustainability into the cost benefit trade-offs of
rational actor economics” (2010, p. 2). Abstracting from the environ-
mental domain to the sociotechnical requires a number of modifications
to work in HCI that focuses on ICTs for (environmental) sustainabil-
ity, but I have argued throughout this dissertation that developing
new commons theory to explain institutional successes and failures, in-
cluding case studies using the Knowledge Commons Framework, is an
important first step.
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APPENDIX A VARIABLE DEFINITIONS &
APPLICATION TO ICOADS CASE STUDY
In this appendix observations used for the coding of state variables described
in Chapter 5 are justified. Formal definitions are offered before an explana-
tion of how the variable was coded for the ICOADS case study.2 This analysis
draws on interview data from “interactionist” studies described in Chapter 3.
Where this is the case, I distinguish between participants with the following
convention - ICOADS Steering Committee (ISC) and a randomly assigned
number (e.g. [ISC-06] unique to each particiaptn in this study. Participants
are not identifiable through this coding or the selection of interviews used in
this chapter.
Variable Name Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3
Begin date 1981 2001 2011
End Date 2000 2010 Present
Description In Text In Text In Text
Multiple levels Single-Level Governance International Governance International Governance
Institutional diversity Low Medium Medium
Centralization 4 (Highly Centralized) 3 (Somewhat Centralized) 2 (Somewhat Decentralized)
Governance scale State-based International International
Scale match No-Match Match Match
Selective Pressures Competition, Resource Availability Competition, Technological Innovation Obselescence, Resource Availability
Articulation Medium Low Low
Capital High High High
Coordination Low High High
Governance trigger Slow Continuous Change Slow Continuous Change Sudden Disturbance
Diagnostic Capacity Neither Treating proximate causes (symptoms) Treating underlying drivers
Autonomy High- complete autonomy Moderate- some autonomy Moderate - some autonomy
Metric diversity Low- no metrics for success Medium- some metrics for success Medium- some metrics for success
Rules-In-Use Position, Authority Information, Payoff Boundary, Aggregation, Scope
Policy instrument Incentive Based Insturments Incentive Based Instruments Input and Output Based Standards
Table 9. Coded State Variables from the each regime of the ICAODS case
study.
2The properties that correspond with each state variable can be found at
http://git.io/vJnPX.
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Discussion of Coded State Variables
Institutional diversity
Definition: “Ostrom (2005) has argued that institutional diversity is impor-
tant for the same reason that biological diversity is important: that different
institutional arrangements are frequently a response to local conditions and
thus a diversity of arrangements are needed in order to adapt to a diversity
of conditions” (Cox, 2014). This is particularly true of conditions in a so-
ciotechnical system which couple diverse technologies and people. A diversity
of arrangements used to sustain a sociotechnical system can also be seen as
a way to avoid path dependence
From Regime 1 to 3 ICOADS went from having low institutional diver-
sity to a medium. Low institutional diversity implies that that a homogenous
set of institutional arrangements were applied to a diverse set of resources.
Originally, COADS was governed by just two institutions (both federally
supported research laboratories). Over time, this resulted in social conflict
which led to the introduction of new institutional arrangements - includ-
ing ICOADS, JCoMM, and the ICOADS Steering Committee - all of which
can be seen as evidence of the project becoming more heterogeneous in its
governing structure.
Centralization
Definition: A centralized governance system has few actors/actor groups that
hold a disproportionate amount of authority of over actors or parts of a com-
mons. More decentralized governance systems have flatter hierarchies.
ICOADS governance became less centralized over time - Regime 1 was
“highly centralized”, and Regime 2 and 3 became a “somewhat decentral-
ized” as it continued to decentralize its power and decision making authority.
This is in line with institutional arrangements becoming more diverse, as de-
scribed above, and the scale of the governance model shifting from state to
international, as discussed next.
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Governance Scale
Definition: This variable defines the scale at which a governance system op-
erates, including:
• International regime: more than one country is involved;
• State-based (national) policy: at the level of one country;
• Sub-national policy: within a country (e.g., states, provinces, regions);
• Local: a finer scale than subnational (e.g., community-level, several
laboratories, etc.)
The governance scale variable is meant to code what jurisdiction the
governance system has authority over. For instance, can the governance
model apply rules, sanctions, bans, or assign tasks at state, national, or
international levels? ICOADS moved from a state-based national scale to an
international scale; first with granting partners voting rights in the renaming
of the project (in 2001), and then further formalizing the internationalization
of the project with the signing of a letter of intent to cooperate (in 2013).
The scale of a governance can be coded, within different states of a system,
as having a binary “match” or “no-match.” In ICOADS first regime, a set
of internationally archived records are used to produce resources that are
provisioned with a state-based governance model. This sets up a tension
where the broader ICOADS community felt there was not a match between
the source of the inputs (international weather records) and the governance
of the outputs (a state-based model). Regime 1 therefore does not provide a
match between stakeholders and governance. In Regime 2 and 3, governance
expands through the formation of JCoMM and this results in an international
governance structure that now matches the scale of the resources and their
users, producers, and provisioners.
Selective Pressures
Definition: Selective pressures are understood to cause governance adapta-
tion. As Smith, Stirling, and Berkhout write, “Without at least some form
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of internal or external pressure...it is unlikely that substantive change to the
developmental trajectory of a regime will result” (2005).
The types of pressures exerted on ICOADS governance relate to its shift-
ing between regimes. These variables are meant to define and provide context
for those pressures, but these categorizations should not be read as directly
causing a regime shift. They are one of many stresses, disturbances, and
motivations for a regime shit.
For example, the first shift between regime 1 and 2 is a result of “compe-
tition” and “resource availability” pressures. Competition for users, and for
satisfying the need for a comprehensive marine dataset influenced ICOADS
leadership to formally recognize the contribution of its international part-
ners, as well as merge with its chief competitor, the Marine Data Bank. By
expanding the scope of legitimate stakeholders for producing and provision-
ing the commons, ICOADS governance also necessarily had to become less
“Centralized”, increase its “Institutional Diversity”, and adjust its “Gover-
nance Scale”. These three variables (Centralization, Institutional Diversity,
and Governance Scale) correlate strongly with “Selective Pressures” when a
regime shift occurs.
Selective pressures also have three sub-variables which are meant to fur-
ther categorize responses from the commons governance.
Sub-variables of Selective Pressures: Articulation, Capital, and
Coordination
• Articulation explains the extent to which a governance model is capable
of recognizing, describing, or defining selective pressures.
• Capital, both social and technical, explains the extent to which a gover-
nance model can access and extract resources from a network of stake-
holders.
• Coordination explains the extent to which a governance model is able
to organize a response to selective pressures (Cox, 2014)
In Regime 1, ICOADS stakeholders had a partial (medium) ability to
articulate problems that were introduced by “competition” and “resource
availability”. This regime also had high social and technical capital , as
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was evidenced by the allotment of supercomputing time to develop COADS
1, and the ability to coordinate trading of archived marine data amongst
international partners. The coordination of these partners, beyond simply
contributing data, was somewhat low - as evidenced by early literature that
described the project as a “national” effort (e.g. Slutz et al., 1983).
In Regime 2, selective pressures include “technological change”, seen
through innovations in the assembly of reanalysis data products, and “com-
petition for resources”, which were due to the proliferation of high quality
subsets of ICOADS. Articulation of these problems remained low; the num-
ber of sub-sets were so numerous and so diffuse that they could no longer
be included in ICOADS documentation. Both social and technical capital,
as well as coordination within the second regime were high as ICOADS was
able to coordinate development for integration with reanalysis projects, and
position the resources to be used in major international climate assessment
reports.
In Regime 3, the most current regime, ICOADS suffered initially from
the selective pressure“resource availability,” but seems to have responded to
some of these problems by coordinating international partners for support.
However, ICOADS continues to face selective pressure to innovate, which it
has not been able to respond to, and thus risks being branded “obsolete” in
relation to already existing high quality subsets and reanalysis products.
In the overall state of regime 3, articulation was low. This is evidenced
by the fact that the ESRL defunding seemed to take even most senior NOAA
project partners by surprise. But, this also demonstrated that levels of social
capital were high in the third regime, as NOAA consequently acknowledged
that restoration of partial funding for ICOADS was due to an outpouring
of support from the international community. Technical capital was low, as
the interruption of work on IMMA software greatly delayed progress on an
anticipated and improved ICOADS third release.3 Coordination was high in
Regime 3, as demonstrated by the ability of ICOADS to respond with letter
of intent to cooperate, and the formal assignment of tasks to project partners
that agreed to work towards a third release.
Selective pressures, along with governance triggers and diagnostics are all
3This is an admitted flaw to the way that the “Capital” variable is currently coded:
When social and technical capital do not align the results are a compromised “medium”
coding, when in fact it should be “high” and “low.”
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highly related variables and should have a consistent relationship, which I
describe in the next two sections.
Governance Triggers
Definition: This variable is meant to provide information about the accumu-
lation of selective pressures. “Governance triggers are characterized by the
notion of disturbance from socioecological systems management. A distur-
bance is some event, or set of selective pressures which cause a change in
state variables.” (Cox 2014) Governance triggers can be either “sudden dis-
turbances”, such as a defunding event from NOAA that shifts state variables;
or, a governance trigger can consist of “slow continuous change”, such as the
obsolescence of a technology over time as ICOADS is currently experiencing
in its third regime.
Regime 1 and 2 of ICOADS can be characterized as having slow contin-
uous changes. Disturbances during these periods are related to organizing,
creating rules, and fostering cooperation amongst diverse partners. Even
during periods of scientific controversy, such as the discovery of anomalies
in sea-surface temperature measurements in a historical period of the 1940-
1960s (Rayner et al., 2005), there was a relatively stable ICOADS response
and a cooperative effort to improve these errors (Woodruff et al., 2011).
Regime 3, which is marked by an unanticipated defunding event, is the
first time that sudden disturbance causes a shift in state variables. The
ability to diagnose this problem, and coordinate responses to this event can
be seen as important characteristics of a sustainable knowledge commons.
Diagnostics
Definition: Characterization of the scale at which a regime responds to a
selective pressure, or disturbance. A diagnostic capacity can be to treat un-
derlying drivers of a distrubance, treat the symptoms of a driver, or neither
(Cox, 2014).
The diagnostic variable attempts to categorize the response of a regime
to selective pressures. This variable is related to governance scale and scale
match, as well as the selective pressures sub-variables:
170
• A governance with a strong scale match and ability to articulate, draw
on capital, and coordiante responses will be able to successfully tran-
sition between regimes.
• Without a scale match, or effective articulation of selective pressures,
the governance regime will lack the ability to make a diagnosis of why
a selective pressure is occurring. Subsequently, the governance regime
may respond to only the symptoms of the problem, and not address
issues related to the underlying causes of that problem.
Regime 1’s governance had no scale match, a medium level of articulation,
and low coordination to respond to selective pressures. The governance model
failed to respond to issues of competition and resource availability; and, it
neither treated underlying causes of the selective pressures, nor its symptoms
until a regime shift was required to do so. The ability to shift governance
models smoothly, was partially a result of the high social and technical capital
that
Regime 2 had a match between governance and resource sets, but a low
ability to articulate the underlying causes of its selective pressures. Failing to
recognize underlying problems related to measurement and evaluation of the
project resulted in a sudden disturbance event that nearly ended the project.
In treating the symptoms related to selective pressures like technological
change and competition for resources, Regime 2 was able to coordinate a new
method of scheduling releases, a new method of coordinating work (CLIMAR
and MARCDAT), and begin development of a new database model through
IVAD.
Regime 3 of ICOADS finally begins to treat underlying drivers of its
disturbances, and social dilemmas - notably by formalizing commitments
from international partners, and beginning to diversify the metrics that it
optimizes its work for (e.g. Weber et al., 2013).
Metric Diversity
Definition: The range of evaluative criteria that a project optimizes for, or
is judged upon.
All three regimes suffer from evaluation problems that stem, at least in
part, from a lack of metrics that can clearly communicate ICOADS’ impact
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to organizations that bear the costs of provisioning a shared set of resources.
In discussing the first and second regime, metrics were rarely mentioned by
my participants, nor in the literature of ICOADS. More broadly, there was
no recognition throughout regimes one and two that an underlying problem
in sustaining ICOADS was a lack of formative evaluation. Metric diversity,
in this case, is strongly tied to diagnostics; an indicator of healthy or ro-
bust knowledge commons may indeed be a diversity of metrics for evaluating
success, attainment of goals, or more broadly conveying the importance of
resources to a broad set of stakeholders.
Policy Instruments
Definition: A taxonomy of the basic types of policies and institutions that a
governance system uses in order to effect actor behavior and achieve com-
mons outcomes. These include: outcome, input, and usage-based standards;
incentive-based instruments; and, information and insurance provisions.
Policy instruments can be broadly categorized as either regulatory or
incentive based. Regulatory policy instruments are aimed at effecting be-
havior of commons stakeholders through coercion or punishment. Incentive-
based policy instruments are meant to elicit desired behavior through re-
ward. In ICOADS, incentive-based instruments were used throughout all
three regimes. Regime 1 and 2 relied exclusively on incentive-based policy
instruments, as these regimes had little authority in the way of sanctions or
enforcement of rules to establish any kind of regulatory policy about what
kind of actions were, or were not accepted. By formalizing partner respon-
sibilities in regime 3, including those related to the production of a third
release, ICOADS governance has adopted some minor “input and output
standards”. In general, the lack of diverse tool uses has been problematic for
ICOADS governance, which has not.
Rules-in-Use
To reiterate from previous chapters, rules here are understood to “specify
the values of the working components of an action situation; each rule has
emerged as the outcome of interactions in an adjacent action situation at a
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different level of analysis or arena of choice” (Ostrom et al., 1994, p. 4142).
Rule types inlcud: Position, Boundary, Authority, Scope, Aggregation, In-
formation and Payoff. In the following section, I describe the rules-in-use for
each of the three ICOADS governance regimes.
Position Boundary Authority Scope Aggregation Information Payoffs
Regime 1
Regime 2
Regime 3
Table 10. Accumulation of rules across three regimes of ICOADS (1983-
2015)
Regime 1
Rules in Regime 1 can generally be classified as fitting two types:
• Position Rules specify a set of positions that actors can play. Each
position has a unique combination of resources, opportunities, prefer-
ences, and responsibilities.
• Authority Rules specify which set of actions is assigned to which
position (McGinnis, 2011).
In COADS initial governance - which was ad-hoc, and loosely coordi-
nated - position rules are established by data provisioners whom assigned
responsibilities to one another, and to end-users. Users were free to ob-
tain data, and encouraged to report errors and participate in improving the
archive (Woodruff et al., 1987). Data producers who contributed statistical
techniques, algorithms, software, or data processing were assigned rights and
responsibilities to stewardship of these resources, including any version of the
release one that they obtained archived as part of this work.
In an interview about this early process, one participant characterized the
early coordination in the following way: “...the problem is that, ICOADS has
a single point of failure. I mean (PI) was ICOADS - he was the identity. And
while we didn’t have a communication problem through language or respon-
siveness, we bumped up against competing interests - it was a much bigger
project and scope than even (PI) realized when we first started putting data
out...before the CLIMAR meetings started.” [ISC- 06] This demonstrates
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the centralization of power during this regime, and as such, requires each
new regime to revisit authority rules.
Regime 2
The second regime introduces three new rule types to ICOADS governance.
• Information rules specify channels of communication among actors
and what information should, must, or must not be shared.
• Payoff Rules specify how benefits and costs are required, permitted,
or forbidden to stakeholders.
• Scope Rules specify a set of outcomes, such as what should be pro-
duced, what levels of maintenance a resource set requires. Scope rules
are closely related to payoff and information rules. (McGinnis, 2011).
Information rules developed during this regime are seen in the specifica-
tions of formatting data for exchange, and recommendations from the second
CLIMAR meeting in 2004 which reads, “There were seen to be shortcom-
ings in the access to ICOADS data. There are many, overlapping sources
of data and products, and the problem of optimising data provision is com-
plex. Many users are working with outdated versions of COADS. Often data
are available, but it is difficult for the uninitiated to discover what is there.
There should be a Web-based route map to the best available data which
should be widely advertised to all the various user communities” (Parker et
al., 2004). The “route map” took the form of website developed to host spec-
ification documents, and link to relevant existing WMO standards (Woodruff
et al., 2006). The process of creating this resource moved to formalize what
information should be available, when, and for whom.4
Payoff rules are established in granting international partners formal
recognition through a name change. Recall that when asked about the pro-
cess, one of my participants replied “...that debate really focused attention
4The development of a rule type doesn’t imply that a social dilemma has been solved.
In this case, blending of different data products and an overall growth of the archive leads
to unmanageable complexity for end users. Introducing informational rules is a way to
treat symptoms of a larger problem in managing a sustainable growth of the project, but
rules aren’t themselves symptoms of a solution.
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on the fact that COADS should be looked at as an International dataset,
because you know a lot of other countries were putting money and data into
it.” [ISC-01] The settlement of the name change debate brought with it a
larger set of responsibilities for international project partners, and their en-
gagement in provisioning and producing new interim products throughout
the regime.
Scope rules are another artifact of the CLIMAR and MARDAT meetings,
where strategic directions are set, and future goals are established. Estab-
lishing scope rules also represents a significant shift in the governance model,
as it becomes increasingly less centralized.
Regime 3
Two new types of rules are added, and one rule type is further developed in
this regime:
• Aggregation rules (such as majority or unanimity rules) specify how
the decisions of actors at a node are to be mapped to intermediate or
final outcomes.
• Boundary rules specify how participants leave or enter positions of
authority (McGinnis, 2011).
Aggregation and boundary rules are established by mechanisms intro-
duced by the letter of intent to cooperate. When asked about how these
rules are put into practice, a participant described this situation as follows,
“The governance is still in flux- the committee are new, the terms of refer-
ences are still new, and we still have to formalize a bit more how members
serve, how long do they come and go, etc.” [ISC 04]
In March of 2015 when a discussion about the appoint a permanent chair
for the steering committee was raised, the interim chair reminded the steering
committee that he was retiring. and expressed no desire to remain in the
role during retirement. Tellingly, no one understood nor knew the procedure
to make a nomination for a new chair, or whether on-going questions about
future support of ICOADS at NOAA should impact this choice.5
5As it stands, no decision has been made, and existing by-laws offer little guidance on
how to proceed.
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Additionally, the Authority rules of previous regimes are both formalized
and enacted in new ways in the third regime. This includes formally divid-
ing responsibility for the future provisioning of ICOADS resources, and the
creation of a set of core institutions - beyond the original USA partners of
NOAA, NCAR, and CIRES - that formally acknowledge their intention to
sustain ICOADS over a five year period (beginning, December 2013).
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APPENDIX B GLOSSARY
This appendix includes a glossary of concepts used throughout the disserta-
tion. Where appropriate these terms are defined in the body of the disserta-
tion.
Commons
The commons is a generic term that can refer to a resource management
approach, as well as the shared resource system being managed. In the
broadest sense, the commons are marked by “privileges and immunities for
an undefined public, rather than rights and powers for a defined person or
persons...The main function of commons is to institutionalize freedom to
operate, free of the particular risk that any other can deny us use of that re-
source set, subject to symmetric known constraints and the risk of congestion
applicable to that resource set, under those rules, within the expected popu-
lation of users” (Benkler, 2014). The two classes of commons can include, on
the one hand pastures, forests, and irrigation districts of the natural world,
and on the other, high-performance computing, software libraries, and data
archives of the digital realm. This dissertation deals exclusively with the
latter type of commons.
Communal Property Rights
Across the many different contexts that she studied, Ostrom’s work estab-
lishes five different kinds of communal property rights:
1. Access the right to enter a defined physical area and enjoy non-
subtractive benefits (e.g. hiking, skiing);
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2. Extraction the right to take products of a resource system (e.g. to
fish, divert water);
3. Management the right to regulate use patterns and make improvements
on the resource;
4. Exclusion the right to determine who will have access and withdrawal
rights;
5. Alienation the right to sell or transfer management and exclusion
rights. Varying combinations of these rights are associated with sta-
tuses. Owners have all of these rights; authorized users can only access
a property and withdraw resources.
Design Principles for the Commons
Three decades worth of work on the success and failures of commons gover-
nance was synthesized by Elinor Ostrom in her 1990 book titled “Governing
the Commons” These findings were summarized as high-level design princi-
ples:
• Clearly defined boundaries should be in place.
• Rules in use are well matched to local needs and conditions.
• Individuals affected by these rules can usually participate in modifying
the rules.
• The right of community members to devise their own rules is respected
by external authorities.
• A system for self-monitoring members’ behavior has been established.
• A graduated system of sanctions is available.
• Community members have access to low-cost conflict-resolution mech-
anisms.
• Nested enterprises that is, appropriation, provision, monitoring and
sanctioning, conflict resolution, and other governance activities are or-
ganized in a nested structure with multiple layers of activities. (Ostrom
1990, 90102)
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Excludability
The excludability of a resource is one of two dimensions used to classify a re-
source. Excludability helps to explain whether it is economically efficient, or
practically possible to create barriers around the consumption of a resource.
Goods having low degrees of excludability means that it is economically in-
efficient, or practically impossible to exclude users from accessing a good.
Governance
A helpful definition of governance is that it includes, “a complex of public
and/or private coordinating, steering and regulatory processes established
and conducted for social (or collective) purposes where powers are distributed
among multiple agents, according to formal and informal rules” (Burns and
Sthr 2011: 234). As stated below, a sociotechnical perspective recognizes
that collective action is needed to sustain the social relations, orderings,
and enforcement of cultural norms, as well as the technical components that
allow a commons to effectively function over time. A governance model, a
term also used throughout the dissertation, implies the sets of “institutional
arrangements (such as rules, policies, and governance activities) that are used
by one or more actor groups to interact with and govern” shared resources
(Cox, 2014).
Governance models typically differ in their centralization (or decentral-
ization) of decision making power - such as self-governing or monocentric
governance. This dissertation explores polycentric governance models that
nest authority at multiple levels, types, sectors, or jurisdictions. A prelimi-
nary definition of polycentric is it provides for a “structural feature of social
systems of many decision centers having limited and autonomous preroga-
tives and operating under an overarching set of rules.” (Aligica and Tarko,
2011). The overlap of these different levels create collective action dilemmas,
which require multiple rule types to function efficiently. Polycentric models,
as I discuss in the following chapter, are increasingly effective for helping
sociotechnical systems cope with social dilemmas related to sustainability.
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Infrastructure
Infrastructure, like sustainability, is an inherently relational concept. In sci-
ence and technology studies infrastructures are usually defined in relation
to organized practices of communities, disciplines, or fields of study (Star &
Ruhleder, 199). The term of art for scientific infrastructures has recently
become cyberinfrastructure (Atkins, 2000), which I take to mean “...the set
of organizational practices, technical infrastructure and social norms that
collectively provide for the smooth operation of scientific work at a distance.
All three sets are objects of design and engineering; a cyberinfrastructure
will fail if any one is ignored”(Jackson et al., 2007, p. 6).
Polycentric
A form of governance that nests authority and decision making at different
institutional scales (i.e. local, regional, national, etc). Polycentricity is de-
fined by Aligica and Tarko as “structural feature of social systems of many
decision centers having limited and autonomous prerogatives and operating
under an overarching set of rules.” (2011). The idea of a polycentric order
was first offered by Michael Polanyi in the “The Logic of Liberty” (1951) and
later used by Vincent Ostrom in the 1970’s during debates about the effi-
ciency of administrative structures in American municipalities (Aligica and
Boettke, 2009).
Resilience
The notion of resilience in socioecological systems is partially evolutionary,
and partially ecological. Holling formulated this idea in the early 1970’s,
defining resilience as a “measure of the persistence of systems and of their
ability to absorb change and disturbance and still maintain the same relation-
ships between populations or state variables.” (Holling, 1974) In Chapter 5
I focus on transitions of ICOADS between different governance regimes; the
ability of a commons to routinely make these governance transitions is de-
scribed through a series of resiliency processes.
The NSF’s Critical Resilient Interdependent Infrastructure Systems and
Processes (CRISP) program offers a helpful definition of a resilient process
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for infrastructures; these are “the features of an infrastructures inherent ca-
pacity to resist disturbances, initial loss of service quality, and trajectory of
service restoration. Conceived as a process, infrastructure resiliency can be
achieved by a myriad strategies in addition to simple repair and replacement”
(2013). The “myriad strategies” of ICOADS resiliency are a subject explored
throughout this project.
Rivalry
Sometimes referred to as “subtractability” - rivalry is one of two dimensions
used to classify a resource. Rivalry refers to whether or not a resource has
a finite or limited supply. The competition for ownership / consumption of
the resource is it’s rivalry.
Rules-in-Form
Often written or codefied in a formal document, rules-in-form are the types
of rules that govern actions within an institution. Examples include charters,
missions, constitutions, and creeds. These are opposed to rules-in-use.
Rules-in-Use
Informal rules that dictate what is or is not acceptable within an institution.
Often times rules-in-use are not spoken, and in some cases may not even be
fully understood by actors within a system. Examples of rules-in-use include
norm-based rule systems, codes-of-ethics, and tacit knowledge.
Rule Types
• “Boundary rules specify how actors are to be chosen to enter or leave
a situation
• Position rules specify a set of positions (council members, president,
etc.) and how many actors hold each one
• Information rules specify channels of communication among actors and
what information must, may, or must not be shared.
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• Authority rules specify which actions are assigned to a position at a
node
• Aggregation rules (such as majority or unanimity rules) specify how
the decisions of actors at a node are to be mapped to intermediate or
final outcomes
• Scope rules specify the outcomes that could be affected
• Payoff rules specify how benefits and costs are to be distributed to
actors in positions.” (McGinnis, 2011)
Sociotechnical Systems
This project conceives of a sociotechnical system as the mutual constitu-
tion of people and technologies in social, political and economic settings that
require collective action in order to effectively function over time (Sawyer
and Jarrahi, 2013). The contextual and embedded nature of sociotechni-
cal systems makes governance, institutional arrangements, and symmetric
information exchange paramount to their success.
Sustainability
Sustainability can be a relative term. In the context of this project, a sustain-
able knowledge commons is a sociotechnical system that over the long run,
enhances both the quality and the resource base on which science depends,
provides for the continued support of resources (such as data, or software, or
instrumentation), is economically viable, and enhances the quality of science
being conducted. In this sense, a sustainable knowledge commons doesn’t
just persist over time, but evolves given different external and internal pres-
sures. This idea is a central theme of Chapter 5.
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